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

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SEPTEMBER 1978
VOL. LI NO. 3

Encounter

Edited by MELVIN J. LASKY *and* ANTONY THWAITE
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Per copy: UK 80p: USA & Canada $2.00. Back numbers £1.00 ($2.50). Postage extra: 15p (25c)
Annual Subscriptions: UK & Europe £8.75: USA & Canada $21.00 surface, $26.00 by air: Elsewhere £10.00.
Binder for six copies: £2.00 ($4.00).
Address for all departments: Encounter Ltd., 59 St Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS (01-836 4194).
US news-stand distribution by Gordon & Gotch (USA) Inc., P.O. Box 1425, Long Island City, N.Y. 11101.
Authorised as Second-class mail, Post Office Department, Ottawa, and for payment of postage in cash.
Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. *©1978 by Encounter Ltd.*
Manuscripts are returned only if accompanied by s.a.e. (English stamp or International Reply Coupons).

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

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Renzo Rosso

The Gallows

Venerable and Most Esteemed Theodosius, I have received your letter containing the main points of the Agrarian Law which you made haste to promulgate as the first action of your Ministry. These have made a tremendous impression on me—I consider them perfect, and able (though not perhaps by themselves alone) to raise the Empire to new heights.

As for your asking me to give you advice and make suggestions, in any way possible, at a time that is so crucial for your career and our common destiny, this honours me and flatters me, but does not prevent me from having one grave doubt: what possible effect could the thoughts of a scholar, far from the Court and the practical realities of politics (as I am) have on a man such as you have been for so long—of notable talent and established experience, nominated this very day as Prefect of the Praetorians and responsible therefore for the governing of the State?

It's true of course that the historian's role seems at first glance made to measure for the understanding of even that part of History which is the Future—soon to become the Present. And, certainly, his aim (already fixed even if far from clear) gives to his viewpoint the vision of old people, who only see well the things that are far off. If, therefore, my suggestions are not going to be unjust and presumptuous, they will have to be limited to the discipline I have made my own—the study of the Past; drawing from this, if possible, those analogies with the present which make advantageous any reflections about similar causes, about similar aims, and perhaps similar outcomes.

Now it seems to me that the situation today, full of threat and sinister possibilities, with an Emperor who is not yet an adult only recently elected, presents an extraordinary resemblance to the beginning of the reign of Mauritius, who found himself faced with the daunting inheritance of Justinian, of his nephew, and of Tiberius Constantinus. Just as in our own terrifying and unhappy period, civil life then was oppressed by every kind of violence. The two parties, the Blues and the Greens (the authority of the monarchy already buried with the body of Justinian) were dedicated to activities and feuds of the most ferocious kind. The City Guards, far from restraining them, stimulated them even more, either by the divisions within their own organisation and the consequent lack of clear orders, or because in the street-fighting (finding themselves often caught between two sets of extremists) they reacted with a brutality that was without motive and ineffective—showing only the weakness which tore them apart.

The Law received terrible blows from the magistracy itself, which, strait-jacketed in a hierarchy in inverse proportion to merit, independence, and courage, carried out its tasks with complete arbitrariness—trials taking place far from the scene of the crime, witnesses suborned or threatened, prosecutions clearly inspired by the Court and Senatorial circles, scandalous findings of guilty and not guilty.

The Church, next, instead of halting this great decline, seemed to accelerate it. Under the convenient screen of theological disputes, it took care to extend its benefits and privileges (of which it already had its fair share). to double the funds of the monasteries and in short, to make as much money from the Faith as it possibly could. Faction after faction busied itself with the Palace intrigues,

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influencing (with all the weight of the prestige and superstition it could bring to bear) the Senators who were loyal to the Church—who were accustomed for a long time now to hide beneath charity and obedience every impulse of greed, and who were the worst ruling caste that the Christian faith had ever produced.

As for the organisations controlling Finance, there was nowhere such chaos and corruption as in the offices of Customs and Taxes. Immense fortunes built up by speculation or take-over were protected from tax of any kind. Towards any honest worker, on the other hand, the fiscal authorities acted with such ferocity as to be considered a scourge worse than the barbarians or the armies of the King of Kings.

Great tracts of the interior were from time to time depopulated; hordes of poor country people, fleeing from the South and the East to Constantinople, sold first of all their remaining farming implements, then their wives and daughters and finally themselves—to the various political parties—convinced by the very example of the Court and the Senate that it would be better to give up their honour and dignity to usurious pimps and party leaders rather than their lives to the Goddess of Hunger.

Even the businessmen found themselves badly off through the breakdown of commerce —disrupted by the country's enemies or hindered and damaged by their faithless and powerful allies. To such an extent that one could say there were no ex-soldiers, peasants, shopkeepers, artisans or employees who had not entrusted their passive survival to Public Assistance, so that it was in the hands of the criminal and crazy Treasury—though, at the death of Tiberius Constantinus, the Treasury's coffers were empty.

I CONFESS TO YOU that I don't know what the true basis of the fame and the greatness of Justinian was. I know only that during his reign and the two succeeding ones the highest offices of the State were handed over to the worst race of hypocrites and opportunists that one could imagine—a prolific race if, after more than two centuries, it can reappear unaltered! If, in these last thirty years, it has been able to reproduce its misgovernment with impunity, leading our Empire to the brink of catastrophe!

Well, then, as you know, Mauritius in less than one year reversed this terrible situation. The wars in Mesopotamia will be well known to you, and the treaties with the young Cosroes, equally with the re-conquest and the hard lesson taught to the Avari on the Danube. Perhaps less well known to you will be the strong measures in favour of agriculture and commerce, and the outstanding encouragement given to the silk industry and shipbuilding. Evidently he knew how to choose civilian officials and generals who were worth something; he knew how to promulgate decrees, concerning money, of indisputable wisdom and foresight. But all this is still not enough to explain the speed of his success—because to obtain it he had to change the hearts and souls of his subjects, to bring into being responsibility and willpower where previously idleness, cynicism and despair had flourished.

What then did he find, of such a sudden and peremptory sort, to change the nature of millions of men? Hundreds of trials—nothing more. But in these he hauled into the dock the chief officials of the Court, eminent contractors, the tax-collectors of entire Provinces, senior officers and the very highest magistrates—those, in short, who had committed the most serious and notable crimes, and speculating with public money, destroying the discipline and justice of the State, had ruined the harmony of its values, and offended the people with their arrogant licentiousness.

These were public trials of thunderous impact. The Procurator General of Chancery, three Supreme Court Judges, one Vice-Prefect of the Praetorians, four Chamberlains, ten Senators and some Officers were hanged on the towers of the city walls. The others were given prison for life. In this way the lower orders saw the admirable network of duty and personal safeguards re-woven; and Mauritius could demand (and obtain) from everybody the necessary sacrifices. You too, Theodosius, will have very shortly to ask for great sacrifices. Your Agrarian Law aims at repopulating the deserted countryside, and to do this you will have to force the majority of our people to consent to the movement of great numbers of men. Reflect

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then, if you think it is applicable, on this remote lesson from History. In order that the State can count on the energy and cooperation of the body, its head must be clean, washed free of filth and parasites. Reflect too on the greater and more easily exploited opportunities that you have, compared to Mauritius. He became Emperor when Tiberius Constantinus was dead. In our case the preceding sovereign, recently deposed, still enjoys the light of day.

In all honesty, interpreting the scanty records, I wouldn't like to say whether the few years' reign of Tiberius was glorious, infamous or mediocre—nor, if he had lived, what fate Mauritius would have allotted to him. But I know, alas, only too well (as you know and as everybody knows) to what a low level this our present ruler has brought the majesty of his office, what lack of confidence and what harmful opinions he has fostered by his disgraceful behaviour—greed for money, nepotism, friendship and protection granted to thieves and adventurers.

Personally, I abhor the gallows—and it is not always necessary to have recourse to it; nevertheless the uneasiness of cultured and sensitive minds when confronted with severe penalties allows us the necessary breathing-space at moments of extreme danger.

If the elimination of a few heads distinguished by noble birth, prestige or wealth (but corrupt and indifferent to the common good) serves to re-establish trust in the laws, this can be done without a qualm. If not, the increase of lawlessness will have no bounds, ending in general misery, and we shall have, finally, a second tyrant like Foca, the loss of our liberty, and terror. This is what History tells us, even if we know that its favourite pupil is the wind. All I have done is humbly to remind you. I wish you never-ending good fortune—all the natural gifts for the task which awaits you, you have already.

Your Most Devoted Slave
Nicephorus Sirus

Tug

When we started this game I had backers
Equal to the men who hold your rope.
I had a strong anchor man
And I had support in the galleries.

I find myself being jerked
Across the marked tiles sliding.
My team is obviously slackening its hold.
Some have let go entirely, and of some
I cannot remember they were there.

There is little point in dislocating my shoulder, no hope
Of pulling all you six back to my side.
I am accelerated across, thread on a whirling bobbin
With only just time to think
Whether I should come across with a leap and a laugh or
Let go the rope.

Jenny Joseph

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George H. Quester

Can Europe Really Be Defended?

Some New "Conventional" Arguments

Defence is Deterrence

MOST COMMENTATORS on the confrontation of conventional military forces along the European Central Front tend to focus on the relative strengths of the two alliances. Will NATO grow stronger than it was, relative to the forces of the Warsaw Pact, or will it grow still weaker? How can new technologies and new situations make NATO stronger? If a war comes, how will it affect the European landscape over which it is fought, and who will win?

I want to ask a very different question. Is the trend moving toward strengthening the offence or the defence? Does the trend encourage the first strike and the initiative? Or does it instead encourage sitting back and waiting in a crisis, to see first whether an enemy attack is indeed coming?

A few observers will be quick to say that this is identical with a discussion of NATO strength, since NATO is designed to be defensive and to maintain the *status quo*. Therefore: "What strengthens the defensive strengthens NATO."

GEORGE H. QUESTER *is Director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University and author of "Offense and Defense in the International System" (1977). His article is based on a paper he prepared for a series of arms-control workshops organised by the Aspen Institute, which included some of the leading military analysts of Europe and the USA. We propose to continue the discussion in forthcoming issues of* ENCOUNTER.

Of course, the Warsaw Pact also claims to be entirely defensive, phrasing all of its war games on the premise of an aggression by NATO. The truth for each alliance may be more complicated. It is hard to believe that Moscow would not like to acquire some territory in the West—if the price were low enough. Conversely, if there were another rebellion in Hungary or East Germany or Czechoslovakia, it is hard to believe that the West would not like to liberate these territories—if only the price were low enough.

With motives complicated on each side, therefore, one cannot judge the situation by deciding whether the intention of either alliance is "offensive" or "defensive." One must examine the offensive or defensive nature of the military technology and of the geography. Whatever the good intentions of the two sides, they are more likely to lunge at each other if the situation seems to offer enormous advantages to whoever takes the initiative. "Wars nobody wants" are produced when the situation favours the attacker. Conversely, whatever the bad intentions of the two sides, they are likely to sit still during a crisis if the military technology suggests that the advantages are with the defender.

If there were a net trend in favour of the defence—in terms of weapons and environment rather than in terms of intentions—this would be altogether good news. It would make conventional war less likely, as each side would wait longer in a crisis (or wait indefinitely) before sending its forces forward. And it would be less neccessary to brandish threats of unbearable nuclear retaliation and to risk escalation all the way up to World War III.

THE BEAUTY OF SUCH a dampening of the conventional offensive menace is that no one would need to reduce the threat of nuclear escalation explicitly, with all the painful issues of political

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consultation and strategic credibility this tends to raise. Rather than having to extricate the American tactical nuclear weapons that are emplaced in Germany, we would eliminate the conventional warfare situations that made them important deterrents in the first place. The US would not have to look so assiduously for ever more plausible applications of tactical nuclear power, from precision-guided *nuclear* warheads to the "Neutron Bomb." The simple facts of the conventional balance would tell one and all that the risk of Soviet tank invasion—or the risk of "Finlandisation"—no longer loomed large.

The "Neutron Bomb" is perceived as the antidote to growing Soviet conventional force strength in Eastern Europe, and to growing Soviet intercontinental missile strength. It would presumably give Western leaders a means of inflicting high casualties on Soviet tank forces, and even repulsing them, without destroying Western Europe in the process, without, one hopes, producing an escalation to World War III after the nuclear firebreak had been crossed). Knowledge that tanks and their crews would be lost if sent forward—or that World War III might result—might thus deter the Soviet leadership from ever launching such an armoured attack. But what is proposed in this article is a very different approach.

Nuclear deterrence has shielded Europe well to date, but it has produced certain anxieties and tensions in the process. If conventional means were to replace it, such anxieties would be substantially reduced. Is it "deterrence" when wars are avoided simply because the attacker would lose many more troops and vehicles than the defender? Whatever it is, "deterrence" or just "defence", it tends to produce peace, which is what we want.

No one would claim that war is "impossible" when the defence predominates, or that it is "inevitable" when the offence predominates. Yet the defensive or offensive cast of the confrontations of forces does make a great difference. When there is a strong defensive cast to the form of weapons, either side must have a substantial numerical superiority over the other before it could contemplate an aggressive war with any zest or relish. What is more, when this defensive cast is present, it is virtually impossible that both sides simultaneously could have such a favourable inclination toward striking forward.

When this situation is reversed, so that the shape of weapons favours the offensive more and the defence less, one has less of a margin of safety. At the worst, one then gets the possibility that both sides might simultaneously feel militarily "better off" attacking, a situation ripe for war-outbreak in any crisis.

2. *The New Trends*

ALONG the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation line through Central Europe, what are the major developments by which we can assess a trend? At least one trend would not seem reassuring at all, for NATO planners or for advocates of conventional stability: namely, the substantial augmentation of Warsaw Pact forces in numbers of men, tanks and other armoured vehicles. An increase in the simple total of divisions would not indicate the magnitude of the growth, for the tables-of-organisation for such units have been expanded between 12 and 20% in manpower per division, and 40% in the number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APC). Since the 1960s, the total increase in deployed manpower for the Warsaw Pact side of the Central Front (in part reflecting the occupation of Czechoslovakia) may thus amount to 100,000 men.

This augmentation of Soviet forces suggests an increased Warsaw Pact ability to roll Westward. If the two forces had previously been more or less within a thin zone of technological equilibrium, we would have reason to fear a shift into the extreme situation where one side could feel free to attack—free to attack, that is, except for the threat of nuclear escalation and World War III, which ever since 1945 has stabilised the front (and worried those who thought about such "stabilisation").

But there are at least three other new developments of magnitude on the European Central Front which may be much more stabilising. They probably take much of the significance out of any growth of Soviet armoured forces and probably tilt future conventional combat toward the defensive. Thus, they widen the zone of equilibrium in any comparisons of forces. These three significant developments are (*1*) the improvement in the accuracy of anti-tank guided-missiles (ATGM); (*2*) a similar improvement in surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles (SAM); and (*3*) the increasing urbanisation of the German landscape, particularly in some parts of West Germany that used to be simply labelled "the North German Plain."

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THE IMPROVEMENT in accuracy and kill probabilities of the precision-guided anti-tank missiles is quite phenomenal. Such an improvement, which had been predicted for a number of years, was dramatically demonstrated in the 1973 Sinai Desert war between Israeli and Egyptian forces.

The new weapons allow ordinary infantry soldiers, with a minimum of training and often with only the equipment they can carry on their backs, to disable tanks and armoured personnel carriers at considerable distances. The new weapons, in effect, reduce the major problem of such combat to the identification of the target. Once the target has been acquired in the sights of the ATGM, the chances of destroying it become good. The overall effect is to reward the side that already has its forces in place, as opposed to those trying to fight their way in, because a moving tank or armoured personnel carrier reveals its position more readily than one sitting still. And since motorised vehicles are now generally easier to destroy, an attacking army is constrained to move more slowly, indeed largely on foot, which again makes the net defensive position stronger.

Similarly, the technological breakthrough in the ability of ground-based anti-aircraft equipment to shoot down aircraft in the combat zone makes it foreseeable that the entire area above a future battlefield will become unsafe for the air forces of either side.

While there are some important complications for the net assessment of the defensive or offensive impact of such new anti-aircraft weapons, the basic tilt again will be to discourage the offensive, reduce the temptations to attempt pre-emptive strikes and first strikes, and thus make wars generally less likely. This is especially true for air-force *versus* air-force combat, where the continual menace has been that either side might win an air power monopoly for a battle by catching the other air-force on the ground. The advantage of inflicting such a total defeat on the enemy's air-force (and then using one's own remaining air power tactically to help win the battle on the ground) might have driven a nation into striking in a crisis, rather than waiting for the crisis to dissipate. The outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 is an example.

The new SAM protection, however, will make it more difficult for either side to come out ahead by pre-emptively striking at the other's air bases. SAM protection will be extensively deployed around these bases so that an attacker might lose more aircraft than he destroys on the ground. And even if a tactical air monopoly were achieved the attacking air force might still be driven back by the continuing fire of the SAM equipment deployed within the surface combat zone. To hold the only remaining "tactical" air-force would be less attractive if that force were tactically usable no longer.

THE THIRD MAJOR DEVELOPMENT is neither directly technological, nor has it been deliberately by the NATO command, which may benefit from it; the increasing urban sprawl and congestion in northern Germany, in what once might have been excellent country for a tank offensive.

The sprawl is obviously the product of population increase and in particular of the tendency of people to congregate in urban environments.

The View from Peking

Peking

AFTER discussion here with leading Communist officials and Army officers, a reasonably clear picture began to emerge of Chinese military theory and strategy.

Although they have successfully tested a hydrogen bomb and have adequate means of delivering it on targets in the Soviet Union, they have firmly stated that they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is in direct contrast to the doctrine of NATO, *which is based clearly on the threat that nuclear weapons* might *be used to meet a conventional attack. The Chinese describe this, in an interesting paradox, as "a policy of appeasement." By this they mean that the West is neglecting its military defences, believing that it can rely upon the nuclear deterrent. Everyone, they say, including the Russians, knows that the West will* not *be the first to use nuclear weapons, and it is against this background that the Soviet Union calculates that it can pursue its aggressive policies virtually unhindered. It is an interesting proposition, and those who are disposed to reject it out of hand might wish to consider the possibility, however remote, that they might conceivably be wrong.*

Lord Chalfont

in THE TIMES (*London*)

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But it has important military by-products. The buildings of a modern city, or of a suburban corridor running along the sides of a German *Autobahn*, offer the equivalent of prepared positions for defensive forces aiming their weapons at advancing armoured columns.

One author has indeed proposed forming these urban-related constructions into the most extensive man-made fortifications ever, a complex far more impenetrable than the Maginot Line.[1]

Of course, this urban sprawl, populated by enormous numbers of vulnerable civilians, raises another question. Are their residences to be taken as some sort of military asset for NATO, or does such civilians' presence make the buildings militarily useless or worse? Some analyses of the possibilities available to the Warsaw Pact forces have conjected a "city-hugging" advance, which would, in effect, let the aggressor use these urban populations as hostages, and preclude the defenders' use of tactical nuclear weapons and even of large-scale conventional firepower when an advancing armoured column has been spotted.

YET AN OFFENSIVE CITY-HUGGING strategy is not entirely convincing. Moving close to cities slows an advance even when massive defensive firepower is not encountered. Slower advance means that more of the German civilians involved will have left the area or moved into cellars and shelters. If massive firepower cannot be used against Soviet tank columns, individually sited anti-tank weapons may none the less exact a devastating toll—the defensive commanders having assessed in advance the narrow corners and strategic intersections through which attacking vehicles must come. The dense urban build-ups may indeed offer a net advantage to the defence, compared with the open fields which they replaced, even when one takes into account the presence of a civilian population.

As mentioned, some of the extrapolations of effectiveness for the new anti-tank guided missiles have been derived from the desert battles of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Sceptics note that these weapons usually require visual identification of the tank target, and that this will be more difficult to achieve in Germany, where large portions of the terrain are built up or covered with forest. Buildings and trees break the line of sight, which was so uncluttered on the desert; and thus tanks presumably will be able to come closer before they become vulnerable to an ATGM.

These cautions are entirely in order, but deserts started out as tank country, and the new precision guided missiles there whittled down the tank's advantage. By contrast, before the new anti-tank weapons were introduced, forests and urban areas were already less favourable for the tank because they offered concealment for defensive forces even with more primitive weapons. The new ATGMs, therefore, subtract less from the offence in these areas because the offence has less to start with. The obstacles that block the missiles' view also serve to hurt the tank and shield other kinds of anti-tank forces.[2]

3. *Some Caveats About "Defence"*

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN offensive and defensive military postures has hardly won wide acceptance as an analytical tool for arms control or military planning. One hears continuing criticisms of the distinction by combat-experienced military professionals, military historians and specialists in arms control. The criticisms suggest that it will always be difficult to figure out whether a weapon is more helpful to the offence or the defence. Moreover, even if the microcosmic effects of a weapon in battle can be assessed, it is typically argued that its macrocosmic impact is too difficult to predict:

> "Defensive weapons can be used for offensive purposes. . . . One must distinguish between

[1] See Paul Bracken, "Urban Sprawl and NATO Defence", *Survival* (XVIII, No. 6, Nov./Dec. 1976), pp. 254-260, which includes an extended discussion of the strategic implications of German urbanisation. The mere mention of the Maginot Line will naturally serve as grist for the mill of those who are sceptical of defensive preparations, for it is normally cited to prove the futility of fortifications against the power of the tank. But the truth is that German *Panzer* columns did not break through the Maginot Line, but went around it in the Ardennes; the French had not extended the Line along the Franco-Belgian frontier.

[2] A great deal of information on this subject is presented in an unclassified US Army *Field Manual No. 100-5* (Washington, DC, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976). See also the most valuable discussion in F. Clifton Berry, John Patrick and Philip A. Karber, reviews of US Army *Field Manual No. 100-5* in *Armed Forces Journal International* (Vol. 114, No. 2, October 1976), pp. 23-39.

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> defensive capability and defensive intent. . . . If a war breaks out in Europe, both offensive and defensive weapons will be used by both sides. . . . Offense is the best defense."[3]

The calculation of the true impact of a shift in military technology or deployments can often be difficult and cumbersome; but there is a net impact in one direction or the other. A change in the military confrontation either makes it more attractive to launch the first strike, or makes it less attractive. In the beginning, one cannot label a weapon's final impact, forever stamping it as "offensive" or "defensive," regardless of what military stew it is blended into. Yet the stew itself will have an offensive or defensive odour, and this needs to be analysed and identified.[4]

What follows is a sorting of several types of such complications. To begin with a case easy to find in history: What if only one side of a frontier has the resources or inclination to erect defensive fortifications? Is this a contribution to international stability? Or does it often lead to the launching of wars by that better-equipped side? One might find this illustrated in the fortifications erected by Vauban for the France of Louis XIV. Since these were not matched by identical fortifications along the other side of the frontier in Germany and the Low Countries, what was the net impact of such weapons?

Where the addition of an effective "defensive" military technology is so one-sided, the result may be to increase rather than to decrease the likelihood of war. The increase does not come because the confrontation has become destabilised, for there is no heightening of pre-emptive incentives. Indeed, the addition of fortifications, even if only on one side of the line, decreases this first-strike temptation or fear on both sides. Rather, the increased likelihood of war comes because the better-equipped side may now feel that it *outnumbers* the other in aggregates of military power sufficient to make war profitable.

A one-sided augmentation of defence can also be very much more encouraging for war, of course, if it defends non-military items. This is an old story for those of us who are used to the analysis of strategic nuclear forces. ABM defences that promised to shield people against attack were to be condemned, because by reducing the future costs of war, they might eliminate a deterrent and cause war to happen. ABM defences that only shielded missile silos were, by contrast, desirable; they discouraged the offensive initiative, since they (like an additional layer of concrete over the missile silo) would impose higher attrition on the attacking missiles for each missile destroyed in the force being attacked. What protects people is bad; what protects weapons is good. Such are the times we live in!

IT IS THUS IMPORTANT to be precise about how one applies the "defensive" and "offensive" labels. For most of this article I will be referring to defence or offence in the "counterforce" sense of battlefield exchange. Despite what common sense might tell us, the "defence" that protects people is something enormously different.

What if Vauban's 17th-century fortresses were primarily important for shielding French towns and agricultural districts from an enemy's punitive and painful "countervalue" retaliatory response? They would then have freed Louis XIV to send his armies into Flanders, secure in the knowledge that his other borders would go unpunished. What if the Siegfried Line had given Hitler the same insurance against damaging attacks on the Rhineland? What if better SAM protection gave Hanoi hope that a Viet Cong offensive in the south would not be followed by effective aerial bombardment of the north?

One must worry lest the new round of precision

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[3] Good presentations of this sceptical response to the offence-defence distinction can be found in Richard Burt, "New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Directions", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 126 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976); James L. Foster, "The 'Revolution' in Conventional Arms: Implications for Great Powers, Middle Powers, and Others", paper prepared for Cornell Peace Studies Program Conference on *Great Powers' Military and Strategic Involvement in the Middle East*, (April 1977, The Rand Corporation); and Michael Nacht, "Implications of New Technologies for European Security: What Are the Issues?", paper prepared for the Aspen Institute Berlin Conference on *The Changing Conditions of European Security* (June 1977).

[4] A clear analysis along parallel lines can be found in John J. Mearsheimer, "The Proliferation of Silver Bullets: The Impact of PGMs on Conventional Deterrence", paper prepared for Cornell Peace Studies Program Conference on *Great Powers' Military and Strategic Involvement in the Middle East*, April 1977 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University).

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guided munitions (PGM)—whatever they do for the "counterforce" exchanges of offence and defence—too substantially reduce the "counter-value" costs of war.

Another kind of problem demands attention when defensive fortifications are placed along both sides of a frontier, but only along a portion of that frontier. What if a new defensive technology is developed that is supremely damaging to attackers, but only in mountain areas, or only in jungles or deserts—that is, for only a portion of the front, and not for its entire length?

THE MOST LIKELY RESULT is that one has narrowed the sector of the front over which offensives could be launched. The possibility remains that this situation would be more conducive to war, however, if the two sides were not equally able to shift forces from the stalemated sectors of the front to those still offering offensive opportunities.

A more complicated and worrisome version of this situation would occur when the protected and unprotected areas were separated so that only one side could shift its forces to the offensive-prone zone. Such may well have been the case in 1939 when the Maginot and Siegfried Lines were thought to have blunted offensive possibilities along the French-German border in the West, but no such reinforcement had been applied on behalf of Poland to the East. One could, of course have envisaged deploying substantial contingents of French and British forces to Poland, if the Maginot defences in the West really were thought so impregnable. But this deployment would have had political and economic costs and geopolitical complications; and in any event, it did not occur.

None of these exceptions to the war-discouraging impact of defensive deployments seems particularly applicable for the current NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. But there are some other possible exceptions that may be more relevant, and more worrisome.

4. The Ambiguity of SAM

A SPECIAL CASE needing more careful analysis arises when a seemingly defensive weapon is mobile and can be brought along on an incursion into someone else's territory.

The View from Paris

STRONG fears that a SALT II—Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—agreement between America and Russia would lead to the "Finlandisation" of Western Germany were expressed in Paris last week by a group of high-ranking NATO *diplomats and soldiers. The soldiers expressed the view that West Germany could be faced with the choice of total capitulation or of becoming a nuclear battlefield.*

They were speaking at a seminar to discuss "the political implications of new weapon technology on relations between East and West and within the Alliance."

While the United States has agreed not to deploy the Cruise missile in Europe for three years, the Russians have already stationed scores of their new SS 20 mobile missiles on their Western frontier. The missiles are considered to be in the so-called "grey" area, which is neither strategic nor tactical, but can hit targets in Western Europe. Experts believe they could totally destroy Western Germany.

The missile, because of its mobility, is difficult if not impossible to "take out" with NATO *missiles. Also in the "grey area" is the controversial Russian Backfire bomber, which could reach Belfast or Birmingham.*

Although NATO *has tactical (or battlefield) nuclear weapons in Germany, there was in the seminar a general consensus that these would never be used. It was thought that members of the Alliance would refuse to give prior permission to the Supreme Commander to "go nuclear" when he felt the moment had arrived. In a situation such as the Warsaw Pact powers invading Europe, there would be insufficient time to obtain the permission from Washington and leading European members of the alliance. The targets would be overrun by the enemy before permission to use the tactical weapons was received.*

Members agreed that the Soviet build-up in Europe was designed to promote their efforts towards ultimate global domination, without firing a shot.

"Finlandisation", in the minds of NATO *experts, means a country near the Soviet Union, not a member of the Warsaw Pact powers, which could not be expected to take military action against the Russians.*

At best, the term suggests a country which may even claim to be neutral but does not maintain its neutrality in the vigorous manner of, say, Sweden or Switzerland, as a result of a covert or open treaty with Moscow.

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I do not hereby concede that "any weapon is offensive or defensive depending simply on the purpose for which it is used." The important technological variable is whether the weapon can be made mobile. Artillery that is anchored in place tends to be stabilising; the kind that can be moved does not. The latest Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system can perhaps be made mobile, and therefore capable of shielding tanks or being fired from the backs of tanks.

As noted, the presence of efficient SAM systems on both sides of the front may have a supremely defensive impact by discouraging pre-emptive air strikes. It will now be quite dangerous to send one's air-force into the other side's air space. To the extent that air power is used against the other side's air-forces sitting on air bases, or against ground forces deployed in defensive positions, the new generation of SAMs is a stabilising factor.

But tactical aircraft have been particularly helpful in plugging short-run gaps in the line, where opposing tanks have made penetrations by the use of surprise attack or *Blitzkrieg* tactics. If an attacking tank column, which broke through the initial ground barriers, is shielded against air attacks by portable SAMs, the contribution of the new technology at that time and place is hardly "defensive." The NATO alliance has expected to rely heavily on its tactical air power. The possibility that SAMs may cancel out most or all of such advantage in the future would not be welcome news.

How does one then sort out whether the total impact of SAM is stabilising or not? The task of making the calculation is not hopeless. Much will depend on the likelihood that the tank is now able to make such breakthroughs in the first place, in face of the other technological innovations I have discussed (especially the anti-tank guided missile), and in face of any improvements in defensive force structure that might be devised. The "perversion" of an air defence weapon (SAM) into a screen for an offensive tank depends on the continued capability of that tank to move forward. If the ground portion of the new PGM technology has damaged *this* capability enough, then the surface-to-air PGM will not be "perverted" into an offensive weapon.

IN THE END, we find a not-so-disturbing net reading of the impact of the new surface-to-air missile systems on the European military balance. Rather than shielding advancing tank columns, SAM may still be mainly significant for diminishing the opportunities of tactical air attacks. The impact of SAM will be the obverse of the offensive or defensive impact of the air weapon it negates. That air weapon had some defensive role, but its function was largely offensive. By countering that offensive air threat, SAM, therefore, will be largely a contribution to the defence.

5. Deliberate "Smash & Grab"

SO-CALLED "SMASH-AND-GRAB" tactics contain yet another caution that may explain many of NATO planners' worries about predicting a defensive tilt.

The problem is: What if a country is intent on only very limited gains and deliberately launches a surprise attack along a confined sector—as the Turks did in Cyprus; as the Israelis did several times in 1947–48; perhaps as the Russians and East Germans have long been war-gamed into Hamburg? Quick gains are then made because the defending side is not expecting war at that moment and requires hours or days before it can fight back at full potential. Once the attacked side is fighting back, the strength of the defensive may take hold on both sides, but the territory that has been "grabbed" now remains in the aggressor's hands, to be "defended" against counterattacks.[5]

Whatever its immorality and abnormality, the surprise attack promises to be most significant in the future of international politics. Except in the most slow-moving and gentlemanly of times, it has indeed been quite significant in the past.

One model of such an operation was the Egyptian recovery of the east bank of the Suez Canal in 1973. The Sinai War of 1973 displayed fully the new potential of defensive technology, but the Egyptians used Israeli expectations of peace to push across the Canal before Israel's defensive capability took hold. Then, the Egyptians utilised their own defensive technology to impose substantial casualties during Israeli efforts to return to the Canal.

[5] For a well-stated concern for the possibilities of Soviet gains in a short war, see Steven Canby, "The Alliance and Europe: Military Doctrine and Technology", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 109 (London International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975); and Steven Canby, "NATO: Reassessing the Conventional Wisdoms", *Survival* (Vol. XIX, No. 4, (July/August 1977), pp. 164–168.

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The Israelis, none the less, did get back to the Canal and across it, and were finally stopped by diplomatic interference rather than by defensive weaponry. But this does not upset our inferences about the technology. The Israelis' counter-offensive succeeded because of their greater military skill and greater technological ingenuity, rather than because of shortcomings in the Egyptian defensive weapons.

"SMASH AND GRAB" relates also to World War I, where at the outset Germany maintained mobility long enough to seize a substantial area. The subsequent defensive stalemate left the Germans in control of this territory for four years.

The Germans, by mobilising more quickly, had won the "battle of the frontiers." But they were not content with seizing Belgium and northern France and considered their attack a failure because it did not reach Paris.

This "smash-and-grab" or "battle of the frontiers" phase worries many Western military analysts for the 1980s and causes them to scoff at distinctions between offence and defence. What if the new precision-guided munitions make the defence stronger? They will have little impact until after that peculiar first round of fighting in which only the attacker really knows there is a war on. By that time, Hamburg or some other valuable chunk of European real estate will have slipped behind the Russians' defensive barrier. Then the enhancement of the defence will only mean that it will be much less possible for NATO to launch a counter-offensive to recover what is lost.

An ideal moment for the Russians to launch a surprise attack would be when their Warsaw Pact forces are deployed for war games in East Germany. But an attack might come without even this much advance warning. The day-in and day-out augmentation of Soviet forces allows for a surprise attack potential even when manoeuvres are not used to bolster force readiness.

HOW RELEVANT IS THIS possibility to Europe? Let me talk first of the possibilities of a deliberate Soviet move toward a finite "smash and grab."

Western analysts have for the past 18 years war-gamed and worried about the "Hamburg grab", a sudden Russian and East German move to seize the Hamburg area and give East Germany a port on the North Sea, to humiliate and embarrass the West during some crisis in another part of the world, or perhaps to set the stage for future grabs. If nothing else, this scenario served in the days of Kennedy and McNamara as the model of what augmented conventional NATO forces would be repelling and what the threat of nuclear escalation might not be able to deter.

But is it really so clear that the Warsaw Pact leadership would be ready to entertain so infinitely risky an operation for such finite returns? If Hamburg were "grabbed", it might be a long time before the NATO side were to relax and be susceptible to the next grab. The East's loss of trade after such a move would far exceed the economic gains of gaining a German port. If the grab were intended to be background music for a crisis elsewhere, the combination of all such "music" might lead to nuclear "noise."

In any event, the Russians and East Germans have always had something much easier to grab, much less dependent on increases in Soviet tank forces, namely the irritating and humiliating enclave of West Berlin. Would West Berlin not be attacked and digested long before the move came against Hamburg? Does NATO not thus have an early-warning indicator, in the form of its most defenceless forward position, to alert it to a Soviet motorised attack on the much more defensible Hamburg position?

SOMETHING PROTECTS West Berlin, and it is not any balance of conventional military forces. Perhaps the protection comes from the risk of escalation to nuclear war if the city were seized. Perhaps the deterrent is essentially non-military: seizure of West Berlin would be followed by a prolonged termination of trade between West and East Germany, and between the NATO countries and the Soviet bloc. If nothing else about the suspension of *détente* were to hurt Moscow, the suspension of trade would clearly damage the Communist economies more than those of the NATO countries.

West Berlin or Hamburg, or any other small piece of territory that could be grabbed in a surprise attack, would have to be extremely valuable to outweigh the economic losses. The nature of East-West economic dealings gives the West a powerful hostage which discourages such grabs.

The new military technology promises to be extremely stabilising for all contingencies except for such "grabs." If other factors (as illustrated by the case of West Berlin) cover this exception, the net result may be a satisfactory stabilisation

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across the entire spectrum of contingencies. Something real and tangible is happening in the swing of conventional military technology toward the defensive.

Western military preparations might thus best be directed towards solidifying the overall stabilising impact of the new defensive technology rather than trying to protect against the possibility of very small territorial grabs. We already know that one can shield West Berlin militarily only by upsetting the East-West military balance. To erect a special shield around Hamburg might similarly be to invest in weapons systems that will upset the defensive balance overall.

6. The Soviet Investment in Tanks

THE RUSSIANS have shown an awareness of the vulnerability of the tank and have invested heavily in new anti-tank guided missiles. In the Sinai Desert the Egyptians used such Soviet-supplied missiles against Israel's US-supplied tanks. The Russians have also invested thought and money in studying how to suppress NATO's anti-tank arrays and restore the ability of their armoured columns to move forward.[6] Despite complicated re-orchestrations of the uses of artillery, on-foot infantry, armoured personnel carriers and tanks, the end result has been that any future offensive will have to move forward more slowly, and with less assurance of success, than in the past.

Then why should the Russians continue to invest in the tank (and in additional military tools to assist the tank) when it may hardly be cost-effective any longer as a military instrument?

One interpretation would be that the Russians are showing themselves to be still aggressive in their overall intentions and hope to maintain a plausible threat to conquer Western Europe. This may be rooted in the idea that such a threat was the only counter to the American nuclear monopoly in the years before 1949, or that Marxism-Leninism requires the ultimate "liberation" of the working classes of Dusseldorf and Brussels. Or the Russian investment in tanks might be based on more modest hopes for the "Finlandisation" of Western Europe. Whatever the reasons, the tendency of the Russians to maintain large tank inventories still sends the same ultimate signal, of wanting to be able to roll on short notice into Dusseldorf and Brussels.

The US Army and NATO, of course, also invest in tanks, which suggests that this evidence of Moscow's aggressive intentions is not so conclusive. Yet the West has not invested as heavily in tanks at any time, and could describe itself as merely responding to Soviet deployments, along lines of argument to be explored below.

Do we thus have a relatively clear indictment that the Russians *want* capabilities for aggression against Western Europe, since they have failed to avoid such capabilities? What other explanations could there be for the Soviet investment in tanks? There are indeed some other possibilities, which may make our indictment of Soviet intentions less clear.

ONE EXPLANATION IS that any military organisation after a time comes to identify strongly with its customary weapon, even past the point of that weapon's cost-effectiveness.

The Soviet fixation on armour may be much the same as the US Navy's attachment to the aircraft carrier. The carrier can be sunk by smaller and cheaper ships—the same sort of "democratic revolution" that has made the tank vulnerable to on-foot infantrymen. Does the US Navy therefore de-commission its carriers? No, it invests instead in new airplanes and additional escort ships, for the primary purpose of keeping the carriers afloat in combat. The institutional processes of any military service may thus preclude easy abandonment of a principal military tool in which increasing amounts of money and a declining ration of strategic thought have been invested.

A related interpretation of Soviet tank procurements is that Soviet production lines mindlessly produce whatever they get the hang of producing. When size ten shoes can be delivered, they are delivered; when they can't be, they aren't, and this irrespective of demand. Similarly, once the bugs were gotten out of the T-72 tank production line, the result emerges predictably enough: the delivery of large numbers of T-72s. One can find some analogous Western behaviour, occasionally in conventional military procurement, perhaps more typically in the production of nuclear warheads throughout the life of the US Atomic Energy Commission and its guardian Joint Committee on Capitol Hill.

[6] A valuable insight into the Soviet deliberations can be found in Philip A. Karber, "The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate", *Survival* (Vol. XVII, No. 3, May/June 1976), pp. 105–111.

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A third interpretation of Soviet armour procurements is that the tank, while militarily less cost-effective, has great impact in the repression of possible uprisings in Prague or Warsaw or Dresden or Budapest, much as the American aircraft carrier is still regarded as a psychologically potent means of showing the flag off the coast of Kenya or Korea. A tank at every street intersection of a major city is quite likely to be a pacifying influence.

This would be a more rational explanation of the Russian decision to procure tanks *and* to deploy them in larger numbers to Eastern Europe.

7. *Inadvertent "Smash & Grab"*

WHILE EACH OF THE ABOVE theories discounts Soviet aggressive intentions toward the NATO countries, they may not ease our concerns very much. "Combat uses" often tend to be found for weapons after they have been militarily deployed, no matter how mindless or non-military the original procurement decision was. If the Russians had come up with a force of minefields and anti-tank guided missiles, instead of investing so much in tanks and armoured personnel carriers, the results would have been much more reassuring to the NATO allies.

I have argued above that a rational and deliberate "smash-and-grab" scenario does not make much sense for Soviet interests in Europe. Yet one must also face up to the inadvertent "smash and grab", modelled on the experience of 1914, when a Germany with larger ambitions seized and was able to hold most of Belgium and a significant portion of northern France. What if the Russians now send tank forces forward in hopes of reaching Frankfurt-am-Main and then wind up overrunning only Hamburg—that is, in the 1914 pattern, making gains by aggression which would not have been worth the price of war in the first place?

The introduction of anti-tank guided missiles, and the Soviet awareness of their effectiveness, may reduce the risks, because the grand move on Frankfurt no longer looks easy. But over a limited range, these weapons may exacerbate the problem. What if the Warsaw Pact leadership were now to fixate on the only remaining plausible opportunity for the tank and motorised forces: that they get across the border quickly enough and with enough surprise (again, the 1914 model) to pre-empt the mobilisation of the NATO reserves required to man anti-tank weapons? If Soviet armour could reach Frankfurt before the NATO reserves were assembled with their ATGM units, the result would not be a defensive stalemate but a *blitzkrieg* victory of the very kind that NATO planners have always worried about.

The View from Washington

Washington, D.C.



THE British Government has in effect decided to run down the country's nuclear stockpile which means not replacing the Polaris strategic missile.

This conclusion is based on Mr Callaghan's reported decision fully to support President Carter's plan for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Nuclear experts claim such a treaty would steadily reduce effectiveness of all existing Allied nuclear warheads and completely "run down" the expertise required for nuclear modernisation and replacement.

The same experts say that the Russians in their vast territory would be able to carry out low-level tests unobserved by the West. Tests of 15 kilotons or less made in hard rock in the heartland of the Soviet Union would be undetectable in America though they might be registered in parts of China.

The United States Energy and Research Development Agency sent a team to Britain this year to try to discover senior British nuclear technicians' attitude to the dangers of a comprehensive test ban.

After the visit a senior American technician said that Britain's nuclear stockpile certainly could not survive under such a ban, which would render it impossible for Britain alone to develop a successor to the Polaris.

AMERICAN EXPERTS SAY *that Britain must decide within five years on the type of strategic nuclear weapon to replace Polaris. But the Ministry of Defence says there is more time.*

The French Government is most unlikely to agree to such a test ban, but this will provide but cold comfort to West Germany because France remains outside the military command structure of NATO.

The Germans and other non-nuclear states within NATO *have relied on Britain to maintain a nuclear trigger to ensure that the United States does not allow itself to become "decoupled" from a nuclear war in Europe.*

DEFENCE & FOREIGN AFFAIRS DAILY
(Washington D.C.)

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IT IS NOT THAT the new confrontation of forces would increase the chances of Soviet victory in a surprise attack. It is rather that such a surprise attack would now offer the *only* chance of victory, even if less chance than before, and that Soviet decision-making in some less-than-rational way would be drawn to this *faute de mieux*.

The prospects for a victorious surprise attack may not have to be very good to produce a danger. Since the Russians have appropriated their resources for tanks and have a psychological vested interest in them, the Warsaw Pact officers involved will be looking for a mission, a redeeming return, for the equipment that has been purchased. In earlier years, before the advent of new defensive anti-armour weapons, they might have rested, institutionally satisfied and content. With the newer weapons facing them, however, these officers may come to believe that a surprise attack is the one practical use for the weapons they have, destabilising the decision-making process on their side of the line.

THIS POSSIBILITY of a foolish and inadvertent Soviet "smash and grab" attack is not easy to dismiss. Yet it may not be a reason to reject the generally good news offered by the new defensive technologies. There are a number of appropriate responses to this possibility. As mentioned above, one is to structure NATO forces, as they are being equipped with the new defensive weapons, primarily to make Frankfurt unreachable for the Soviets, rather than offering this protection to Hamburg and the frontier zone. Where there is a choice, one gives greater priority (not total priority) to preventing the major *Blitzkrieg*, since the broader political and economic incentives already cited tend to ward off any deliberate smaller territorial grab. Russians who are convinced that they could never get to Frankfurt will never stumble into Hamburg. If the Russians dazzle themselves with the prospect of a grand and successful sweep all across Germany, NATO must solve the problem by making that grand sweep impossible. This may be accomplished with a healthy application of the new technologies, even without relying on risks of nuclear escalation.

A SECOND APPROACH, of course, would be to try to convince the Russians that they should divest themselves of tank forces. This may be an uphill battle, but it may yet be achieved over time. Perhaps we cannot hope that a military establishment anywhere could bring itself to pass up new weapons simply because their acquisition would be destabilising, simply because they favour offence rather than defence. Rather, our more modest hope might be that military leaders would pass up such weapons when the flow of military technology itself has made them loser-weapons, weapons that are not conducive to winning wars, weapons that waste metal and manpower because they have become too vulnerable. Even then, we can expect the Russians, as noted, to behave like the US Navy with its carriers, delaying the moment of truth, and in the process prolonging the presence of weapons that by their very nature may be destabilising.

8. Are Tanks Indispensable?

HOW, THEN, SHOULD the US and NATO respond to the continued Soviet deployment of tanks and armoured personnel carriers? Should they match these deployments by buying tanks and APCS themselves, or invest more heavily in the new missiles, which show every sign of being very effective against armour?

It would be useful at this stage to broaden the discussion one last time to the more general role of the tank in warfare, and to cite some considerations that may make Russian and NATO planners alike very reluctant to surrender the armoured weapon, even if new technology seems to be making it vulnerable, even if arms-control logic seems to label it as "destabilising."

Students of military history (in particular students of the Soviet response to the German invasion in 1941) can be expected to be sympathetic to the idea that the tank is the appropriate response to the tank. These analysts would go far beyond fears of "smash-and-grab" and brood instead about cases where the best response to the enemy's attack is to "roll-with-the-punch" and rely on the offensive power of one's own tank columns to counter-attack when the enemy is overextended and a portion of his forces can be cut off from its logistics.

One model for this would be the French counter-attack in the 1914 battle of the Marne (before the defensive stalemate set in for both sides), a counter-attack that inflicted a severe setback on the Germans.

Another model is what many commentators now regard as the appropriate Allied response

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to the German breakthrough in the spring of 1940, namely to have used armour in echelon to counter-attack and pinch off the overextended German columns. Indeed we now know that Hitler, at the peak of his own armour's success, feared that such a counter-attack might impose a setback comparable to that of 1914.

To explore further the possibility that the heavy Soviet tank investment may be linked today to defensive *intentions*, one only has to remember the role their tanks played in World War II. After 1941, the Soviet commanders avoided the static defence lines, which many ascribe to the French 1939 Maginot mentality, and used armour instead of rolling counter-offensives. If the Russians merely want to be able to defend Leipzig and Warsaw and Kiev against "NATO revanchists" doesn't this plausibly explain their tanks and motorised infantry? And if NATO forces are to defend themselves against the offensive potential of these Soviet tanks, isn't the best response then to invest in tanks also?

The use of mobility as the ultimate counter to mobile forces certainly makes a great deal of sense, *if* no other means exist to shield a country against aggression. Such a use of *counter-offensive* mobility exploits one ultimate gift of nature: that the best-laid plans of men often go astray. Plans are needed to launch offensives and aggressions; yet human beings are quite generally disposed to leave flaws in plans. Hope thus persists for those who wish to defend the territorial *status quo* rather than alter it.

IT MAY THUS BE normal and unavoidable for each side to invest in some weaponry that supports the offensive, to be ready to exploit any slips-of-execution in the other side's aggressions. Yet real instabilities will arise in the political and military confrontation if this weaponry comes to be the bulk of the military force on each side. The temptation to strike first will then loom ever larger. An offence-prone situation will always pose the greater risks. Shooting first and asking questions later never guarantees victory, but where the offensive predominates, it seems to offer greater hopes of victory.

In the past, the tank may have been the best counter to the tank, but today the anti-tank missile may be better, or at least almost as good. In this day and age, a responsible state or alliance must pay attention not only to who will win a war but also to reducing the likelihood of war coming. For avoiding war, the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) is better than more tanks; for winning war if it comes, it may give quite as good service.

9. *The Role of Reserves*

THE STABILITY OF THE confrontation with one's adversary is certainly not the single consideration in planning one's military structure, in Europe or anywhere else. Normally, one will want to balance the reduction of the likelihood of war with the reduction of the cost and damage of war if it comes, and with winning rather than losing the war if it comes.

Yet the maintenance of stability, as a way of reducing the likelihood of war, merits relatively high priority among these objectives. To reduce the likelihood of a "war nobody wanted", one would wish to acquire military forces that are most effective on the territory they originally occupy and are less effective, and less threatening, on territory they might try to move into.

Reserve systems, involving rapid shifts to large forces-in-being, are notoriously destabilising and suggestive of the offensive. They tempt the other side to strike while the iron is hot. Reserve forces offer the advantage, of course, of reducing peacetime costs of defence preparedness, while increasing the chances of avoiding defeat in war. But, unless one manages the reserve soldier carefully, the price of these advantages may be an increased temptation toward pre-emptive attack in a crisis, and therefore an increased likelihood of war.

Similar advantages are obtained, of course, and similar problems arise from stationing additional American forces at bases in the United States, and flying them in and matching them up with equipment in Germany when needed. The gains come from economic savings in peacetime and military effectiveness in war. The costs come from the incentives for pre-emptive attack in a crisis.

BUT IT MAY YET WORK OUT that the blend of destabilising reserve forces with new defensively-oriented weapons will produce a stabilising result. An important advantage of the new generation of anti-tank and anti-aircraft precision-guided missiles is that they are relatively easy to operate, meaning that even a "weekend-warrior" reserve soldier can use them effectively. With some of these weapons, nothing more complicated will

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be involved than holding the target in a viewfinder while the missile travels to its target, much as one keeps pointing the camera at the subject while taking home movies.

The ideal reserve system for a theatre like Northern Germany would produce a force-in-place very quickly, in the event of political crisis or a surprise attack, but would show no capability for plunging over the line into Eastern Europe. Some European countries, most particularly Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, have maintained militia reserve mobilisation systems which seem to fit this model. The Swiss model, for example, poses no threat to neighbouring countries. It generates a military potential that is defensive to the extreme, as each unit is especially good at defending the particular area in which it lives, having studied the peculiar features of its local terrain and noted the best spots for ambush.

IT IS SOMETIMES SPECULATED that such an effective, locally oriented militia system is only possible where it has been based on tradition, centuries-old tradition in the case of the Swedes and Swiss or more recent guerrilla tradition in the case of the Yugoslavs. Whether one could establish the same local-defence militia spirit in Germany, where the reserve unit has long been more attuned to railroads, mobility, and grand national mobilisations, is a most important and interesting question.

The idea of a more territorially-oriented German militia was proposed as early as 1954 by Colonel von Bonin. Von Bonin's plan was disowned by his superiors in the West German Defence Ministry, and he was dismissed. But it would be a fair generalisation that West German military leaders have all along inclined to a more forward, blocking defence than American planners.

Most such German proposals are not advanced out of any overwhelming concern for the stability that a more defence-oriented posture might provide, but rather as part of a continuing divergence of opinion about some of the other issues. The usual American view of an effective conventional defence for Germany has entailed a "rolling-with-the-punch" tank manoeuvre; but various German analysts concluded early enough that this form of defence might do too much damage to Germans and the German landscape. Such debates over "how best to defend West Germany conventionally" have always tended to become empty, in the light of the conclusion that Warsaw Pact tank forces would win against either strategy, forcing the NATO powers to rely on nuclear escalation as the deterrent to the Soviet onslaught.

If the arrival of precision-guided munitions with conventional explosives has now breathed new life into this discussion, we must sort out with care the alternatives they offer, lest these opportunities be missed.

IF ONE HAD the same militia mentality in the Hamburg Land that one sees in the Zurich

The View from the Pentagon

THE PENTAGON *has found that, for technical reasons, it cannot, as it had planned, build neutron weapons to fit the most widely deployed NATO artillery piece, the 155mm-howitzer. Thus, if President Carter should eventually order a go-ahead for production of the controversial neutron weapons, the US would build fewer than half the number originally programmed.*

Neutron versions of the 8-inch shell and the Lance warhead were designed, tested and ready for production by last summer, when the controversy over the weapons first became public. Research on the 155mm version was about a year behind that for the other two.

In numbers, however, the 155s were to be the major part of the neutron arsenal. There are 1,290 155mm-howitzers among the NATO forces in Europe. There are 450 8-inch guns and 92 Lance launchers programmed for Europe.

When President Carter held up immediate production of the 8-inch and Lance neutron shells, the engineering research on the 155mm-shell was just being approved. By that date, however, Department of Energy scientists, who develop and build US nuclear weapons, had found that they could not miniaturise the neutron components to fit into the small 155mm-shell.

Therefore, the Pentagon this spring quietly approved building a new 155mm nuclear shell, but of the traditional fission variety. The new 155mm and 8-inch shells are to replace almost 20-year-old nuclear shells deployed in Europe.

Even without the neutron feature, the new shells would provide 20-mile range, twice that of the older ones, and would include new safety features that render them harmless if stolen.

Traditional nuclear weapons now deployed do most of their damage through blast and heat effects. The neutron versions kill mostly by radiation. Advocates of neutron weapons say they would sharply limit the amount of collateral damage to areas outside the immediate target.

WASHINGTON POST

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canton, one might be able both to establish a credible defence against even smaller "smash-and-grab" operations, and still not throw away the new defensive tilt of the new military technology.

If one cannot achieve this optimum of location-specific, quick-reaction capability among the North Germans, however, it may then be far wiser to let Hamburg defend itself and to concentrate on maintaining a broader capability for defending the bulk of West Germany. This broader capability must, above all, not be vulnerable to surprise, so as not to tempt the Warsaw Pact into putting tanks to use.

This hardly means throwing away the possibility of relying more on locally oriented reserves. The operational question on reserves is obviously how quickly they can become effective, as compared with the pace of an enemy onslaught. If the local battalions east of Hamburg cannot get into their uniforms in time, this need not be true for the local battalions west of Hamburg. We may never go as far as the Swiss with their semi-automatic weapons in the hall closet; yet the new ATGMs are weapons that require little mating-up time, little central coordination and therefore can impose a heavy attrition on Soviet tanks trying to rush ahead of their infantry in an advance to the Rhine.

10. Some Conclusions

NATURE AND THE INVENTIVENESS of man may be handing us a new form of military technology that will help enormously to stabilise future East-West relations in Europe, and generally make conventional-weapons aggressions less attractive and less worrisome. Some of the soothing and balancing impact of the new technology will be achieved no matter what the military establishments decide to do. But some of it will be achieved only if attention is addressed to this particular consideration of balance, and if emotional attachments to obsolescent vehicles like the tank or the tactical fighter-bomber are overruled.

The "Neutron Bomb", by comparison, raises more problems, and may not offer more solutions. It promises—as do the new conventional precision-guided missiles—to punish the offence and to strengthen the defence, but only at a substantial erosion of the firebreak between conventional and nuclear weapons, with an increased risk therefore of escalation to World War III. The enhanced radiation of the bomb would indeed be most damaging to the tank crews of the aggressing force rolling along in the open; but experts disagree about whether there might not also be too much of such damage to defending soldiers, and to civilians huddled in ordinary shelters and basements. A heavy reliance on the Neutron Bomb would, moreover, be seen around the globe as a revival of the nuclear arms race, with damaging impact on the effort to halt nuclear proliferation. By contrast, a general emphasis on the increased effectiveness of conventional defensive armaments can only contribute to reducing still further the military glamour of nuclear weapons.

If the possibilities for conventional defence are fully explored, i.e. if the tendencies toward the weakening and obsolescence of the tank are reinforced, the Neutron Bomb would in the end simply be redundant.

If we can design a NATO force that will screen against all but the smaller Soviet aggressions, we may in the end have a force stabilising enough to make detailed battalion-by-battalion comparisons of the two alliances less frightening or meaningful, and even make the threat of nuclear escalation decline considerably in importance.

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L. P. Wilkinson

From the Point of View of Antiquity

Classical Approaches

IV. Homosexuality

I WELL REMEMBER the slight *frisson* of surprise with which, some twenty-five years ago, I first read the word "homosexuality" in the columns of *The Times* newspaper. It was then a subject hardly referred to in polite society or literature.

But in 1953 there occurred two or three court cases involving prominent people, and a converging movement gathered momentum, coming from the Howard League for Penal Reform, the Church of England Moral Welfare Council, initiatives of Sir Robert Boothby and Mr Desmond Donnelly in the House of Commons, the rebound of a hostile motion by Earl Winterton in the House of Lords, and certain newspapers and broadcasters, towards having the whole question of the law relating to homosexuality re-examined. Though Cornford's "Principle of Unripe Time" was invoked by R. A. Butler and later Henry Brooke, Home Secretaries in governments afraid of electoral repercussions, the Wolfenden Committee was appointed in 1954 and its Report of 1957 was widely discussed. But it was left to Lord Arran in the House of Lords and to Humphry Berkeley, and after him Leo Abse, in a private member's bill in the House of Commons in 1967, to undo the Labouchère Amendment to the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885, which penalised homosexual acts between consenting adults in private. All this produced in Britain a freer climate of talk and opinion, paralleled in some other countries,[1] until now we find ourselves accustomed to open advertisement of meetings and rallies of homosexuals, something unthinkable only a few years ago.

But there had always been one class of persons, relatively small but important as an élite, on whose attention the subject of homosexuality was inescapably thrust—those who were brought up on the study of the Greek and Roman classics and ancient history. There was much deprecation of this dark shadow on the idealised world of antiquity. Those debates in Parliament showed how ill-informed were some current ideas about ancient attitudes towards it; and indeed you would find little about it in many standard works of reference such as the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. So I should like to try to elucidate what is by no means a pellucid phenomenon.

IN THE WORLD PRESENTED to us by the Homeric *Iliad* homosexuality is not a feature.

The friendship of Achilles and Patroclus, though deeply passionate, is not overtly homosexual.[2] When the ambassadors leave them at the end of Book 9, they retire to bed, each with a woman concubine, in opposite corners of Achilles' hut. It is only in later ages, as in Aeschylus' lost play *The Myrmidons*, that their relationship is assumed to be sexual. Again Prince Ganymede, son of Tros, because of his beauty, had been carried off to heaven by the gods, we are told, to be Zeus's cupbearer. But it was left for later, pederastic poets to cite the Most High

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[1] The Kinsey Report of 1948 was a catalyst in the United States.

[2] After Patroclus' death Achilles' favourite was Antilochus, son of Nestor. Other legendary pairs of devoted friends were Theseus and Pirithoüs, Orestes and Pylades, and in history Alexander and Hephaestion.

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as a precedent for their own amours. It is true that in Greek mythology there are plenty of stories of the love of male gods for mortal males; but we cannot tell whether or not these antedate the Dark Age that followed the fall of Troy in the 12th century B.C. Nor is homosexuality found in the world of the *Odyssey*. When Telemachus visits Nestor in Book 3, his host arranges that he shall have his only unmarried son to sleep beside him in the colonnade; but it would be rash to deduce anything more than courteous companionship from that.

The poet—or two poets—whom we call Homer, shaping these two epics substantially as we have them in the second half of the 8th century B.C. (it would seem), was careful to preserve intact the bygone heroic age with which they dealt. But in the nearly contemporary Hesiod also, the earliest personal poet, there is no mention of homosexuality either, though he dealt with his own age; and it was the love-affairs of heroines that dominated the lost Hesiodic Corpus. Yet in the 7th and 6th centuries it was ubiquitous in the Hellenic world, as in the personal poetry of Stesichorus and Archilochus, Sappho and Alcaeus, Ibycus and Anacreon, and finally Pindar, now mostly known to us only in fragments and from hearsay.

Homosexuality itself is bound to exist everywhere and in all ages, inasmuch as we may assume that the genetic make-up that conditions the sexuality of human individuals has always varied in such a way that hardly anyone will be 100% male or female, and some will be very much of a mixture. The Kinsey Report used for assessment a spectrum graded 1–6. Active homosexuality will occur sporadically in societies where positive taboos against it are not too strong. But it will only be widespread where it is overt and given cultural encouragement. How did such a situation come about in 7th century Greece?

A long-standing explanation has been that it was introduced in the Dark Age by the Dorians, the last of the races that invaded the Greek world. There was some colour for this. For instance, such practices were especially attributed to their favourite god, Apollo, and their favourite hero, Heracles. They appear to be more institutionalised in Dorian states such as Crete and Sparta. However, they also flourished in some non-Dorian states, being particularly uninhibited in Elis and Boeotia, while homosexual scenes on vase-paintings were a speciality of Athens. The theory is at best not proven. In any case the Dorian invasions are a rather problematical subject.

We should think of these practices as evincing bisexuality rather than homosexuality, in that they could coexist with family life, which remained the organisational basis of society. Surprisingly, to our way of thinking, we rarely hear of their being considered likely to disturb normal sexual relations between man and wife, perhaps because the marital relationship was not generally passionate. It is interesting to learn, however, that in an earlier version of Euripides' *Hippolytus* than the one we have, Phaedra used her husband Theseus' relationship with Pirithous to justify her making passionate overtures to her stepson.[3] For various reasons our evidence about Greek attitudes to homosexuality is confusing. Items may refer to widely separated ages (five centuries divide Plutarch from Plato), or different states, or different social classes. Also there was in later times a flourishing industry in *chroniques scandaleuses*, many no doubt apocryphal, whose products we find garnered in such works as the 13th Book of Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists*. And, on the other hand, whitewashers may have been at work, including perhaps Xenophon and Plutarch.

NOR IS IT EASY TO DISCERN why and how this Greek idiosyncrasy took hold. The seclusion of women may seem an obvious reason, but it cannot be a complete one.

In Ionia, the coastal area of Asia Minor, where they were particularly secluded, it never became an institution, whereas in neighbouring Aeolia, where they were not, it inspired the poetry of Alcaeus (not to mention Sappho). It flourished in Athens, where women were somewhat secluded, but equally in Dorian Sparta and Crete, where they were not. Several ancient authorities thought that tyrants suppressed it because it was capable of inspiring passions reckless enough to overthrow them, as the lovers Harmodius and Aristogeiton overthrew the Pisitratids at Athens. But it is hard to generalise. One is driven back to the opinion of Plato, persistent in antiquity, that it was ultimately bound up with the development of athletics and gymnastics. These were practised naked, produced beautiful bodies, and in some states at least gave occasion for young men to mix with boys. There is a steady increase during the 5th and 4th centuries in the proportion of statues of boy victors at Olympia, as recorded by Pausanias. "I melt", wrote the Boeotian

[3] When Polemo (later head of the Academy from 313 to 270) was young his wife brought a suit against him for maltreatment because of his addiction to pederasty. Orpheus was alleged to have turned to pederasty after his loss of Eurydice because after her no woman could please him.

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Pindar, "when I see the fresh young limbs of boys." Their development in some states was part of a policy of manly training for defence which also involved mess life (*syssitia*) and the spirit of loyal comradeship it bred. The old Homeric warfare of princes with their retainers fighting in the cause of some other prince has given place to the line of disciplined infantry fighting for its country. The important thing to realise is that the love of a young man for an adolescent was regarded as the best possible means to education. He would long to mould him to an ideal and to shine in his eyes, while the boy would long to emulate his lover and win his approval. Either would be ashamed to let the other down in a crisis, and this was a keen spur to valour. Such relationships, far from seeming effeminate, were considered the height of manliness.[4] A small, wedge-shaped stone found on the Acropolis at Athens bears a 5th-century inscription, "Lysitheos declares that he loves Mikion more than all the boys of the city because he is brave."

[4] Cf. the homosexual chivalry that flourished from about A.D. 1200 in parts of Japan, among the Knights Templar, and in Albania down to this century.

BOY IN A CLOAK (*c. 330 B.C.*)

AT SPARTA such pederasty was the basis of education, both technical and moral, an education regulated through family, society, state and religion, just like an arranged marriage. At the age of twelve an upper-class "Spartiate" boy became eligible for a lover. A youth of similar class would sue for him, and if approved, take over the father's role. It was considered unseemly for tangible inducements to be offered, and we are told that a desirable boy could be fined for accepting a rich suitor in preference to a better but poorer one (though it is hard to conceive how the assessment could be made). An able-bodied young Spartiate who did not take on a boy, and an eligible Spartiate boy who acquired no lover, could be penalised. The law held the lover responsible for the boy's development, and the boy's reputation, good or bad, reflected on him. The lover was called the "inspirer" (*eispnelos*), and the boy his "hearer" (*aïtes*). The day on which the compact was made was a great occasion for the families and friends too. The lover gave his boy a suit of armour, and began to initiate him into the practice of arms. In the circumstances beauty could not be the sole, or even the prime, reason for choice; courage and character were no less sought on both sides. Yet the relationship seems to have been romantic. The object of the whole arrangement clearly was to perpetuate a tradition of martial excellence in an aristocratic caste, and to quicken it with emotional sentiment.

Similar institutions prevailed in the Cretan aristocracy. There was an elaborate ritual of courtship by simulated rape, analogous to the marriage ritual of Sparta. Giving three or four days' notice, a young man would intimate his intention to abduct a boy. Then, if both families approved, he would carry him off, after a token resistance, to his man's quarters (*andreion*), and thence for a sort of honeymoon to a country house, where he also entertained his friends to feasting and hunting. After two months he brought him back. If the boy complained that he had been subjected to violence, reparation had to be made and the affair was broken off; but if he said he had been well treated, he received from his lover (*philetor*) a suit of armour and a bull to sacrifice to Zeus at a feast for those who had accompanied them. He became his lover's comrade-in-arms (*parastatheis*). Boys thus favoured were called "the honourable" (*kleinos*). They had special places in choirs and gymnasia,

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and wore for life a distinctive garment.

Most famous of such élite corps was the Sacred Company of Thebes, consisting of 150 pairs of lovers. Founded in 378, it was invincible until annihilated 40 years later, after heroic resistance, at Chaeronea. Beside the body of the noble Epamindonas on the field of Mantinea was found that of his loved Cephisodorus, and they were buried together.

BOTH SPARTANS AND CRETANS are said to have sacrificed before battle to the god Eros. In general, Eros represented erotic sentiment, love, whereas his mother Aphrodite represented the physical manifestations of sex, lust.[5] Though both were concerned with either the heterosexual or the homosexual, Aphrodite was naturally more concerned with the former, Eros with the latter. Eros was represented in art as a dignified and handsome youth; it was only in the Hellenistic Age that he came to be a rascally, puckish boy, even a little child, often in multiplicate, presaging the Roman cupids and their descendants, the Renaissance *putti*.[6]

At Athens homosexual love had no connection with military chivalry, yet in the 6th and 5th centuries it was all-pervasive. There the custom (*nomos*) was, as Plato makes Pausanias explain in the *Symposium*, much more complex than in other states, which were either completely permissive, as in the case of Elis and Boeotia, or prohibitive, as in the case of many Ionian cities under the rule or influence of Persia. There were laws, attributed to the wise Solon, forbidding slaves either to take part in gymnastics or to have sexual intercourse with a freeborn boy, partly no doubt to prevent their becoming "uppity" through gymnastic or sexual prowess, partly to prevent their infecting free boys with the debased ethos of slaves.[7] This might suggest tacit approval of such affairs when between citizens. Yet schools and gymnasia were put out of bounds to men in the prime of life, that is, under 40 or so, at times when the boys were there and in the hours of darkness. No one under 40 could train a boys' choir. Any citizen who engaged in sexual activity for money was disqualified for life, as unclean, from the privileges of citizenship. Each tribe had an official called *sophronistes*, guardian of the morals of its young. Moreover, individual fathers appointed for their son an escort (*paedagogos*) whose duties included seeing that no lover communicated with him. Any boy who was having an affair was liable to be teased by his contemporaries. Lysias in Plato's *Phaedrus* has to reckon that a boy may hesitate to yield to a seducer out of respect for the *nomos* or conventions of society.

ALL THIS POINTS TO general hostility among ordinary people to pederastic practices. But the complexity referred to by Plato's Pausanias arose from the differences and illogicalities involved in what actually went on. The *nomos* encouraged the lover to pursue and the boy to flee. (Professor Sir Kenneth Dover, one of the few scholars who has freely discussed such matters, compares the modern situation in which many parents encourage their sons to make love but are horrified if their daughters do so).

At all events, by the 5th century those precautions had ceased to operate. Socrates, whose insatiable love of boys is frankly emphasised by his disciples Plato and Xenophon, who were yet at pains to clear him of any charge of corrupting the young, spent much of his time hanging round schools and gymnasia.[8] We have also the direct testimony of countless Athenian vases, which from the third quarter of the 6th century to the third quarter of the 5th are often inscribed "so-and-so is beautiful", or simply "the boy is beautiful." Boys' names occur nearly twenty times as often as girls'. They generally suggest aristocratic birth. Some recur often, and in more than one painter—obviously those guaranteed to make a vase a best-seller. Some are known to us from history. Nine are familiar from the Socratic circle. Many vases depict scenes from the gymnasium or wrestling-school, and in some physical eroticism is overt. Handsome youths are also prominent in the sculptures of the Parthenon frieze. There was, as we saw, something like a cult of youthful male beauty. Sophocles may stand as an example of the spirit of the times at Athens. He was exceptionally beautiful; and as a boy he was chosen to lead the victory procession after the Battle of Salamis, naked, anointed and playing his lyre. He became proverbial for his love of beautiful boys, and several of his lost plays

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[5] "The enjoyment of Aphrodite without Eros can be bought for a drachma" (Plutarch). Eros had no recognised cult in Plato's time: "his true temple is the soul of men" (Xenophon).

[6] We first hear of these as appearing in Aëtion's picture of the marriage of Alexander to Roxana (327 B.C.), playing with his armour; cf. the *putti* in Botticelli's *Mars and Venus* in the National Gallery.

[7] We learn from Demosthenes that there were laws, with the possibility of summary execution, against rape. These extended to the rape of slaves; in that case, he emphasises, it was the nature of the act, not the person, that the State regarded.

[8] Xenophon depicts him as experiencing a *frisson* when accidentally rubbing shoulders with the beautiful Critobulus over a book at school.

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had homosexual themes.[9] Such were the people who set the tone of society.

LET ME INTERJECT HERE a few remarks about the nature of such relationships. They were generally, in the classical period at least, entered upon by youths or young men with boys who had attained puberty, roughly aged twelve to eighteen. We must remember that, because of military commitments, men married rather late. Homosexual affairs between adults are less often in evidence. Adult pathics who used make-up and walked in a mincing way (*kinaidoi*) no doubt found partners; but they were objects of opprobrium to the majority—comic poets, for instance, could expect their audiences to laugh or shudder at them. In pederastic affairs it was assumed that one party was older than the other and took the initiative: we do not often encounter boy Lolitas. Indeed the vase paintings suggest that the boy is doing a favour to someone who has won his affection rather than enjoying himself. The lover was usually a young man, though not necessarily so: Pindar was apparently already middle-aged when he fell in love with Theoxenus of Tenedos. A defendant in Lysias admits, "I may have been rather silly about the youth *for my age*, but I hope you will not think the worse of me for that, since all men are liable to passions." It seems to have been taken for granted that boys and young men would go through a homosexual stage before settling down in marriage. It was not a matter of inversion, or even perversion, but of an expected stage in life.

Inevitably the question arises: were such relationships physical? Let us begin with the poet Sappho, who flourished in Lesbos about 600 B.C., since we may briefly deal once for all with what later acquired the name of lesbianism. She had a cultural circle of young girls, as did some other women there whom she names; but it seems to have been as unofficial as Socrates' circle of boys later on. These circles may have been the women's reaction to the prevailing craze for male homosexuality. Some of the fragments of her poems to her girls are as passionate as any love-poems could be. Three or four are capable, if no more, of a physical interpretation, and in one can be read almost for certain the word for the leather-covered phallus or dildo used by lesbians, *olisbos*. But we hear singularly little of lesbianism in the ancient world, as indeed in the modern, partly no doubt through feminine reticence, and partly through the smallness of the proportion of female to male writers. To Queen Victoria its very existence was unimaginable.

It is a surprise to find Solon, the Athenian lawgiver of the early 6th century who, as we saw, was credited with those stern precautionary laws, referring to pederasty in fragments of two poems in unmistakably physical terms and as though it were a normal stage in a young man's development. The Greek vocabulary for homosexual relations distinctly implies that *coitus per anum*, or at least *inter femora*, was the normal form, and many passages in literature have the same implication. Graffiti on rocks in the Dorian island of Thera (Santorin) dating from the 6th century or earlier leave no doubt about what went on there. No sharp distinction was drawn between buggery and other forms of erotic play, though *coitus per anum* may have been considered as equivalent to treating as a woman, by contrast with *coitus inter femora*; whereas in Britain almost down to modern times it was literally a matter of life and death, and the Wolfenden Report, with four dissentients, retained the differential, not for any rational reason, but because of "long and weighty tradition" and the presumption of "a stronger instinctive reaction" in normal people, plus the curious argument that what was called "the extreme form" was worse because it most resembled the normal act. However, Greek vases indicate that normally the boy stood and was taken from behind between the thighs.

With regard to the Cretan and Spartan couples, in theory at least, physical eroticism was forbidden. The pro-Spartan Xenophon and some later writers insisted that this prohibition was effective, however incredible it might seem to people in many permissive states. We must not be automatically cynical. Among the war like Albanians of the 19th century there were similar pairs; and although love was expressed in passionate terms, anything physical that went beyond a kiss on the forehead was considered worthy only of disgusting Turks. Cicero accepted a compromise version, that at Sparta everything was permitted so long as a blanket separated the partners. (One is reminded of those mediaeval lovers who tantalised themselves by sleeping with a sword between them.) All one can say is that it would be surprising if the flesh did not sometimes prove too weak, and the scepticism of many ancient writers, from Plato to Plutarch, is understandable.

[9] In his *Colchides* Zeus was enflamed by Ganymede. One of his satyr plays was called *The Lovers of Achilles*. Euripides' *Chrysippus* represented the curse on Thebes as beginning with the rape of that son of Pelops, by Oedipus' father Laiüs. He was reputed to have written this play for his beloved Agathon. It was probably a 7th century epic by Pisander that made Laiüs the introducer of homosexual practices to Greece.

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AT ATHENS INDEED there were male brothels, served by slaves who were hired out by their masters or kept by brothel-keepers, and there was a tax on male prostitutes, annually confirmed by the Council. Phaedo was reputed to have been a prisoner-of-war rescued by Socrates from a brothel. One of Lysias' speeches, *Against Simon*, involves a contract for the services of a boy. In Aristophanes' *Frogs* the mire of Hades awaits those who cheat boys of their contracted pay. These would probably be the freelances who called at houses or hung about at night in dark regions such as the Pnyx and Mount Lycabettus, selling themselves, if not for money, for presents or *la dolce vita*. It would naturally be hard to prove either that any physical act had occurred or that money had passed.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that (in Athens at least) homosexual practices were smiled upon by the general public, at any rate after the middle of the 5th century. Xenophon spoke of them as "something of the greatest reproach among us." Indeed the whole vocabulary of euphemisms for them is pejorative (apart from one common in literature, *charizesthai*, to grant one's favours), especially as regards adult pathics. It was these, and not the active partners, who were abused and derided. Aristophanes' plays abound in satire on pathics, notably on the poet *Agathon* in the *Thesmophoriazusae*, who was old enough to have won his first victory as a dramatist five years before. That he was voicing his own sentiments is shown by what he says *in propria persona* in the Parabasis of *The Wasps*. One explanation of the conflict of evidence may be that homosexual behaviour was more fashionable in aristocratic and highly cultured circles, among the people who bought elegant vases or read Plato, than in the population at large. Yet Aristophanes, even if we discount his being assigned a part in Plato's *Symposium*, probably moved in such circles. It is unsafe to suppose that because the audience was not shocked by jokes about homosexuality and because comic "heroes" are represented as enjoying it such conduct would be approved in real life.

By far the most reliable evidence we have for normal opinion, at least in the 4th century, is the speech of Aeschines against Timarchus (delivered in 346). If only we had Demosthenes' reply! Timarchus was supporting Demosthenes in prosecuting Aeschines for treason. Aeschines counterattacked by accusing Timarchus of having in his youth, though a citizen, prostituted himself for money. From this speech we learn, among other things: what reactions could be expected from a jury of ordinary citizens, their probable distaste for the whole subject; the text of those old laws for the protection of boys, still nominally in force; how a citizen who was a pathic might behave; that Aeschines himself could afford to admit to the court that he had had homosexual affairs, and was still liable to experience such passions, and that he had written verse about them. He distinguishes between commercial sex (which he calls disgusting, ridiculous and effeminate) and love (*eros*), which he approves—not between the physical and the aphysical. Admitting that in the nature of things he could have no direct evidence, he reminds the jury that Rumour (Pheme) was a great deity to whom their forefathers had set up an altar. And so horrified were they by his mere innuendos of commercial sex that they condemned Timarchus. What shocked them was that a citizen should have demeaned himself to do what would not be disapproved in an immigrant or a slave: sell his favours for money.

THE HEYDAY of the beautiful boys of Athens waned in the second half of the 5th century, as aristocratic social traditions were replaced by democratic. Not suddenly, of course; Socrates, as we saw, was still obsessed with them. But they ceased to be celebrated on vases, nor were scenes from the gymnasia and wrestling-schools any longer portrayed. With increased specialisation in athletics, tough professionals superseded graceful amateurs in Greece as a whole during

MAN AND YOUTH (*late 6th century A.D.*)

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the 4th century. It is true that Plato was writing in the first half of that century; and right down to the 4th century A.D. Sophists and rhetoricians were to continue the debate raised by his Pausaniat in the *Symposium* as to whether homosexual was better than heterosexual love (and we have just seen what Aeschines could say about the formes in 346). But in the so-called New Comedy of thar century, a fair index of public taste, love-interest centres on courtesans, or on problems of married life; and love as part of marriage is central to the plots of such plays as Menander's *Arbitration* and *Ill-natured Man*.

Consider what Plato has to say about love. In his *Symposium* Phaedrus sets the ball rolling by asserting that there can be no greater benefit for a boy than to have a worthy lover, nor for a lover than to have a worthy object for his affection. He makes specific reference to courage in battle; but that love could also be conceived as inspiring non-military education had already been illustrated in the 6th century by Theognis, the aristocratic poet of Megara, who addressed his lucubrations on life to a boy he loved named Cyrnus. In the next speech in the *Symposium* Pausanias distinguishes between the common Aphrodite (*Pandemos*) and the heavenly (*Ourania*). Common love is inferior because it is directed at women as much as youths, and actually prefers its objects to be as unintelligent as possible; whereas heavenly love is exclusively male, and prefers boys beginning to show intelligence to mere children. Pausanias does not say that there should be no consummation in physical intercourse, but that on the part of the elder it should be primarily a love of the soul, of character rather than looks, and on the part of the younger a cautious and deliberate yielding motivated by desire for improvement. This speech was probably intended to represent the justification for pederasty that the better kind of Athenian gentleman of that time would give.

The culminating speech, that of Socrates, describes enlightenment he claims to have received long ago from a wise woman of Mantinae, Diotima. It gives the subject a new metaphysical dimension. Love of Beauty first seen in an individual can and should broaden into love of all physical beauty; then lead to revaluing of moral and physical beauty, so that the loved one need not be good-looking at all if he excels in spiritual qualities; and thus by gradual process to the final achievement, the contemplation of divine and absolute beauty, which is identical with truth and goodness. That is Platonism.

But there is a concomitant theme. Love is a manifestation of the universal human desire to procreate, to perpetuate oneself. Those whose creative urge is physical have recourse to women and beget children. But in some the desire is for spiritual children, for begetting thoughts; and this can be achieved by intimate association with beauty embodied in a young friend. That is Socraticism; for we may fairly assume that it was Socrates' idea that the old Greek sexual pederasty, portayed at its best in Pausanias' speech, could be transfigured by becoming a sublimation of sexual libido into a common quest for truth and all other ultimate goods which would elevate both lover and beloved. The innovation lies in the belief that sexual intercourse takes the steam out of this process. It is emphasised by the scene that follows in the dialogue, when Alcibiades, greatest of all Socrates' many passions, comes in drunk and reveals to the company how once he tried to secure for himself Socrates' sovereign educative help by making love to him, and how Socrates abstained all night from taking advantage of this.

That this was indeed Socrates' attitude to physical pederasty is borne out by another of his disciples, Xenophon. In Xenophon's *Symposium* Socrates praises love of the soul as against that of the body.[10] It involves a self-restraint that is willing and pleasurable. Affection is reciprocated because the boy recognises its disinterestedness. His soul becomes the more lovable the more it progresses in wisdom, and the two enjoy caring for one another. These graces too are a gift from Aphrodite, and they are lifelong; whereas physical love is liable to be wasted on one whose soul is displeasing. Bloom soon fades, feeding on beauty surfeits, and the affection evaporates. Seduction is even worse than rape, for it corrupts the soul as well as the body of the seduced, who will concentrate, not on improving his soul but on exercising his charms. Besides, the boy, unlikely to share keenly, as a woman does, in the physical pleasure, may be disgusted, and come to find the persistent beggar for favours a bore.

IN THE PHAEDRUS Plato represents the youth of that name as reading to Socrates a speech by the fasionable rhetorician Lysias which has excited him by its virtuosity, on the thesis that it is better for a boy to grant his favours to a non-lover than to a lover. Socrates, in rivalry, treats Phaedrus to a far more eloquent speech, describing the disadvantages of yielding to a passionate love, which is as the desire of the wolf for the lamb. But instead of going on to develop the other half of the thesis, on the advantages of yielding to a non-lover, Socrates suddenly disowns the speech he has made, as blasphemy against the god of love; and in a magnificently eloquent and imaginative recantation he praises passion as a divine mad-

[10] Neither this nor Plato's *Symposium* prevented his being misrepresented as a practising homosexual in later times.

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ness. Love that is inspired by it can, if it transcends the physical, confer truly Olympian victories; and even if the couple prove unable to resist the physical urge, at least their wings will have begun to sprout.

> "These blessings [Socrates concludes], so great and so divine, the friendship of a lover will confer on you. But the desire of the non-lover, which is alloyed with mortal prudence and calculating principles of conduct, will beget in the soul of the recipient the narrowness which the common people praise as virtue. It will cause the soul to be a wanderer upon the earth for nine thousand years, and a fool below the earth at the last."

Such is the rationale of Platonic love.[11]

A MODERN, especially perhaps an English, educationalist might ask: "Would not a boy like Charmides, whom Plato so vividly describes as the cynosure of every eye, be spoiled by the attentions of older lovers?" One may certainly feel that the behaviour of the adult Alcibiades, who had had so many admirers in his youth, was that of a spoilt child. Plato was aware of the danger, and makes Socrates in the *Lysis* reproach Hippothales for the poems he writes which make his boy vain and proud. He himself, on the contrary, hopes to make his beloved Lysis more circumspect and modest, by talking to him in a way that makes him realise and confess his ignorance. One has to recognise that many of those who have proved the best educators in our schools and colleges have been Socratic in temperament, such as William Johnson (Cory), the poet of *Ionica*, at Eton in the last century. Plato believed that the spirit needed a stimulus that was ultimately sexual in order to exercise its educative function. On the other hand one has to think of the effect on the boys who cannot inspire any emotional reaction, surely a majority today if not also in antiquity. Might they not suffer from inferiority complex and neglect if this were the chief basis of education? And does this not matter?

As to the psychological effect upon boys of homosexual experience, one must realise that, whereas some modern boys, seduced by an elder male, may find the experience traumatic, Greek boys took such experience, first passive then active, in their stride, and usually seem to have turned out largely or completely heterosexual in their adult practice.

I NOW COME TO Plato's one-time disciple, Aristotle. His promise in the *Politics* to discuss elsewhere whether homosexual institutions are good or bad is not fulfilled in any extant work; and the treatises on sexual matters that we know him to have written are lost. But from casual remarks we can perceive his realistic attitude.

Whereas Plato talked chiefly of passionate love (*eros*), Aristotle talked of friendship (*philia*). To him friendship had three possible aims, education, advantage and pleasure. In love-affairs, assumed to be between young man and boy, the former sought pleasure, the pleasure of the eye, the latter advantage in the form of attentions and gifts. The lover was disappointed at the boy's lack of the kind response he hoped for: he himself aimed at pleasure, and fed on beauty, both of them transient things; whereas true *philia* was deep and durable. (Here Aristotle is, as often, too cut and dried in his distinctions in the psychological sphere.) Aristotle had a distaste for physical homosexual practices, as Plato and Xenophon had. They seemed to him worthy only of barbarians like the Celts—a notable reversal of traditional Greek feeling. And unlike Plato (though not Xenophon) he saw *eros* as the basis of the family, which was anterior to the state and essential to it.

In one important respect, however, Aristotle's disapproval was more discriminating than Plato's.

FROM A BRONZE STATUE OF A YOUTH (*c. 330 B.C.*)

[11] Though Plato (at *Republic V* 468) lets Socrates playfully suggest that the bravest soldiers should be rewarded by being allowed to kiss the most attractive boys, he did not approve of physical intercourse with boys.

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In the *Republic* Plato said that there should be a law forbidding a lover to do anything to his boy-friend that a father would not do to his son. Late in life, when he came to compose the *Laws*, he had lost even the degree of tolerance he had shown in the *Phaedrus* for passionate lovers who found themselves unable to resist physical temptation. Abandoning for once his admiration for Sparta and Crete, he repeatedly condemns homosexuality. In so doing he calls it "unnatural", using an argument he would not have admitted in another context—that it is not found in the animal world.[12] But anything that occurs in nature is natural. It is rather odd that Plato should have come to take this line, considering that in the *Symposium* he had shown himself capable of devising an imaginative myth (put into the mouth of Aristophanes) of how it had come about, by the agency of Zeus himself, that varieties of sexual make-up exist in human beings, including that of both male and female homosexuals.

So it was that the emotive, question-begging phrase "unnatural vice" early took root in the Western world, to the detriment of rational approaches to the subject. In the Lords debate in 1957 Archbishop Fisher said roundly, "Nature makes both heterosexuals and homosexuals alike —there is no doubt about that. We are told with authority that, in varied proportions, both tendencies are present in every one of us." The Wolfenden Committee decided to eschew the expression "unnatural"; and in the subsequent debates it was used only by critics like Sir Cyril Black and Mr William Shepherd (who took the Committee to task for their decision) and, of course, Field-Marshal Montgomery.

Aristotle's approach, on the contrary, is that of an honest scientist. He recognises that predominantly male embryos can acquire female characteristics, and *vice versa*, in the womb. In the *Physiognomica* some successor of his gives a detailed list of the characteristics of the pathic; and in the *Problemata* another speculates on what maladjustment of the body causes him to have the physical desires he has. He himself distinguishes between congenital and conditioned homosexuality—in modern parlance, between inverts and perverts—a distinction which the Wolfenden Committee was to find "not very useful" for purposes of social legislation. In the *Ethics* he says that some people are homosexual by nature and others by habit, such as those who have been conditioned by being abused from boyhood. And he adds the all-important judgment, that no one could call those in whom nature was the cause profligate (*akrateis*, lacking in self-control), nor those who are, through habituation, in what must be considered a diseased condition. Elsewhere in the *Ethics* he says

> "The appetite for food is natural since everyone who is without it craves for food or drink . . . and for love also (as Homer says), if he is young and lusty. But not everyone craves for this or that kind of nourishment or love, nor for the same things. Hence such craving appears to be our very own. Yet it has of course something natural about it" (W. D. Ross).

He is here allowing that the abnormal can in a sense be called "natural." In the Loeb edition, where Aristotle uses the word *atopos*, "abnormal", of some pleasure, Rackham misleadingly translates it as "unnatural."

In the Hellenistic Age philosophers continued to theorise, and rhetoricians to debate, about *eros*. We know the titles of ten works on the subject emanating from Plato's *Academy* and Aristotle's *Lyceum*. The headship of the Academy is said to have passed from lover to beloved for three generations, though this may have been rather a case of what we should call favourite pupils. Diogenes the Cynic, though his cult of shamelessness might have led him to approve of homosexual practices, seems from various anecdotes to have been hostile to homosexuals. This might have been in accordance with his principle that we must live according to nature, which was inherited by the Stoics, if he shared Plato's interpretation of the word "natural."

THE STOIC SCHOOL, founded about 300 B.C. by Zeno of Citium, at first took a Platonic view of *eros* and its place in education, Zeno, reputed to have been homosexual in his own personal inclinations, laid it down that "the wise man will love young people who show by their beauty a disposition to virtue . . . the bloom of youth is the flower of virtue." But such talk was nebulous, not to say cant. As Cicero bluntly put it: "Why does no one fall in love with a plain boy or a handsome old man?" And in fact the Stoics settled down to the view that all passion was bad. Here they parted company with Plato and approached their rivals, the Epicureans. These considered that *eros*, so far from being a divine dispensation, did you no good. You were lucky if it did you no harm. Sexual appetite was something to be satisfied, like hunger, in the readiest way, without sentiment. Sentiment was reserved for friendship, the most valuable thing in life.

In art and literature love was the great theme of the Hellenistic Age, the age of individualism. It could be either heterosexual or homosexual,

[12] Actually it does occur among animals, rarely however unless the sexes are segregated.

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as in Theocritus and the epigrams of the Anthology. But here tradition often overlay personal experience: we miss the direct evidence for real life that the 4th-century Attic Orators had supplied. Meanwhile, the Hellenistic world was gradually being transformed into the Roman Empire.

IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC the Romans' attitude to homosexuality was that of most non-Greeks; it was a Greek idiosyncrasy which they despised. They considered that gymnasium life had made the Greeks effeminate and undermined their military efficiency—the opposite of the old Spartan and Theban view; and the first great Roman poet, Ennius, said "stripping among citizens is the origin of vice." At first the law took cognisance only of rape, save that (as still with us) there were special prohibitions for soldiers on service, in the interests of military discipline. But in the 2nd century B.C., when captured Greece captivated its rude conqueror, there was an increase in homosexual practices; and at some time a *Lex Scantinia* was passed against them. This law was naturally hard to enforce, though it came in useful for trumping up charges in the law courts. As at Athens, it seems to have been adult pathics who continued in such ways (*exoleti*) that incurred most opprobrium. Respectable Romans always deplored them, the philhellene Scipio Aemilianus as much as the antihellene Cato, Cicero and Seneca alike. Julius Caesar felt that he had been indelibly smeared by Catullus' imputations. The Julian laws of Augustus prescribed the death penalty for sexual relations with free-born men and boys.

The qualification "free-born" here highlights the fundamental difference between the attitude of Athenians and Romans, of Solon and Augustus, on this matter. Whereas Solon had forbidden slaves to partake in homosexual practices, at Rome it was *only* slaves and other non-citizens who could legitimately be used for them; and they could be used without restraint. There was something sacred about the person of a Roman citizen. The Elder Seneca quotes from a speech a succinct sentence:

> "Compliance is a stain in the free-born, a necessity in the slave, a duty in the freedman."

Trimalchio, the freedman in Petronius' novel, owed his wealth to a master for whom he had served fourteen years in the pleasure department (*ad delicias*). "Nothing is disgraceful that the master orders", is his retrospective comment. Horace's remark, Epicurean in spirit, that any sensible man requiring relief will have recourse to the nearest slave boy or girl available (though made in a satire deliberately aping a tradition and not to be taken as necessarily indicative of what he would do himself), reveals what was taken for granted in some circles at least of society.

High prices were paid for beautiful slaves by private owners. Some kept *paedagogia*, regular establishments of beautiful boys, both home-reared and purchased, to play the Ganymede for the delectation of guests as well as master. The agriculturalist Columella warned masters against selecting their farm foreman from among slaves who had been used for such purposes. There were also male brothels at Rome; and the male prostitutes, *pueri meritorii*, had their own festival (on 24 April) as attested not only by Cicero but by fragments of a calendar that have survived. Romans may have been attracted also, unlike most Greeks, by boys under the age of puberty: Domitian stipulated by edict that no boy should be prostituted under the age of seven.

AS FOR LITERATURE, at Rome experience was even more overlaid with literary tradition, so that in the matter of homosexuality we cannot tell what the poets themselves did, only that audiences were familiar with the idea and at least tolerant of it.

Catullus addresses a cycle of poems to a boy he calls Juventius; but he also protests elsewhere

BRONZE STATUE OF A YOUTH
(*c. 330 B.C.*)

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that, while a poet should himself be chaste, there is no need for his verses to be so. Ovid specifically says that he is immune from the love of boys because he dislikes any form of intercourse where both partners do not achieve orgasm, which is interesting as showing that to him (unlike most Greeks of the classical period) pederasty meant affairs with boys under the age of puberty. Propertius hardly mentions the subject. Horace and Tibullus show more interest, but not enough for us to draw conclusions about their personal tastes and conduct, though Horace's description at the end of the first ode in Book IV of the dreams he has about the boy Ligurinus has a vividness that might suggest experience.

THE CASE OF VIRGIL is different. He seems more involved. The commentator Donatus says: "Tradition has it that he was inclined to desire for boys; but right-minded people (*boni*) have thought that he loved them as Socrates loved Alcibiades and Plato his boys." With this surmise I would agree, even disregarding such gossip as that he pertinaciously refused Varius' offer to share his mistress with him.

Virgil is not, in his major poems, a personal poet; but there is one short personal poem in the *Catalepton*, No. 5, which nearly all critics accept as his. In it he says goodbye to his associates at Rome when, as a young man, he is setting out for Naples and the Epicurean circle of Siro. Among these he includes *formosi*, which in Greek would be *paides kaloi*, beautiful boys, and particularly his "chiefest love" (*cura curarum*), Sextus Sabinus. But even in the major poems we can, I think, discern an inclination. In the Second Eclogue Corydon's love is a boy, Alexis. One has to ask why, considering that the poem is a literary *tour de force* largely composed of motifs from heterosexual poems by Theocritus. I think that Virgil's own predilections are the most probable explanation. And in the *Aeneid*, though Dido is effective, if sometimes too rhetorical, as a tragic queen in the literary tradition of Medea, I feel it is with those young men killed in the flower of their youth while fighting in Italy, such as Lausus and Pallas, that the poet is really involved; and particularly with Nisus and Euryalus, a pair of lovers just like those of the Theban Sacred Company:

> *his amor unus erat pariterque in bella ruebant.*
>
> ("These were united in love, and charged together into battle." 9. 178–83; cf 5, 295–6.)
>
> *Euryalas forma insignis viridique iuventa, Nisus amore pio pueri.*
>
> ("Euryalus outstanding in beauty and the freshness of youth, Nisus in devoted love for the boy.")

It was *amor pius*, we are told, that bound the elder to the younger. If this implies that their love was sublimated, not physical, it is quite exceptional in Roman ideas; but not improbable in Virgil, nicknamed *Parthenias*, "the virginal", whose well-attested shyness seems to have included something like a horror of sexuality.

UNDER THE EMPIRE homosexual practices continued to spread. It is clear from Lucian that, by the 2nd century at least, the Scantinian Law was a dead letter. Sometimes a youth would set up house with a man as his "*frater*", doing the shopping and housekeeping. As for the more sleazy types, the triangle between the three males who are the chief characters in Petronius' novel must have been recognisable as reflecting real life. But gossip was also active about some of the Emperors, about Tiberius (perhaps on scanty evidence), Caligula, Nero, Galba, Otho, and (as the final extreme) the openly pathic Elagabalus. Eunuchs—an Asiatic, not a Greek institution—were introduced and became the rage in some circles of society. Nero espoused Sporus, with all the honours generally accorded to an empress.

The most interesting case is that of Hadrian, a great philhellene. While touring in Asia Minor he fell in love with a beautiful Bithynian youth, Antinoüs, who became his constant companion for nine years. I have already mentioned Antinoüs' effect on sculpture. When he was drowned on an expedition up the Nile (in A.D. 130), the Emperor's grief pervaded the Empire. He was deified, and identified with Mercury, Apollo, Dionysus, or Osiris. A newly-discovered star was claimed to be his soul. He became a subject for passion plays; and games were founded in his memory. This at least is evidence of passionate love, much more reminiscent of the affairs of 6th- and 5th-century Athens than the mere exploitation of slaves, which we must unfortunately take to be more typical of Roman homosexuality.

The Emperor Antoninus Pius was the first to introduce punishment for intercourse with an unwilling slave. Alexander Severus thought of prohibiting male prostitution, but abandoned the idea for fear of riots. Philip the Arab actually did prohibit it; but there was no great change, it would seem, until the coming of the Christian emperors.

THE ATTITUDE OF CHRISTIANITY was influenced by its Jewish inheritance. The Law of Moses had explicitly condemned sexual acts between males. The fate of Sodom was there as an example; and

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St Paul, with his reservations on sexuality, had added his denunciations. Indeed to strict Christians, as in the ideal city of Plato's *Laws*, all sexual intercourse outside wedlock was a sin. Constantine revived Augustus' penalty of death by the sword for homosexual acts; and this was confirmed in 538, and again twenty years later, by Justinian, who denounced them as devil-inspired and a cause of pestilence, famine and earthquakes.

From then until our time in Christendom sodomy has been what the Law has called "that abominable crime, not to be named among Christian people." Hence the wording of Housman's poem, which he never ventured to publish, evoked by the trial of Oscar Wilde:

Oh, they're sending him to prison for the colour of his hair . . .
The nameless and abominable colour of his hair.

The *Code Napoléon* made a breakthrough by not distinguishing in its prohibitions between heterosexual and homosexual acts, and Italy followed suit in 1889. But English and Scottish Law remained among the most severely discriminatory. What was achieved by the agitation leading to the Wolfenden Report of 1957 and the subsequent Sexual Offences Act of 1967 was, besides legal reform, a ventilation of the whole matter, leading first to a more rational and then to a more compassionate approach, and to a social climate which has made it possible for me to write as I have done.

Sulpicia

Round this particular date I have drawn a circle
For Mars, dressed myself up for him, dressed to kill:
When I let my hair down I am a sheaf of wheat
And I bring in the harvest without cutting it.

Were he to hover above me like a bird of prey
I would lay my body out, his little country,
Fields smelling of flowers, flowers in the hedgerow—
And then I would put on an overcoat of snow.

I will stumble behind him through the undergrowth
Tracking his white legs, drawing about us both
The hunter's circle: among twisted nets and snares

I will seduce him, tangle his hairs with my hairs
While the stag dashes off on one of its tangents.
And boars root safely along our circumference

Michael Longley

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DISCUSSION

A Last Critique

On Kennan's Warnings—By LEOPOLD LABEDZ

"Many talents preserve their precociousness into old age." KARL KRAUS

BUT some do not. On each occasion when George Kennan has formulated a foreign-policy platform he has gone on to complain subsequently that he has been "misunderstood" and his views "misinterpreted."

In his *Memoirs* he complained that this happened to his *Mr X* "Containment" article (Vol. I, p. 359) and to his Reith lectures (Vol. II, p. 252).[1] Now he laments again ("A Last Warning", ENCOUNTER, July) that the criticisms of his recent statements on Soviet-American relations made by Richard Pipes and me "embraced several distortions or misunderstandings" of his views. What rotten luck! What makes Mr Kennan so accident-prone to suffer from so many "misunderstandings" and "distortions"? His critics' lack of intelligent perception? Their bad faith? Or could it possibly be something else? Could it be that the real reasons are his own innumerable ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions? And when they result in criticisms he proceeds to bemoan the "misinterpretation" of his position and produces arguments straight from the French *Fable de la Chauve-Souris* (The Bat's Fable). He either says:

Je suis oiseau; voyez mes ailes;
Vive la gens qui fend les airs!
(I am a bird; look at my wings;
Long live those who take to the winds!)

Or, if necessary, he retorts:

Je suis souris; vivent les rats:
Jupiter confonds les chats!
(I am a mouse, long live rats:
Jupiter confounds the cats!)

In this zoo of ornithological dialectics one can get lost between doves and hawks, mice and rats.

My article, "The Two Minds of George Kennan" (ENCOUNTER, April) provided a small catalogue of his contrary positions (which I referred to as Kennan *Mark I* and Kennan *Mark II*) during the last 40 years. In his rejoinder Mr Kennan does not even try to face this basic criticism; he simply ignores it. Instead, he proceeds *à la chauve-souris*. In his reply Kennan *Mark I* and Kennan *Mark II* somehow merge to become again (albeit with a difference) "Mr X."

> "I am charged by Mr Labedz with having abandoned, and turned against, the doctrine of 'Containment', and with having disowned the rules I suggested, many years ago, for dealing with the Soviet authorities. I am not aware of having done either of these things; nor can I imagine where Mr Labedz got the notion that I had."

Yet here is what *Sputnik* (a digest of the Soviet press published—in English, French, Spanish, German, Czech, Hungarian, and Russian—by the Novosti Press Agency in Moscow) printed in its May 1978 issue:

> "In 1947 the American journal *Foreign Affairs* published an article that represented a theoretical justification of the Cold War. The writer signed it merely as '*Mr X*', but insiders knew that it was the work of the eminent American diplomat and scholar George F. Kennan. Thirty years later, speaking to *Izvestia* correspondent Vitali Kobysh, Kennan said: 'I REGRET THAT ARTICLE.'

KENNAN: To begin with, there is no '*Mr X*' any longer. Admittedly, this acknowledgement as such is scarcely an adequate explanation. My expression of regret notwithstanding, you must not forget the period in which that article came to be written. The world was then imbued with anxiety and fear. The *Foreign Affairs* article—as with hindsight it is not hard to see—did not promote understanding, specifically between our two nations. But then, its publication itself was a Cold War product."

[1] Replying to a round table discussion on his views on *The West, The Atom and Russia* (ed. M. J. Lasky, 1958, p. 51), Kennan characteristically began by saying: "I must repress, first of all, the urge to deal at length with the individual misunderstandings of my own views which emerge here and there in the discussion. . . ." The discussants included Raymond Aron, Denis Healey, Richard Lowenthal, among others.

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Multiplication of the examples of George Kennan's contradictions would become rather monotonous. To Mr Kobysh he says: "*Je suis oiseau*", to me he says: "*Je suis souris.*" Having appeared before the Soviet (as well as non-Soviet) public as penitent for the sin he committed in launching the idea of "Containment", he turns around and proclaims in ENCOUNTER that

> ". . . to the extent that the various prerequisites for effective American action might be present, I would be no less in favour of 'Containment' today than I was 32 years ago."

In the meantime, asked by the reporter of *The New York Times Magazine* (7 May 1978) whether he feels that his views have been consistent, George Kennan confidently replied: "Well, they have, to my mind."

CAN ONE REALLY take seriously all these tergiversations? Would George Kennan now complain that the correspondent of *Izvestia* (which quotes him so often nowadays) distorted his opinions? In any case, in lending himself to Soviet propaganda he appears to have forgotten the lesson he himself formulated about Soviet Communists' "extraordinary ability to cultivate falsehood." Certainly he disregards his own rules for dealing with Soviet officials, rules which he says still seem to him "reasonably sensible": "*Don't act chummy with them. . . . Don't make fatuous gestures of good will. . . .*"

Other arguments in Mr Kennan's rejoinder show a similar lack of logic and unwillingness to confront the gravamen of his critics' reasoning. He reiterates his point about the contrast between Stalin's and Brezhnev's Russia as if it were a clincher:

> "Anyone who cannot see and appreciate the true extent of the difference between Russia today and Russia at the height of the Stalinist terror has a very poor idea of one or the other of those phenomena, if not of both."

But nobody denies the change! The substance of my proposition, which he altogether failed to face, was that the real question in this context is the problem presented to the West by the rise of the Soviet empire. Richard Lowenthal (ENCOUNTER, June) emphasised the same point:

> "I am aware of no inherent reason why a bureaucratic oligarchy could not be as expansionist as a despotism; after all oligarchies and even democracies have been known to pursue imperial policies. . . ."

But if George Kennan disregards now the threat of Soviet expansionism, he has not always presented Soviet domestic change in terms of sharp contrast rather then of historical continuity between Stalin's and Brezhnev's Russia. In his *The Marquis de Custine and his Russia in 1839* (1971, p. 124) he wrote that the work of de Custine is

> "probably the best of the books about the Russia of Joseph Stalin, and not a bad book about the Russia of Brezhnev and Kosygin."

Does this suggest that Kennan has "a very poor idea of one or the other"? Not at all. It only suggests that when it comes to foreign policy he is quite ready to resort to the *chauve-souris* type of argumentation in which contradictory statements mix and mingle.

IT IS ONE of the mysteries of George Kennan's logic why he thinks that "in the situation we face today" (i.e. when the Soviet Union has become a Super-power) few circumstances are still relevant to the idea of "Containment" as he formulated it in 1946 (i.e. when the Soviet Union was only a Regional power). Looking at the three decades of international change, one would have thought that it became *more* and not less relevant in the present circumstances when Soviet imperial ambitions are increasingly buttressed by growing military and strategic potential. Therefore, unless one is ready to embrace absolute pacifism or capitulation, Kennan *Mark I*'s explanation (*Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 346) of what made him embrace the idea of "Containment" is *still* pertinent. It is

> ". . . simply to cease at that point making fatuous unilateral concessions to the Kremlin, to do what we [can] to inspire and support resistance elsewhere to its efforts to expand the area of its dominant political influence, and to wait for the internal weaknesses of Soviet power, combined with frustration in the external field, to moderate Soviet ambitions and behaviour."

But, to be sure, with all his hedging, George Kennan *has been* slipping to a position which is difficult to distinguish from "pre-emptive capitulation", all his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. He has in point of fact adopted a pacifist stand. Asked by the *New York Times Magazine* reporter whether he accepts the "better red than dead" formula, Kennan replied:

> "Well, I do. I would say, '*Rather* red than dead.' But, mind you, your question is simply an attempt to carry the issue to unreal ultimate conclusions."

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There would, of course, be nothing extraordinary in Mr Kennan espousing a pacifist position. What is astonishing is his attempt to combine the logic of "Containment" (as defined above by him) with the logic of the "Rather red than dead" attitude. No matter how "realistically" qualified, the attempt is just another two-sided example of the Kennan *Mark I*/Kennan *Mark II* confusion.

Its underlying premise is quite clear. Indeed, if Kennan were a *CND* man marching to Aldermaston there would be no need for him to try squaring the circle by using arguments which, in Stalin's phrase, fit this premise like the saddle fits the cow; they are simply rationalisations of his befuddled emotionalism. They obviously derive, at least partly, from a residual wish to preserve the fatherhood of "Containment"; because of this he is inhibited from accepting the full implications of his changed frame of mind.

There is a striking contrast here with the position of some younger "progressives" who share his foreign policy attitude, but not at all his ambiguity about "Containment", past or present. For example, Daniel Yergin attributed his disorienting influence on post-War American policy to the fact that he had imbibed the nefarious anti-Soviet "Riga axioms" from the counter-revolutionary Tsarist émigrés. Evidently, for Yergin, Kennan should have followed at the time "the Yalta axioms" (which Kennan is in fact now—belatedly—doing.)[2] The incongruity of his present position makes him vulnerable both to those concerned with Soviet expansionism and to the "born-yesterday progressives."[3] Unlike them he is knowledgeable about the Soviet Union; but they have logic and no inhibitions, while he has no logic and notable inhibitions.

THE WAY KENNAN ARGUES ABOUT human rights and defence problems is another illustration of this.

He would not "underrate or defend what are, in the Western view, the darker and less acceptable aspects of Soviet rule." But he sees "no reason for the ritualistic incantation of them at frequent intervals just to meet the fashion of the times." Thus, having previously said that he admires Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn (but would not support them because he is not a Russian), Kennan now provides a new rationale for a discreet silence about "the darker aspects of Soviet rule." Protests against them are simply "ritualistic" and too "fashionable" for his taste. In this curiously inverted way matters such as the "trials" of Orlov, Ginzburg and Shcharansky become a question of reacting to *fashion* rather than of individual conscience. A historian once remarked: "In George Frost Kennan, the Presbyterian elder wrestled with the Bismarckian geopolitician," One would be inclined to say that the Presbyterian elder seems to be losing, but for the fact that the geopolitician is not doing very well either.

In matters of military capabilities and strategy Mr Kennan admits in his rejoinder that "the Soviet leaders overdo in this respect" . . . and that "this presents a serious problem for the rest of us and warrants reaction of one sort or another on our part." But did he say any of this to the correspondent of *Izvestia*? Surely he cannot justify not mentioning it on the same basis as he justifies his being mum on (say) the Orlov trial:

> "We have, it seems to me, more important things to talk to the Russians about than our dislike of their system and their dislike of ours."

Instead Mr Kennan talked at length to Vitali Kobysh about another favourite subject of his (and this went down very well with his interviewer):

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[2] Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace, The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (1978), p. 21. The reviewer in the Communist *Morning Star* (6 July) wrote:

> "In the view of Mr Yergin today's *détente* is a swing back to the realism of 'the Yalta axioms'. . . . [His book] is a fascinating study of people whose words bounce back upon them. In no case is that more true than in that of George Kennan, that archetypal 'Riga axiom' man, who . . . within a couple of years . . . was backing away in shock at the extreme carrying [*sic.*] of the policies he had advocated, a process that has brought him today to becoming a leading proponent of 'the Yalta axioms'."

[3] Reviewing *The Cloud of Danger* in *The Guardian* (9 February) Mary Kaldor wrote that the book lacks coherence and consistency:

> "It is an extraordinary mixture of liberal sentiments; of reaction . . . [and] of traditional American isolationism. . . . Nevertheless, there are sections of the book which are very welcome. George Kennan was the author of an influential memorandum in 1946 which described the 'dangerous and insidious' nature of international communism, and of the 'Mr X' article. . . . Now he advocates American withdrawal from many of the more extensive foreign commitments and his reasoned and knowledgeable assessment of the Soviet Union contrasts well with the current paranoia."

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"The advocates of a 'hard line' towards the USSR have always exerted pressure on the Administration. By their chauvinistic rhetoric they have created a certain mood in the country. The slightest tendency on the part of the authorities to cooperation with the Soviet Union has evoked a flood of charges of 'being soft on communism'. . . . The collapse of the Nixon Administration gave the 'war hawks' and 'hard-liners' a free hand."

So rather than drawing conclusions from his own (if reluctant) admission about the Soviet leaders "overdoing" their military build-up, George Kennan puts the blame on its Western critics; and he joins the Soviet chorus in the demonological exercise of denouncing them as sinister war-mongering figures. Not long ago this Orwellian inversion of meaning in which *resistance to Soviet expansionism* came to be branded as "a Cold War attitude", was frequently applied

Richard Pipes Replies

IN HIS RESPONSE, *George Kennan addresses issues which were not mentioned in my article and, at the same time, virtually ignores all the points on which I did challenge him. I nowhere said there was no significant difference between Stalin's and Brezhnev's Russia. What I did say, and Mr Kennan chose to brush aside, was that the whole institutional apparatus which Stalin had created to enforce his despotism was never dismantled, and that Mr Brezhnev's successor may, without much difficulty, put it once again to the same use. I appreciate the importance of* les manières *but I refuse to place appearances above substance (as undoubtedly would have Tocqueville, whose authority Mr Kennan invokes).*

I do not know where Mr Kennan found me demanding from him ritualistic denunciations of Soviet iniquities, or where I urged him to seek instruction on "the darker and less acceptable aspects of Soviet rule."

I did, however, emphatically urge Mr Kennan to address himself seriously to the issue of the Soviet military build-up and to reflect on what it implies about Soviet intentions. To this, he responds in a very cavalier manner. Exercising "the privilege of making his own judgments" he rejects the evidence presented by those whom he calls "hard-liners" as entirely unconvincing. He has "no patience" with "worst-case analyses", "totally rejects" the proposition (held, as it happens, by the Soviet High Command) that nuclear war can be won, and finds the carefully worked out strategic analyses of Messrs Nitze and T. K. Jones "highly implausible."

SUCH *ex cathedra* **pronouncements will not do. Mr Kennan evidently sees himself in this connection as a judge who is expected to render verdicts, whereas in reality he is a party to the dispute, on whom it is incumbent to furnish the evidence. His bare opinions on nuclear warfare, unsupported by either facts or critical analysis, may be of interest to his future biographer; they mean little if anything to those of us whose concern is not Mr Kennan, and his views, but national security.**

Since no one, to my knowledge, has ever accused Mr Kennan of favouring "the cultivation of nuclear weapons" his demurrer seems superfluous. He stands however, suspected of being ignorant of strategic matters. Lord Chalfont went perhaps a bit far when in a recent *Times* article ("Why America Must Ignore This Man", 2 May 1978) he wrote that what Mr Kennan "knows about strategy could be inscribed without too much congestion on the back of a Green Shield stamp." But then Mr Kennan does nothing to disprove him when he asserts that NATO countries have it "within their means to assure their security in a military environment wholly devoid of nuclear weapons, if they wish to do so." If these words mean what they seem to mean, namely that NATO should confront the vast array of Warsaw Pact short- and medium-range nuclear missiles with conventional weapons, then he need not defy anyone to accuse him of "treason." The statement is simply too ill-informed to be taken seriously.

I COULD GO ON. *What, for example, is one to make of Mr Kennan's assertion that "not once since 1945 has the Soviet Union . . . sent its own forces abroad for combat purposes"? Czechoslovakia 1968? Or was this not "abroad", in Mr Kennan's definition? The Middle Eastern "War of Attrition" in 1970–71? Or was this not "combat", since the Russians turned and ran as soon as the Israeli Air Force gave them a bloody nose?*

The real problem is that Mr Kennan seems to have developed so overwhelming a fear of Soviet nuclear blackmail that (as he has recently admitted in an interview in the New York Times Magazine*) he is prepared to embrace the principle "rather red than dead." I, on my part, reject this alternative on logical as well as moral grounds. I wish to be free and I wish to be alive, i.e. neither red nor dead; and for this reason I find Mr Kennan's spiritual capitulation before nuclear blackmail, and his efforts to shroud it in a high moral tone, unworthy of him and the cause he champions.*

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to George Kennan himself. But at that time he put the essential blame on Soviet expansionism rather than on those who were concerned with its "Containment."

It is simply misleading and unfair of Mr Kennan to write about Arms Control negotiations in a vein of feigned ignorance.

> "Whether, or to what extent, the various hard-liners in the United States and elsewhere have meant to frustrate these efforts, I cannot say."

He knows perfectly well that his "hard-liners" were as much for the idea of arms control (indeed some of them, like Paul Nitze and Fred Ikle, were involved in negotiating it) as he is himself. What they were and are anxious about is not to allow the Soviet Union to achieve unilateral advantages. He must also know that it is Soviet, not American, military doctrine that a nuclear war could be "winnable", so he is addressing his remarks on the subject to the wrong side. Did any of this come up in the interview with *Izvestia*? And it is not even necessary for him to indulge in "military mathematics" to know that the Soviet Union must have been outspending the United States in the military sector (out of a GNP which is half the size of the American) to have achieved military parity with it (officially recognised in SALT I). It is a matter of elementary logic. So his strictures about "statistics put out with the obvious intention of frightening parliamentarians into appropriating monies they might otherwise not be inclined to appropriate" are, again, misdirected. Instead, he might well have told his interviewer that it is the Soviet Union which has been for the last 15 years "overdoing" it by spending on armaments 11 to 13% of its GNP (some estimates put it at 15% or higher), which is more than *twice* the US percentage figure. Soviet readers are hardly aware of all this as *Pravda* keeps telling them that

> "The Soviet Union had never been the instigator of the arms race. Its expenditure on defence, in contrast to the military budget of the USA and other NATO countries, does not rise from year to year" (*Pravda*, 27 May 1978).

The trick is of course that Soviet military expenditure increases are not disclosed in the official Soviet budget allocations, as Mr Kennan knows full well. In fact, in the last decade while the Soviet Union had been increasing its military spending by 4% to 5% annually, the United States had been decreasing it by a similar amount (in real terms).[4] Whatever the disagreements about the percentage figures, the trends themselves are not in question; and if they are allowed to continue, the United States would find itself in *a position of both conventional and strategic inferiority to the USSR*. All this cannot be dismissed by Mr Kennan with a vague assertion that he has "no confidence in sweeping quantitative figures." And he might well have pointed out to his Soviet interlocutors that they were both "overdoing" it and "understating" it. But George Kennan hardly follows nowadays his own advice to "insist that no single falsehood or distortion from the Soviet side should ever go unanswered."

MR KENNAN'S ANSWER to the criticism of his statement that Brezhnev is "a man of peace" seems to me to be lame, or disingenuous, or both. He says that it should have been clear to anyone that it referred to "Brezhnev's obvious disinclination . . . to see Russia becoming involved in a major war with the Western powers" and not to the "alleged Soviet misdeeds in other parts of the world." What kind of reply is this? In my article on Mr Kennan I myself wrote that Brezhnev does not want a global war, that Stalin did not want one either, and that this does not make the former "a man of peace" in contrast to the latter. Mr Kennan asserts that since 1945 the Soviet Union has not "sent its own forces abroad for combat purposes." This is not strictly true (e.g. Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Soviet air and naval actions in the Middle East and Africa), and only shows that Moscow prefers to achieve its strategic goals by proxy. Mr Kennan is well aware of it.

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[4] Some experts put it higher. Professor Albert Wohlstetter wrote in *Survey* (Summer/Autumn 1976, p. 199):

> "For the 24 years from 1952 to 1976, the average rate of decline [in US arms expenditures] was about 5%. For the 15 years from 1961 to 1976, there was a decline averaging 8% per year. I want to stress that this long-term decline is not simply as a percentage of GNP but in real terms. It is an absolute decline. Since real GNP was rising while strategic budgets in real terms were declining, strategic spending declined even more as a percentage of GNP."

Cf. also William T. Lee, *The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955–1975: An Unconventional Approach* (New York, 1977) and *The Military Balance 1977–1978*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London, 1978). The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (headed by the dovish Mr Warnke) reported that during the decade ending in 1976 US military spending declined from 9·4% to 5·4% of the GNP.

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He analysed it carefully himself once upon a time.[5]

Indeed in his rejoinder Mr Kennan admits that some Soviet interventions "such as those in Angola and Ethiopia are mischievous and undesirable", that the Soviet encouragement of the "heavy Cuban involvement in these situations" is a "serious" matter, and that "whatever effective direct action the United States can mount to obviate the more harmful of their intended results" would be justified. I need hardly add that George Kennan does not appear, from the published interview, to have mentioned any of this to Mr Kobysh of *Izvestia*. But let it pass: *Izvestia* may have "edited."

What is even more clear as an indication of his real attitude is that when President Carter expressed similarly concerned thoughts in his Annapolis speech, Mr Kennan (and 60 other members of his "Committee for East-West Accord") sent a letter to the President (reported by *Trybuna Ludu*, 12 June) "expressing their deep concern about the anti-Soviet campaign conducted by some politicians and figures in the US Administration. . . ." This was generally given prominence in the Soviet and satellite press in their reaction against the Annapolis speech. Does Mr Kennan conceive of this as a contribution to justify "whatever effective direct action" was necessary on the part of the United States "to obviate" Soviet and Cuban interventions?

Mr Kennan warns us against "a rapid return to the rhetorical climate of the Cold War"; and the warning is not dissimilar to that of Leonid Brezhnev who recently accused "some circles" in the West of trying to return "if not to the Cold War, then at least to a chilly war." But Mr Kennan is less self-righteous: "The fault for all this is, of course, not all on one side; I wish that we had less of it. . . ."

In my less penitent view, the attitude of Kennan, who in effect has been putting greater blame on the West, is profoundly mistaken. In the action-reaction process of Soviet-American relations one can, of course, always find arguments to justify this or that act of Soviet policy as simply "a response" to Western conduct.

If one looks, however, at such points in an historical perspective, one notices that they are usually very similar, following a curiously standard thought-form in different historical circumstances. The *New Statesman*'s Kingsley Martin was using the argument about the Soviet need for security at the time of Yalta, and Konni Zilliacus went on about how Soviet soldiers were not fighting abroad at the time of the Korean war. But have not such apologetics lost all credibility today? The "security argument" is surely less persuasive in 1978—with all those Russian *SS–18*, *SS–19* and *SS–20* heavy missiles—than, say, in 1918. Yesterday the polemics were about Eastern Europe, today about Africa, and tomorrow? Whether it will be the Balkans, the Middle East or Western Europe itself, there will still be some who will use the same standard arguments in the Soviet favour. They are only responding, they crave security, anyway they themselves are not directly involved. . . .

THE ORIGINALITY of George Kennan lies in the fact that he uses such arguments without explicitly abandoning the idea of "Containment." The irony of the situation is that (as Norman Podhoretz has rightly formulated it)

> "the Cold War to the Russians is what the West calls 'Containment'—the effort to keep the Soviet empire from expanding beyond the boundaries established in Europe by World War II, and to prevent the takeover of countries elsewhere by Communist force or subversion."
> (*The New York Times*, 14 June).

Mr Kennan mourns the decline of *détente*. "In its heyday", he wrote, "the opposition [to it] was almost silenced—partly by Richard Nixon's formidable credentials as a hard-liner . . . and partly by Henry Kissinger's diplomatic fireworks." But perhaps what we are witnessing is the erosion

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[5] Here is an excerpt from a Moscow dispatch by Ambassador Kennan of 8 September 1952 (*Memoirs*, Vol. II, p. 329):

> "Ever since the beginning of the revolution it had been orthodox Communist strategy not to seek an open and general military confrontation with capitalist power, but rather precisely to avoid such confrontation and to conduct the attack on the capitalist world in a much more cautious manner, representing what Lenin termed a 'state of partial war'. . . ."

And in 1958 in *The West, The Atom, and Russia* (p. 51) Kennan contrasted "Soviet intentions with regard to the use of the *Soviet* armed forces in *international* conflict" with the

> "Soviet attitude toward the use of Communist *puppet* forces in other countries in *civil* conflicts within those countries. I should like to make clear that in my view the Soviet leaders should be expected to make use of puppet forces for the unleashing of civil war elsewhere whenever this holds reasonable promise of serving their interests without engaging too overtly their responsibility. This was my view before Korea; it remains my view today."

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of illusions of pseudo-*détente*.[6] Those who supported it are now saying that *détente* has been "oversold", but at the time one could scarcely hear them protesting against this "over-selling." This was left to those few voices which were unfashionable enough not to remain silent. When these illusions became more generally recognised, those who were spreading them began trying to give a new garb to the concept of *détente*.[7]

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[6] Richard Lowenthal (ENCOUNTER, June) complains that I gave no reason for using this term. He knows that I have explained its meaning often before (e.g. in *Survey*, Summer 1973 and Spring/Summer 1974; in *Hearings before the Committee on Government Operations*, US Senate, 12 July 1973; in G.R. Urban, *Détente*, London & New York, 1976).

Allow me to re-state briefly why so-called *détente* seemed to me to be "pseudo." It has created false expectations about Soviet behaviour. It has anaesthetised the West into a spurious sense of security while the Soviet Union has been trying to tilt the balance of power in its favour. It has not been reciprocal and has given the Soviet Union one-sided advantages. Of course, not *all* Soviet policy goals in *détente* have been achieved, but it has contributed to the weakening of the West.

Lowenthal gives the concept of *détente* a meaning different from the one prevailing during the period in question. He provides a "minimum" definition summed up as "partial cooperation" through the effort "to control the conflict by negotiations and crisis management." But this definition applies as much to the crises of Berlin and Cuba in the 1950s and 1960s as to the crises in the Middle East and Africa in the 1970s, and thus does not distinguish between Cold War and *détente*. Lowenthal says

> "Surely, the fact that within the long-term East-West conflict new disputes have arisen since 1973 is no reason to make light of the settlement of some long-standing earlier disputes between 1969 and 1973?"

He tries to divorce the Soviet long-term strategy based on "ideological struggle"—"stressing the irreconcilable nature of the conflict of the systems"—from "the immediate nature of the process of *détente*." But the point is that the Soviet Union relates the two and sees this relationship as essential for its policy. Therefore the conflict is not just a series of discreet "disputes" (some of which are "settled" through *détente*) but is continuous. "New" disputes unfortunately "arise"; and old ones can easily be revived, in spite of having been "settled."

BUT, AFTER ALL, what's in a name? Some people were branded warmongers because they wanted a genuine and not a fake *détente* (which permitted the Soviet Union to carry on the Cold War unilaterally). But the real problem now is the attitude to be adopted in the next period, be it called *détente* minus, post-*détente*, chilly war, or any other name.

Here George Kennan has unwittingly provided a certain clarification. Stripped of confusions and contradictions, his evolution shows the unfolding of the logic of Appeasement in contrast to the logic of Containment.

George Kennan warns us of dire consequences

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[7] Richard Lowenthal is partly critical of and partly in agreement with George Kennan. But although not always consistent himself, he has had fewer illusions. In October 1963 he wrote in ENCOUNTER:

> "The party régime of the Soviet Union remains a permanent threat to the security and freedom of the non-Communist world as well as the gaoler of the forcibly sovietised peoples of Eastern Europe—during the present pause no less than during the past period of acute, offensive pressures. . . . The danger is that the Soviets might achieve, by the warm sunshine of a policy of *détente*, what the cold blast of their threats has been unable to accomplish: the legal consolidation of the partition of Germany and the disintegration of the Atlantic alliance. . . . We dare not jeopardise our security and unity during a temporary *détente*. But we may, and indeed must, use the present phase not only to reduce the risks of the atomic age as far as possible, but also to contribute, within the measure of an influence, to the kind of profound change in the nature of our opponent which alone can open the road to real peace."

Afterwards, Richard Lowenthal supported Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and the Nixon-Kissinger *détente* (which he now considers "an important achievement", as does Mr Kennan). In May 1976, he stated in ENCOUNTER that *détente* "is seriously in danger", but, unlike Kennan, he did not blame it mainly on the West, but, on the contrary, concluded that the West needs a tougher line:

> "If the balance of power can be restored at the danger points as a result of . . . constructive Western efforts, the temptations for Soviet exploitation of Western weakness will be removed and *détente* can be saved. Otherwise, the loss of balance may well lead sooner or later to the end of *détente*, and even to the loss of its achievements."

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if his present recommendations are not adopted. But what exactly does he propose?

He repeats that he has "nothing against the strengthening of our conventional forces in Europe", but believes that the NATO countries can "assure their security" without nuclear weapons. Any other course will lead to "a catastrophe for all concerned and millions not concerned." This implies one of two things:

1. That unilateral Western nuclear disarmament would lead to a similar action by the Soviet side. But the Soviet Union has shown no inclination to respond to Western initiatives on self-restraint, from the Baruch Plan (1946) to the unilateral cancellation of the *B-1* bomber by President Carter (1977).

2. That the West can base its defence on conventional forces against the nuclear ones, a no less untenable notion.

In fact, the idea that *any* unilateral Western action can lead to the banning of the spectre of nuclear war is quite unrealistic (Kennan also refuses to face the question of the nuclear implications of the Sino-Soviet conflict).

It seems to me to be quite beyond ordinary logic to argue (as Kennan does) at one and the same time

1. That "no one in his right senses would yield to any such thing as nuclear blackmail."

2. That one should adopt the attitude of "rather red than dead."

Underlying this glaring inconsistency is of course an understandable fear of a nuclear holocaust, but even that is no reason for abandoning logic and judgment. A mishmash of incompatible positions can hardly provide a sensible basis for future policy.

WHAT ABOUT the alternatives?

We know from history that appeasement increases rather than decreases the chances of war. A prudent defence policy which (unlike Kennan's "Containment"-minus-effectiveness) does not lead Soviet rulers into temptation is a lesser risk than what Mr Kennan used to call "fatuous gestures of good will" to them. In the long run such gestures can only make us utterly dependent on the goodwill of the Soviet leaders, God help us! A policy of resistance surely offers a better prospect of an eventual emergence of a meaningful system of arms control.

A reversal of "Containment" would increase not only the danger of Soviet expansionism, but also of war. Soviet leaders are sufficiently rational and cautious to avoid nuclear exchange, but the chances of escalation and miscalculation increase with the threshold of opportunity for Soviet "adventurism" lowered. Mr Kennan knows how they operate on the margin, trying to shift the balance of power in their favour incrementally. Their military strength may be growing, but their political appeal is waning. This is one more reason to try to deprive them of the prospects of external successes, so that eventually internal reform becomes their only way out from the problems accumulated by Soviet history. This is after all what George Kennan postulated in the first place.

THE USE OF CONTRADICTORY arguments is particularly striking in his treatment of the relation between Marxist-Leninist ideology and Russian nationalism in Soviet foreign policy. In 1946 Kennan *Mark I* argued that these two factors are not mutually exclusive but that both play a role in Soviet conduct:

> "It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for the first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbour or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. . . . In the name of Marxism [the Bolsheviks] sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is the fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced the country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee the external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate the importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven by their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which . . . provides justification for that increase of military and police power of the Russian state, for that isolation of the Russian population from the outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend the limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which the conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in a new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a

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desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before."[8]

Three decades later Kennan *Mark II* observed (in *The Cloud of Danger*, pp. 176–7) that the post-war developments "undermined the dream of eventual world revolution under Russian-Communist auspices", and he deduced that "the rhetoric of revolutionary Marxism" is now just a "verbal smokescreen" for the traditional nationalist Russian foreign policy. The shift provided him with the basis for startlingly complacent conclusions about the dangers facing the West. These conclusions are summarised by a sympathetic reviewer of his book in *Quadrant* (Sydney, July 1978, p. 42) as follows:

> "If ideology can be discounted as the motor force of Soviet foreign policy Kennan believes it is easy to see how exaggerated are those fears of the expansionist intentions of the Soviet leadership that dominate Western governments' thinking concerning relations with Moscow."

Yet when George Kennan tries to prove the "peaceful" nature of the present Soviet leaders, he asserts again (in *The New York Times Magazine*, 7 May 1978, p. 122) that ideology *is playing* an important role for them:

> "The Leninist-Marxist ideology has never said that the way that Marxism was to triumph all through the world was by an action of the Soviet armed forces. It might be an action in which the Soviet armed forces helped, but the main thing was always to be the action of the proletariat and of right-thinking people within the countries themselves. And this is not just meaningless. They do take ideology rather seriously."

Is it not rather obvious that Kennan *Mark II* can easily match what Kennan *Mark I* used to call "the Russian genius for rationalisation?"

IS THERE ANY REASON to accept his prophecies of impending doom? The end is not near; we had better keep cooler heads. In the past Mr Kennan's diagnosis has not always been very perceptive. In 1959 he said[9] that

> "On the whole, objectives and tendencies of Russian Communism follow the same path as the liberal industrialism in the West. . . . Since the death of Stalin a certain form of parliamentarism, it is true to say rather limited, has appeared."

Ever since then, George Kennan has continued his wishful thinking about the Soviet scene, at the same time modifying his views about Western policy.

WHO WOULD WANT to deny George Kennan the right to change his mind? Like everybody else, he is entitled to revise his views (though preferably without the *chauve-souris* dialectics which make his metamorphosis less explicit). He may give us his "last warning", and we may or may not take it seriously. But when he argues that his views have been consistent this surely cannot be taken seriously. Those who have to take responsible decisions on which the fate of the West and of the world in general depend should be on guard against the combination of apocalyptic mood and intellectual schizophrenia embodied in "A Last Warning." They should not take the assurances about the continued attachment to Containment by the author of "Containment" at face value.

And if Mr Kennan would protest again that he has been "misunderstood" and his views "distorted", I for one would have had enough.

[8] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol, VI (1946), p. 700.

[9] R. Aron, G. Kennan, R. Oppenheimer, et al., *Colloques de Rheinfelden* (Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1959), pp. 106, 118.

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

WITH THE PUBLICATION of the translation of the third volume of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archpelago*,[1] English readers now at last have the opportunity to read this immense, terrifying and epic work in its entirety. To do so is to undergo what is in some respects a unique experience, for *The Gulag Archipelago* is itself a unique book, for which it is difficult to find any parallel in literature. Certainly I myself find it difficult to think of any other book with which it can be usefully compared, unless perhaps one were to take into consideration one of those collections of folk legends and sagas which, almost by accident as it were, for that was never their purpose, reveal to us the existence of peoples, races, entire civilisations of which otherwise we should have no knowledge, even though we might obtain tantalising hints of their existence from other sources. The difference is of course that *The Gulag Archipelago* does not come down to us from some dim and misty past but from an all too oppressively near present. Nor is it the work of a variety of hands which we cannot now hope to identify, but of a miraculously still living writer, whose personality is vividly present to us throughout the book, and whose bitter rage and violent revulsion, his *saeva indignatio*, at the horrors he has to relate belong to the book's very essence.

OR PERHAPS one might be driven to think of the *Divina Commedia*, for where else in literature would one find so complete, so self-consistent, so all-embracing a world, with its own laws and principles, its own history and topography and cosmology, and populated by thousands of individuals whom we come to know intimately, such as Solzhenitsyn has created in *The Gulag Archipelago*? Yet here again the comparison fails, for the *Divina Commedia* is a creation of sublime art and imagination while *The Gulag Archipelago* is a work of the harshest and most relentless realism; while again, in the *Divina Commedia* the human soul emerges from the depths of sin and suffering until it can once more see the stars, but from the darkness of *The Gulag Archipelago* there is no such release.

It is only in their vast scope and immensity that the two books resemble each other; in everything else there is no likeness between the messages they offer to suffering humanity. Only in reading *The Gulag Archipelago* one cannot help thinking again and again that the tortures inflicted by Dante on the souls of the damned in the Inferno are as nothing compared with those perpetrated in the Archipelago on the living flesh of for the most part innocent men and women.

THE UNIQUE EFFECT on the reader of *The Gulag Archipelago* is no doubt in part a result of the manner and conditions in which it was composed. Without access to any of the resources normally available to the historian, in secrecy and by stealth and always in imminent danger of discovery and the terrible consequences it was likely to entail, Solzhenitsyn set out to describe the entire topography, sociology and psychology of a penal system which has by now endured for over half a century, and like the Soviet state itself still shows no signs of withering away. At the same time he undertook to bring to life for us the personal biographies and characters of a representative selection among those millions of individuals who were, and to the present day remain, the victims of that system. It was, and continues to be, an astonishing feat; it was a kind of miracle that the book should have been written at all, and perhaps an even greater miracle that it should have survived to see the light of day.

In an "Afterword" to the present volume, Solzhenitsyn tells us:

> "I must explain that *never once* did this whole book; in all its parts, lie on the same desk at the same time! In September, 1965, when work on the Archipelago was at its most intensive, I suffered a setback: my archive was raided and my novel [*The First Circle*] was impounded. At this point, the parts of the Archipelago already written, and the materials for the other parts, were scattered, and never reassembled: I could not take the risk, especially when all the names were given correctly. I kept jotting down reminders to myself to check this and remove that, and travelled from place to place with these bits of paper. The jerkiness of the book, its imperfections, are the true mark of our persecuted literature. Take the book for what it is."

[1] *The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956* (3): *An Experiment in Literary Investigation*. By ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN. Translated by H. T. WILLETTS. Collins & Harvill Press, £6.50.

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Surely no work of genius, such as *The Gulag Archipelago* undoubtedly is, was ever written under more difficult conditions. But Solzhenitsyn is perfectly right to tell us to take the book, with all its unevenness and imperfections, for what it is, which is the most total and absolute condemnation of the Soviet régime that has ever been written. It is in no way surprising that the Soviet authorities should have placed every obstacle in the way of Solzhenitsyn's completing it, even in its present form; for its publication has probably been the greatest single blow ever delivered against the prestige of the Soviet Union and if that prestige has today very nearly reached its nadir, it is very largely because of *The Gulag Archipelago*.

If today national Communist parties or Euro-Communists attempt to find other ways to Socialism than those adopted by the Soviet Union, it is because they realise that, though their ultimate objectives may be the same, that is to say the destruction of the capitalist system, they can no longer afford to be identified with a system of government which requires and demands, as a matter of deliberate policy, the torture, imprisonment and forcible deportation of millions of human beings under conditions which deny them any claim to mercy or compassion. And if at length this conclusion has been forced upon them, however reluctantly, it has been very largely because of the enormous impact made by *The Gulag Archipelago* on public opinion outside the Soviet Union. It would be quite reasonable to say that in this century no other book has had a greater political effect, and, what is more, that effect is likely to be a permanent and lasting one.

IN THE FIRST VOLUME of his book, Solzhenitsyn traced the origins, genesis and growth of the Gulag Archipelago, the principles and procedures which provided it with a legal basis, and the monstrous burgeoning of this universal system of terror, which so far from being an excrescence on the Soviet system, or an aberration from its fundamental hopes and ideas, became instead an essential and integral element in the functioning of its institutions, both politically and economically.

In his second volume he described how the penal system embodied in the Archipelago functioned at the highest peak of its development, when it swallowed up something between seventeen and twenty million victims; in doing so, he made use of a wealth of illustrative detail and of personal experiences which gave his account an authority and authenticity which were impossible to challenge, but also a sickening and almost unbearable sense of horror. The effect was to create in the reader a feeling almost of incredulity that such a state of affairs could exist in a country which once, even in the days when it was reviled as "the gendarme of Europe", had been recognised and accepted as a member of the European civilised community and even, because of her contribution to its literature, arts and sciences, one of its most creative and productive.

In this third volume Solzhenitsyn follows the later development of the Archipelago up to and after the death of Stalin, and in particular the further refinement added to its horrors by the creation and development of the special detention camps, or *Katorgas*, a Russian term derived from the Greek word for the forced labour of slaves chained to their oar in the galleys. It is a term which in no way exaggerates the depths of degradation and brutalisation to which the inmates of the camps, the *katorzhane*, were reduced, and this was perfectly logical because the object of the camps was quite simply the extermination of their inhabitants; in this they were overwhelmingly successful. He also describes the effect in the camps of the false thaw which followed the death of Stalin, and the equally false hopes which it inspired and were as quickly extinguished; for as the title of one of his chapters has it: "Rulers Change, the Archipelago Remains."

Indeed, it even extended its tentacles, as by some process of colonial expansion, beyond its own frontiers into those remote and barren areas of steppe and taiga and tundra designated for the reception of those prisoners who, their sentences having expired, were condemned to perpetual exile. Here, in many cases, conditions were worse than in the camps themselves; for whereas in the camps the authorities were responsible for providing the barest minimum of food and shelter, in the barren lands of exile the prisoners had become, by an exquisite irony, *free men*, and thus responsible for their own maintenance, yet in such circumstances denied the opportunity to work and earn their own living. To their sufferings must be added those of the millions belonging to the Soviet Union's subject races who were forcibly deported from their native lands at a moment's notice, stripped of all their belongings and possessions and, after journeys which were in themselves a form of calvary, were deposited in wildernesses which did not afford even the most primitive means of existence. In such conditions, to many exiles even the horrors of the *katarga* seemed preferable.

It is characteristic of Solzhenitsyn that, in recounting his terrible story, he still finds reasons, if only rarely and exceptionally, for hope. He finds them for instance in the courage, determination and ingenuity of those characteristic

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inmates of all prison camps, the inveterate and confirmed escapers, who against all odds have succeeded, though in most cases only for a short time, in breaking out of the Archipelago, as in the case of Georgi Tenno, whose own narrative of his escape forms one of the most remarkable and moving chapters of this book; or again in those rare cases where the prisoners rebelled against the relentless inhumanity of the system of which they were the victims, and by sheer solidarity and unity of purpose reduced it, if only briefly, to helplessness. Such outbreaks were necessarily in the end doomed to failure. Yet Solzhenitsyn concludes that wherever a genuine and spontaneous form of public opinion existed in the camps, as opposed to the mockery and parody of it which is provided by the authorities, even the Soviet state itself could be reduced for a moment to impotence, and perhaps this lesson from the Archipelago may offer at least some message of hope and encouragement to those Soviet dissidents against whom the authorities are at the moment once again concentrating all their weapons of intimidation, repression and extermination.

THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO represents one of the most severe reverses the Soviet Union has ever experienced, just because it exposes so nakedly and ruthlessly that unique combination of terrorism, cynicism, hypocrisy, ruthlessness, stupidity and inefficiency which provides the ideological infrastructure of the Soviet state. Where else but in the Soviet Union would the professional criminal, thieves, gangsters, murderers, be granted preferential treatment and appointed to positions of authority in the camps, because in the Soviet mythology the criminal is a "class ally" of the state whereas the political dissident is by definition its mortal and deadly enemy? Such features of the Archipelago turn it into a kind of nightmare version of *Alice in Wonderland;* yet perhaps the greatest horror of all is that the Archipelago itself is only a mirror of evils which permeate and corrupt the whole of the vast mainland to which it is attached.

It constitutes not an exception but the rule, and from this point of view may be regarded as the Soviet Union's most characteristic contribution to the science of government; yet from another, as Solzhenitsyn continually emphasises throughout his immense work, it may be regarded, for all its cruelties and sufferings, as ao improvement on the society of which it is the product, because in the Archipelago the prisoner is offered, as Solzhenitsyn himself has demonstrated, an opportunity to achieve a kind of spiritual freedom which on the mainland is ruthlessly denied him by all the organs of the state.

THE INDICTMENT OF Soviet society presented by *The Gulag Archipelago* is for the Soviet authorities a matter for serious and acute embarrassment; as indeed is the continued existence of its author, Alexander Solzhenitsyn. But it must also be confessed that he and his book equally constitute an embarrassment to all those countries which, outside the Soviet Union, still retain a claim to some measure of freedom and civilisation. For they present those countries with a political and moral dilemma which today shows every sign of becoming increasingly acute and insoluble.

For, on the one hand, to maintain amicable relations with a state which created and continues to maintain the Gulag Archipelago is quite demonstrably to traffic with the powers of darkness. It is indeed to strengthen and sustain those powers, for by now it is almost certainly true that without the advantages it derives from its exchanges with the West, the Soviet Union could succeed neither in the elementary task of feeding its own people nor in the more complicated and sophisticated one of sustaining the vast military-industrial complex which today, in many people's view, is becoming an increasingly urgent threat to the security of the Western world.

On the other hand, to refuse such aid and assistance and to reduce all exchanges with the Soviet Union to the barest minimum is to run the risk of a confrontation in which the Soviet Union holds military advantages to which the Western world has at the moment no adequate answer.

In such a situation, Solzhenitsyn tells us that, when we recognise evil as such, it is our duty to resist it. On the whole I am inclined to agree with him; but precisely how, when, and where, and by what means one offers such resistance is a matter of calculation of which the Western world has as yet been unable to work out the sums, and this failure is reflected in the increasing disarray and confusion into which its policies have fallen. It is the great virtue of Solzhenitsyn that, like other great Russian writers to whom he is the successor, he continually reminds us that into this calculation there intrude moral and spiritual factors which cannot be ignored without inviting disaster.

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Kevin Hart

Three Dreams of Prague, 1968

1

As if the entire population but you
slipped off the globe during the night: you wake
to find the house empty, the sort of silence
that hunts around abandoned aerodromes,
and quicken outside hoping to find someone
but feel a carbine thrust into your back,
a burst of knuckled consonants from behind. . . .
It must have happened while you dreamt. He leads
you off, across the city, past mounds of things
still burning, tanks blundering down the street
much faster than you'd think, until the distant
thunder of orders, tanks and guns, contracts
to a crowded Square where soldiers raise their flag,
divide those captured into groups, open trucks,
slowly collect your first row, then your second. . . .

2

As if you somehow slipped off the globe
during the night: you wake a little early
in a foreign room, your clothes are here
and, next door, someone is eating noisily.
Terrible things have happened. Outside,
men are going to work, sullen as pewter,
you hope no one thinks you different
and quicken past the soldiers at the corner
fingering their guns that seem so big,
speaking grudgingly, a splintered gutteral.
It is too cold for a dream: your breath
hangs like the clouding smoke from the nearby tank
that points you, with the rest, to the Square.
What is happening? The old man beside you
is trembling like the edge of a flag.

3

As if you somehow stepped into a dream
walking one night through Wenceslas Square,
you see a distant flagpole begin to tilt
then sweep the sky, some soldiers march past
a balding man who turns into a shadow
and presses against a wall. Now home,
you remember waking early, and seeing
the sky full of mushrooms floating down
becoming men with guns once they touch the ground.
After the first week it was not strange
not hearing the paper's dull thud on the porch,
seeing the tank swivelling its head
while shopping in the Square, the children off school
playing soldiers in the house all day
and the city bristling with spires and searchlights.

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John Wakeman

A Sea Family

A still-born boy is wrapped
in clean matting
and the Niger takes him gently
to the sea and an old drunk
kicked to death in Glasgow his broken face
veined like the map of Skye
where he was born
makes his way out through the Firth of Clyde
submerged to avoid interfering policemen
and out and out and out sneaking past Ireland
to the sea which was always in his alcoholic blood
though forgotten except in good dreams
and a girl in a village near Lisbon
passes the white sailors' church
forgetting the fat postman who took her
once to the cinema and never dared again
so she steps at dawn into the pearly sea
believing that no one has ever loved her
and the old man hugs the baby
to his smashed ribs and the girl
holds them safe in her flayed arms
and they converse together
and stroll with the tides and the turning moon
amazed at the bright ships and the great fishes.

Lanyon Quoit

Three granite lozenges like grand pianos,
surprisingly on edge,
a wet-grey fluke of granite for the roof:
this is the royal chamber,
a house of cards in spades.

The chamber is empty but admits light—
admits everything in the end.
The king is absent
but the same wind spins the wheeling gulls
that dealt his dust upon the green baize sea
where all our games began.

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AMERICAN CHRONICLE

An Anglo-American Travesty

Evelyn Waugh & "The Loved One"

By Philip Stratford

ON 31 January 1947 Evelyn Waugh and his wife arrived in New York on the *America* en route to Hollywood where he had been invited by MGM to discuss turning *Brideshead Revisited* into a film. This permitted the *enfant terrible* of British letters a chance to flee the privations of the Attlee-Cripps régime "when the kingdom seemed to be under enemy occupation", a brief period of "unaccustomed high living", and an occasion to study American mores at their most opulent and eccentric. Twelve months later, as a fictional tribute to this visit, he published his satiric masterpiece *The Loved One* which uses the burial practices of Whispering Glades (Forest Lawn Memorial Park) as a symbol for his horror and delight with the New World. In a prefatory note to the February 1948 issue of *Horizon,* which Cyril Connolly turned over completely to *The Loved One*, Waugh claims "Overexcitement with the scene" as the prime impulse behind the novel and, as secondary stimulus, "The Anglo-American impasse—'never the twain shall meet.'"

With hindsight, in the Preface to the 1965 edition of *The Loved One*, Waugh says that he did not want a film to be made of *Brideshead* at all. But the promised emolument was such that he could not resist the exploratory, expenses-paid trip. *Brideshead*'s success in the US, where it was a Book-of-the-Month and sold 600,000 copies, had already changed his status as a writer. Like Greene and Orwell at about the same time, he suddenly found, after years of struggle, a fair amount of fame and financial ease. He acknowledged the change in a blanket letter to his American admirers—all but one, according to Waugh, women—published in *Life* as "Fan-Fare."

> "Frequently, unobtrusively, in the last seventeen years [Waugh wrote], I have had books published in the United States of America. No one noticed them. A parcel would appear on my breakfast table containing a familiar work with a strange wrapper and sometimes a strange title.[1] . . . Now I find that I have written a 'best seller.'"

In keeping with this new state, the price-tag suggested for a Hollywood *Brideshead* was $140,000, less what MGM spent on the Waughs, so with nothing to lose and secure in a certain notoriety they travelled westward on The 20th-Century Limited and reached Los Angeles on 6 February.

WAUGH'S INITIAL excitement with the new life soon palled. He complained of "the awful inefficiency of studio and hotel" and of "the aimless genial coffee-house chatter which the Film Executives call 'conferences.'" But he was rescued from boredom by an unexpected distraction. An Australian friend introduced him to "the unsurpassed glories" of Forest Lawn.

> "A large car came daily to take me to the studio [he recalls in his Preface]; daily I directed it to the graveyard where I spent long periods of delight penetrating the arcana of that lustrous trade."

It was here that he experienced what he believed to be "the authentic appetite of a writer on the track of a story." While the film conferences gradually bogged down in disagreement he collected a great deal of documentation on the history, philosophy, and techniques of California burial arts. On 15 March he telegraphed his agent, "Censor forbids film of *Brideshead*", and in subsequent weeks withdrew behind his refusal to make changes required by the Johnston Hays office. Early in April the Waughs sailed back to England on the *Queen Elizabeth*. "We returned", Waugh wrote, "as we had come in effortless luxury", poorer, no doubt, in potential Hollywood kudos, but richer by the inspiration for a new novel.

HE BEGAN *The Loved One* on 21 May and noted in his diary that progress was "Very slow." Seven weeks later, however, he had completed the first draft, and by November was

[1] *Labels* appeared as *A Bachelor Abroad; Remote People* as *They Were Still Dancing;* and *Robbery Under Law* as *The Mexican Object Lesson.*

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able to offer the finished manuscript to Cyril Connolly for the February *Horizon*. The novel appeared in the US in June; in book form in Britain in October. A seemingly uneventful publishing history, though Waugh notes on Easter Monday, 1948: "The printers in Bristol at work on *The Loved One* have burned down." Still, the British and American editions are not quite the same, and the variations between them interestingly accentuate "the Anglo-American impasse."

The book is subtitled in all British, though not in the US paperback, versions, "An Anglo-American Tragedy." After a common dedication to Nancy Mitford, British editions alone include acknowledgements which draw further attention to transatlantic differences. "My thanks are due to Lady Milbanke", the British notice reads, "who first set my feet on the path to Whispering Glades; to Mrs Reginald Allen who corrected my *American*; to Mr Cyril Connolly who corrected my *English*." The American first edition, on the other hand, includes "A Warning" not issued to the British. After the usual disclaimers about using models from life for his characters, Waugh admonishes his American public:

> "As I have said, this is a nightmare and in parts, perhaps, somewhat gruesome. The squeamish should return their copies to the library or bookstore unread."

Beyond this warning, certain measures do seem to have been taken to mollify American readers, for the Little, Brown and Company edition, presumably set from the *Horizon* text, differs in several particulars from the British original. Besides numerous changes to spelling and punctutation, and a few misprints, common enough in American editions of British works, several ghoulish details have been censored and there are corrections to Waugh's Americanese. Any alteration, of course, raises the question, what *can* be cut or changed to modify the impact of an extravaganza like this? Is it possible by amputation—by anything short of total suppression—to make *The Loved One* less "objectionable"? In a fiction so gleefully excessive, how much is too much, and where does it begin?

THE AMERICAN TEXT boldly makes some discriminations. It decides, for instance, that it is too much to have Dennis Barlow, the callous young British hero, consider his last duties towards his American sweetheart, Aimée Thanatogenos, whom he had cremated in the pet cemetery oven, in these terms:

> "He must rake out the glowing ashes, pound up the skull and pelvis perhaps and disperse the fragments."

It eliminates the passage. It also finds the professional observation of Mr Joyboy, unctuous head mortician of Whispering Glades, "The skull drained very nicely", unnecessarily explicit and drops this too. So much for the somewhat gruesome details the squeamish were warned against.

With the help of Mrs Reginald Allen (New England monologuist and novelist Helen Howe), Waugh took some trouble to get his American idiom right. But not enough, apparently, to satisfy his US publisher. Several changes were made, each, oddly, serving to bring the text closer to standard British usage. A "low-down kind of cemetery" became simply "a cemetery"; "bucks" were converted to "dollars"; "kinda" was changed to "rather." When one remembers how Waugh fulminated against the use of "kind of" in English, one can appreciate the editorial delicatesse which may have prompted this last change. But it is rather an imposition to correct anyone's bad usage, particularly when it is intentional.

It is highly improbable, however, that these or other changes—for example, substitution of "The Tents of Kedar" for "The Gardens of Allah Hotel", or a correction to dialect spelling in a quotation from Robert Burns—were made without Waugh's knowledge. Both Malcolm Bradbury and Christopher Sykes, who have written on Waugh, insist on his punctiliousness and the care with which he examined American editions of his books. "Waugh, I am sure", writes Bradbury, "would be struck by the ironic possibilities of textual variation." And Sykes, his biographer states: "If Little, Brown & Co. had

EVELYN WAUGH *by Vicky* (1961).

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made any alterations without his express approval they would have faced a very expensive quarrel with Evelyn Waugh, possibly settled out of court, but not cheaply."

Be that as it may, Waugh himself had second thoughts about his text between the *Horizon* publication and Chapman & Hall's British trade edition, and he made numerous revisions which further increase the rift between American and British editions of the novel.[2] In the first place, he refused to accept any of the American changes for his home version. Pelvis is crushed and skull drained with no regard for the susceptibilities of the British public. He not only rejected the prissy US corrections to his American idiom but continued to polish his own slang, making the ferryman to the Lake Isle of Innisfree address Dennis as "Bud" instead of "Kid", and Mr Schultz say "get buried anyhow like they was just animals" instead of simply "like animals."[3]

He also picked up a few of his own errors. Aimée, the romantic assistant mortician, had told Dennis that besides majoring in "Beauticraft" at College she had studied psychology and Chinese, "for Cultural background." In *Horizon* and the American text Dennis says, "No doubt you know more than I about science and citizenship . . . ." In the British hardcover edition Waugh corrects this to "psychology and Chinese" and eliminates a long following passage describing the propensity of Liberal Members of the House of Commons to quote Shelley.

WAUGH ALSO PUT some finishing touches to character. For one thing, he restored a little dignity to Sir Francis Hinsley, redundant doyen of the British actors' colony in Hollywood. In the *Horizon* and American versions Dennis's friend was given a "weak, sensitive, intelligent face." The "weak" is now dropped, this failing only becoming unmistakable later on when his protégé compares him sadly to a Kaiser's Stoneless Peach. More strikingly, his monocle is retrieved. In the first versions, Dennis, charged to dispose of Sir Francis's mortal remains, agrees with Aimée's professional opinion that "the monocle looks less natural when the eye is closed", and is inclined to dispense with it. In the later text, however, he decides to have the closed eye and the monocle too, so the last view we have of Sir Francis bears the stamp of Mr Joyboy's consummate art: "The gold rim of the monocle framed a delicately tinted eyelid."

Dennis himself, though in either version rather a cool cad, is firmed up to become an unrepentant bounder. In his final tiff with Aimée he is more brazen in his sophistries and in his last meeting with Joyboy more callously cryptic and less prone to self-justification. In the closing paragraphs of the novel Waugh now saw fit to add that Dennis was "a Favourite of Fortune" and to say that he left the California shore "not only unravished but enriched." He had made Dennis the protagonist of an inverted Henry Jamesian drama—an Old World hero caught in a New World dilemma. But the changes make Dennis clearly triumph over American innocence. This clarification may have been due to Waugh's close identification with his hero. The book closes with Dennis, like his author, returning to England,

> "carrying back . . . the artist's load, a great shapeless chunk of experience; bearing it home to his ancient and comfortless shore; to work on it hard and long, for God knew how long. For that moment of vision a lifetime is often too short."

Expressing this in slightly more material terms, he had said in *Horizon* that one of the themes behind his novel was "European raiders who come for the spoils and if they are lucky make home with them."

DESPITE his habitual bravado Waugh seems to have been somewhat anxious about the reception of his story. "Give my love to any friends you see in the USA", he wrote to Randolph Churchill in February 1948, "there will be none after the publication of *The Loved One*." And explaining the "sneak preview" in *Horizon* he says, "I anticipated ructions and one reason for seeking publication in *Horizon* was the confidence that its readers were tough stuff."

The main reason for concern, of course, was the threat of a libel action. He might disclaim drawing portraits from life, but Whispering Glades was Forest Lawn to the last particular. Fifteen years later Jessica Mitford (Nancy's sister and author of another famous book, *The American Way of Death*) wrote, "It is all there just as Mr Waugh has described it [with] many additions, so the overall impression is that today

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[2] The two editions differ by 65 variants in spelling and punctuation, 6 misprints, and 50 changes to the text. The 1965 edition has only a very few minor revisions.

[3] Waugh was very touchy on the subject of the correctness of his American idiom partly, perhaps, because Edmund Wilson, whom he once described as "an insignificant Yank", had implied, writing of *The Loved One*, that he did not understand American life and that his US slang was stale. Some of the changes between the first and second British versions may also be due to Cyril Connolly, whose first wife was American.

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it far transcends his description." Not unreasonably Chapman & Hall feared they might be taken to court, but Waugh found an ingenious solution.

In *A Biography of Evelyn Waugh* Christopher Sykes tells how a friend of Waugh's, Lord Stanley of Alderley, entered into an elaborate hoax on his behalf to divert the danger. It hinged on American snobbery. Lord Stanley added a codicil to his will stating that after reading *The Loved One* in manuscript he wished to be buried in Forest Lawn, a place he understood to bear some resemblance to that so movingly described by his friend. It was hoped that "the knowledge that *The Loved One* had persuaded a member of the British House of Lords to seek his last resting place in Forest Lawn would deter the cemetery from suing the author and publishers . . . ." The ruse succeeded and no ructions followed beyond a hurt reference in the American trade journal *Mortuary Management* to "Evelyn (Bites-The-Hand-That-Feeds-Him) Waugh."

As a European raider Waugh had done quite well from his American foray. He had lived off Hollywood fat for two months and had brought back "a great shapeless chunk of experience" which he quickly refined into a novel. The same year, as by-products, he wrote two more articles, one on Californian necrology, the other on the American film industry. "Death in Hollywood" was his first published exposure of Forest Lawn. He imagined a team of archaeologists digging up the cemetery a thousand years hence and trying to reconstruct the nature of the strange cult which had "flourished on this forgotten strand [with its] idol Oscar—sexless image of infertility—[and] the great Star Goddesses who were once noisily worshipped there in a Holy Wood." In the second, "Why Hollywood is a Term of Disparagement", he attacked with caustic wit the more blatant aspects of big studio practice. This drew an apology from Alexander Korda on behalf of the British film brotherhood, calling Waugh's upstart opinions "distortions" and "caricature", though he was obliged to admit there was a grain of truth in them. As for Korda's charge that Waugh was an unqualified spokesman, an instant expert, this had already been anticipated in typical fashion:

> "A fortnight is ample time in which to appreciate the character of that remote community [Waugh asserted]; there are no secrets under the unflickering floodlights; no undertones to which the stranger must attune his ear. All is loud, obvious, prosaic."

In this article Waugh took the author's point of view and deplored Hollywood trafficking with the original text.

> "Each of the books purchased by a studio [Waugh wrote] has had some individual quality, good or bad, that made it remarkable. It is the work of a staff of 'writers' to distinguish this quality, separate it, and obliterate it."

To illustrate this he cited the case of Somerset Maugham's *Christmas Holiday*, the story of an English schoolboy's awakening to some of the realities of life, which emerged as the adventure of an American airman with an escaped gangster. "Why", Waugh queried, "do they trouble to purchase rights? I cannot believe that any action for plagiarism would lie if they had produced that film without reference to Mr Maugham."

At least *Brideshead Revisited* had escaped cinematic "obliteration."[4] Not so *The Loved One*. Years later, it was turned into a film by MGM. Waugh retained no control. As scriptwriters, Terry Southern and Christopher Isherwood performed the basic cosmeticians' rites on

Evelyn Waugh *by Osbert Lancaster*

[4] Another abortive attempt was made in 1950 to turn *Brideshead* into a film. The scriptwriter this time inspired confidence, for it was to have been his friend Graham Greene; but the film company ran out of money and the project evaporated.

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the cadaver of the novel. The British director Tony Richardson played Joyboy to their Aimée Thanatogenos. Richardson's first Hollywood film, based on William Faulkner's *Sanctuary*, had been a disaster because he had been stuck with a bad script and had been unable to change it. For *The Loved One* he insisted on having complete freedom. And used it.

THE FILM BEGINS in a roughly recognisable way with Dennis Barlow arriving in L.A. as winner of 10,000 free air-miles because he was the ten millionth person to see someone off at Heathrow airport. He looks up his uncle, Sir Francis Hinsley, who finds him a number of sleazy jobs, the last of these in a pet cemetery. Sir Francis's failure to convert an obsolete cowboy actor, Dusty Acres, into a new James Bond leads to the uncle's suicide and brings Dennis into contact with Whispering Glades, its founder, The Blessed Reverend, Aimée and Joyboy.

But here the story veers seriously off course. A ten-year-old scientific genius, who has been expelled from Cal Tech for trying to disassemble an atomic reactor to take home in parts, has been firing off experimental space rockets in the pet cemetery. One of his missiles is used to put Mom Joyboy's dead parrot into orbit. The missile almost hits The Blessed Reverend's helicopter. Snatching inspiration from near calamity, The Reverend develops a scheme for disinterring bodies from Whispering Glades and shooting them into space, thus liberating valuable real estate which he hopes to turn into a pre-death Disneyland for Senior Citizens. To convince top US Air Force brass of the feasibility of his space-burial scheme, he stages a reception in the casket showroom which turns into an orgy when the lids are lifted to reveal the coffins filled with very lively, black-corsetted cuties. By now Waugh's invention has been left so far behind that it seems irrelevant to note that the film ends, like the book, with the disposal of Aimée's corpse. In the Southern-Isherwood-Hollywood *Loved One* she is launched into space, the first involuntary client in The Blessed Reverend's "Resurrection NOW!" programme.

IN *The Loved One: The Production Log of a Motion Picture*, an illustrated work of promography designed as much to advertise as to record the film, Terry Southern describes some of the incongruities and *contretemps* of the production. Eschewing Hollywood practice, Richardson filmed everything on location. For this purpose MGM leased the 55-room mansion of the one-time owner of the Empire State Building, complete with acres of parkland, six bowling alleys, a dry-cleaning plant and a medieval banqueting hall. The British hero, Dennis Barlow, was played by Robert "Young Bob" Morse; it was feared that his American accent might strike a false note until it was decided this could be overcome by dubbing. Robert "Big Bob" Morley, cast as Sir Ambrose Abercrombie, refused flatly, as part of his doctored role, to play a transvestite in a platinum wig, so the scene was reluctantly cut. Cut also were newly invented roles for Ruth Gordon and Jayne Mansfield. Even without them the cast was solid gold, with Sir John Gielgud as "groovy Sir Francis", Rod Steiger as Joyboy, 420-pound Aylea Gibbons as Mom Joyboy, fed in bed on suckling pig, and Anjanette Comer as Aimée, described in Southern's words as "a strange ethereal girl 'half in love with easeful death' and with a marvellous *derrière* and set of knocks." Waugh's text was ventilated to admit even more stars: Milton Berle and Margaret Leighton, "Miss Beverly Hills" as orgy dancer, Liberace, and Barbara Nichols as the USAF Colonel's widow, "that extraordinary stripper, Sara Blodget."

Evelyn Waugh must have had wind of what was happening to his *Loved One* at the hands of "yrs tly" Southern, "Grand Guy Chris Ish" and "Tip Top Tony" Richardson. He directed that his name be removed from the credits.

The film opened in London in the spring of 1966 two weeks before his death and had a bad press—small satisfaction for such a transfiguration of his story. Ten years earlier in one of his meditations on Britain and America he had characterised "one of the great gulfs between our two civilisations" as follows:

> "To the American, English writers are like prim spinsters fidgetting with the china, punctilious about good taste, and inwardly full of thwarted, tepid and perverse passions. We see Americans as gushing adolescents, repetitive and slangy, rather nasty sometimes in their zest for violence and bad language. . . ."

A caricaturist's distortion perhaps, but prophetic in the grisly grain of truth it contained as to the Hollywood update of *The Loved One*.

BACK IN 1948 Waugh had cockily described another theme behind his novel thus:

> "There is no such thing as an 'American.' They are all exiles uprooted, transplanted and doomed to sterility. The ancestral gods they have abjured get them in the end."

Now, in its own way, the New World had taken an ironic revenge and had got Waugh in the end.

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One might apply to the Anglo-American Tragedy of *The Loved One* Aimée's own wistful words in the novel: "Once you start changing a name, you see, there's no reason to stop."

There is a distinct possibility that New World nemesis has stretched still further and that by now even Evelyn Waugh's ghost has gone West, for the complete library from Combe Florey, including his book-cases and armchairs, has been bought and reinstalled as a *nature morte* in that great literary mausoleum The Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas at Austin.

In "Apotheosis in Austin", Cyril Connolly describes a visit to the Texas collection during which he discovered in Waugh's copy of one of his own books a number of painfully vituperative remarks about himself confirming that Waugh had held a venomous grudge against him. "And yet, if he hated me so", Connolly wondered, "why did he present *Horizon* with *The Loved One* free of charge and bear with all my suggestions about it?"

The title of the book in which he turned up Waugh's unkind posthumous comments was *The Unquiet Grave*.

Boccaccio

Discovering his nosegay of disdain
Was no longer deodorant enough
He fled their common grave of pain
And the headline's haemorrhage of news.

He hitchhiked north to forget his love.
His lift dropped him where young lettuces lined
Chalk slopes in hygienic green. Above
A rash of sheep blistered the horizon.

Beside the road he turned his pockets out
To shed the last bus ticket, the last balm
Of her letter smeared where she must have cried
And shredded up his past with ritual calm.

But that singleness of mood was denied
By the sour patterns caravans made
With lime and orange tents upon the hillside
At the end of a supple cinder track.

Momentary fantasy, a plague blown
Precisely to her London with August rain
From Anthrax Island, could not prevent
Horror settling on his peace of mind again.

He saw a version of the truth kissing her
Before pouring out her favourite Buck's Fizz,
The shoulders naked slimmer, the hair darker
And the face, which he recognised, not his.

James Sutherland-Smith

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EDUCATION

The Anti-Organisational Syndrome

Of Generational Gaps—By DAVID RIESMAN

I REGARD as fallacious the belief that the United States is dominated by a single "Establishment", composed of white males of high social origin, most of whom have attended Ivy League colleges and the prep schools that, it is fondly believed, prepare for them. These individuals, coming out of the same clubby social environments, are believed to share the same values; the litany is familiar. This idea has been especially powerful among students of the social sciences in the Ivy League institutions themselves, and from there it has seeped into many of the media and educational institutions in the rest of the country. Indeed, it is a view widely shared by those well-to-do Americans who think of themselves as "against the Establishment", on the assumption that there is but a single one.

The fact is that the social origins of top businessmen in the United States are far more diverse than the social origins of academicians. There are many more people of working-class and farming background in what might be called the high civil service, including the top, of large corporate business than in major universities—where the children of generally affluent, professional and business families dominate and where there are very few people of working-class origin, very few people of Southern Baptist background, and until recently, outside the Catholic institutions, not many practising Roman Catholics. (Of course, most of the supposedly Catholic institutions are no longer "Catholic" in the traditional sense, but rather in the new, ecumenical sense.) I would like to test my surmise that in the *Fortune* Magazine list of 500 major American corporations, there are more top executives who are graduates of Purdue or Texas A & M or other state and Land Grant universities than there are of Ivy League institutions.[1] I would go further and say that, although intellectuals in general and social scientists in particular hold strongly to the belief in a monolithic Establishment which recreates itself in its male progeny, I doubt if there are many who could name ten corporate officials, or have any idea of the sorts of lives and careers that businessmen have had.

One of the problems of understanding in this area comes from the use of the same word, "business", to cover a great variety of enterprises —including large, growing, concerns whose entrepreneur founders are long since dead or retired; residual buccaneers who may make

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[1] I am talking now of undergraduate education, not of that group of top executives who have secured post-baccalaureate education at the Stanford School of Management or the Chicago or Harvard Schools of Business Administration, or the Harvard Law School, etc.

Nor am I talking about banking, particularly investment banking, nor about the large corporate law firms, where the recruitment may be somewhat more from Ivy League-type undergraduate institutions, much as Williams College was once a sort of prep school for Time, Inc.

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immense amounts of money but rarely run numerically large enterprises, for example, real estate speculators and oil wildcatters;[2] and also the small businessmen who are sometimes the parents of our students who may own a jewellery store or a pharmacy but whose pattern of life has almost no similarity with that of the great majority of businessmen and women who have not created their own companies but have taken over, rather timidly, the stewardship of already extant companies.

THIS MODESTY, which is in considerable measure related to a strong sense of responsibility for organisations one did not create, organisations in which one is a transient official who can certainly not pass on his or her position to progeny, is one of the elements that led to the caricature of businessmen as timid conformists in William H. Whyte Jr's enormously influential book, *The Organization Man* (1956). I argued with him when he was writing the book that he was developing a caricature. Even the earlier book, *The Lonely Crowd* (1950), has elements of irony in it which seem to me, in retrospect, unjustified, although it is more the interpretation of *The Lonely Crowd* than what the book itself says that has been seen as an attack on conformity, as if conformity were not a feature of all societies at whatever level of development, and quite essential if societies are to remain societies and not fly apart.

One particularly erroneous caricature in *The Organization Man* seemed at the time to be the belief that the corporate spouse—and this was always a woman—had to subordinate herself to the life of the Organisation, and to fit its social definitions of appropriate wifely behaviour. It seemed to me that it was conceivable that wives might be scrutinised in such a small enclave as the Dupont Corporation once was, but most corporations are far too competitive for talent to care anything about a person's spouse, unless the nature of the spouse is some tip-off to character defects in the prospective employee. Am I mistaken in believing that corporate officials are more concerned with finding competent executives than with finding ones who have, in the old-fashioned way, "lovely and gracious" wives?

THE PICTURE PAINTED of businessmen as "organisation men" is part of a general process of stereotyping and denigration which operates throughout the society. All my life I have tried to remove the pejorative connotation of the term "bureaucrat", and of "bureaucracy", arguing that red tape is the only substitute for red blood, and is inevitable in large organisations, where it is a source of fairness and consistency. Not only businessmen and government officials, but school teachers, members of large hospital staffs and law firms—and, indeed, most of us—are dependent on organisation and can be defined as bureaucrats.

What is true is that we are all in competition with the masters of the electronic media: with the studio stars, including a number of political personalities—these, themselves, often denigrated. Neither the television celebrities nor the politicians (who are often also such celebrities) have generally managed a staff larger than ten, which is why I have consistently opposed for the Presidency either congressmen or senators, and have favoured governors, managers of large corporate enterprises (a quixotic idea), mayors of large complicated cities, presidents of large complicated universities, etc. The television celebrities with whom we ineffectively compete know how to command an audience and a fund-raising banquet. Far from being modest, these celebrities develop and invent their eccentricities, and appeal to the Huckleberry Finn, the Lone Ranger, or the

[2] Although the number of individuals who are buccaneers of this sort is relatively small, they make good copy; and, whether they are recluses like the late Howard Hughes or Right-wing sponsors like Howard Hunt, attract a disproportionate share of public attention. That they so often turn, as Hunt did, to Right-wing causes (only rarely to the Left) seems to be due to the fact that they have worked, or believed that they have worked, hard to justify themselves according to the American Dream, and yet are still looked down upon by established wealth and by the museum curators, cultural critics, and other spokespersons of behaviour regarded as appropriate in the "best circles." We cannot confer a patent of nobility on these individuals and thus bring them within the realm of public approbation (even if only their descendants will really profit from the no longer very formidable laying on of royal hands). Resentment arises against the unexpectedly still unfulfilled situation in which these men (mostly, they are men) find themselves —crowded, as they see it, by the Welfare State on the one hand, and the traditions of proper corporate behaviour on the other. The John Birch Society and similar groups offer them convenient explanations for their unanticipated troubles in the Promised Land. However, such men (sometimes in current theories associated with the Southern Rim in a variant of an older view of a single power élite) have helped—like the very different "Robber Barons"—to develop the prevailing caricatures of corporate capitalism.

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Frontiersman in many American males (and perhaps an increasing number of activist American women).

The Selective Veto

I WANT NOW TO TURN to another and related theme which will be familiar from reading Garrett Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" (*Science*, 13 December 1968), an account of the human predicament very close to my own thinking. Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, my continuing preoccupation has been with the mutual destruction of all commons through nuclear war. I have given much of my attention to the problem of restraining the over-grazing of the commons; and for ten years or so I have sought to help students and others whom I could reach to become aware of the need for restraint in the use of limited resources even though I have never shared the apocalyptic view, for example, of the Club of Rome—that we must move at once to a no-growth, or a zero-population-growth society. But many of these students and graduates regard the commons as preserves for environmentalists, in which there should be grazing only for the animals! I regard the litigious and also the idealistic protests against large corporations on behalf of the grass and the animals in the commons (as, for instance, in recent attacks against building nuclear power plants) as a kind of covert class warfare in which those who already possess amenities, and have risen "above" obvious material necessity, prefer these amenities to jobs and consumer goods which upwardly

The Art of Heavy Crawling

Moscow

International Harvester's Francis Jay Crawford has maintained a discreet silence ever since Russian authorities paroled him from the Moscow prison cell where he was held for 15 days for allegedly violating the Soviet Union's currency-exchange laws. But "Newsweek's" Fred Coleman discussed Crawford's experience with many of his friends and colleagues and with Western diplomats last week, and what emerged was a picture of Soviet duplicity and charges of astonishing indifference to Crawford's plight on the part of International Harvester and the American business community in Moscow.

Soviet police had no difficulty seizing Jay Crawford: they simply dragged the plump businessman from his car while he was stopped at a red light. But fleshing out charges of currency speculation proved more difficult. According to one friend, KGB agents searched Crawford's hotel room "until it looked like a hand grenade had been set off there." Still, they found nothing incriminating—no cache of rubles, no icons or antiques that Crawford might have bought with black-market money. So, this friend insists, police simply manufactured **a case against Crawford. During KGB questioning, Crawford would name Soviet citizens he knew, and later, presumably after Soviet pressure on these acquaintances of Crawford, police would announce that they had signed individual statements testifying to Crawford's illegal money dealings.**

Throughout Crawford's imprisonment, he and his friends believe, International Harvester maintained an amazing equanimity, even sending in a new Moscow sales manager—John Chellman—and plunging ahead with talks on business agreements Crawford had set up. "Why didn't Harvester demand that the Soviets release Jay before going ahead with those meetings?" asks one American in Moscow.

After Crawford was finally released, Harvester prepared a typed statement for the press, asserting merely that their man had not "intentionally broken Soviet law." Only when Crawford objected did Harvester agree to let him tell newsmen flatly that he was innocent. Harvester is not the only company to draw criticism from Crawford and his supporters.

Many American businessmen stationed in Moscow asked for guidance from their home offices and were directed not to protest or threaten the Soviets with any disruption in trade negotiations. Since Crawford was set free, he has noted, not a single American businessman has phoned to ask how he is or offer help.

Harvester executives claim they pulled every string in their man's behalf—even to asking Sen. Charles Percy of Illinois to talk personally with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. To break off negotiations would have left them without any leverage at all over the Russians, said one company spokesman.

"Besides, the Soviets could turn to someone else for heavy crawler tractors."

Newsweek

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mobile people need and want even though they might also like amenities if they could afford them.

None of this is meant to suggest that we do not in fact have, as President Carter has claimed from the outset, a genuine energy crisis. We do—a crisis of wastefulness which is absorbing more and more OPEC oil, forcing other countries to rely on nuclear power with all its attendant hazards. It is worsening our own US balance of payments problems, and thus increasing our temptation to rely on protectionism; and it renders other countries who produce no oil of their own even more vulnerable to the dangers of another oil embargo and the inevitable inflation that results from the vast increases of prices for imported fossil fuels.

We are the largest despoilers of this particular commons. Rather than exercising restraint, for example, in the speed and casualness with which we continue to drive not only cars but other gasoline- and oil-powered appliances, most Americans behave in the way Thomas Schelling described in his brilliant essay entitled "On the Ecology of Micro-Motives".[3] Individuals can always assume that any pleas for restraint come from discredited authorities, whether the oil companies or the politicians, and, since they are against their immediate self-interest, they disregard them as they disregard and even abrogate seat-belt warnings—one of many indications that the anti-organisational syndrome is something which the protesters share, whatever else they may use to differentiate themselves, with the larger American public.

The Environmentalist and the Consumer Protection movements, separately or in combination, can use litigation and administrative adversary proceedings to operate what *The Lonely Crowd* terms "veto groups", that is, groups which more easily stop enterprises than begin them. Yet it is noteworthy that none of the leading consumer advocates (neither Ralph Nader nor Barry Commoner so far as I know, or their less well-known counterparts) have attacked the ominous current wave of American protectionism. The US protectionist tariff barriers erected against Japanese cars and television sets, against textiles from Hong Kong and shoes from Italy, are greater blows to the interest of consumers than most of the matters which agitate our vigilante lawyers who attack producers on behalf of the consumer. I believe that if American companies cannot compete with foreign competition—in part because our unions make exorbitant demands, and in part because our managements are incompetent—we should have a world economy in which people can make what they are best at, which would reduce inflation, balance of trade deficits, and the cost of living for everyone. It would be much cheaper to find other work, to retrain, or, if need be, to pension off our inefficient US steel producers, ship builders, organised merchant marine, shoe manufacturers, etc., than to raise tariff barriers against countries such as Japan which depend entirely on export in order to survive at all, whereas our own US internal market is large enough to keep the companies alive (although the very term "alive" is ironical when applied to these inefficient and decaying, yet protected and surely no longer infant industries). I am not aware that any of the well-known consumer advocates have done anything to try to stop the growing protectionism which seems to me to raise much the same dangers of a worldwide crash as the wave of protectionism did in the 1920s.

IF ONE ASKS WHAT IT IS that the United States is good at, in which we can compete with the rest of the world, I would include not only high-technology agriculture, large airplanes, some kinds of components, a great deal of work in the arts and in scholarship, but also the invention of business schools. There is indeed a great irony in the fact that the Anti-Organisational Syndrome, which is peculiarly strong in the United States (although not peculiarly confined to this country but endemic everywhere), has not prevented the export of the Harvard Graduate School of Business model to such countries as Turkey or the Philippines. Hardly any of the students I have been referring to—and remember that I am talking about a minority of able students in selective colleges who come from (or soon adopt) the manners of the affluent families whose children dominate such colleges—are aware of how eagerly much of the rest of the world, whatever its nominal political coloration and ideology, seeks the techniques and inventiveness and understanding of economic development available at Harvard Business School and at other somewhat comparable schools such as Stanford or the Sloan School at MIT.

Japan's Meritocracy

JAPANESE WOULD UNDERSTAND very well how different is the operation of the anti-organisational syndrome in the trajectory of Japanese student life. Japanese secondary-school students compete with incredible energy and dedication to enter the great but over-applied-for government universities or their private counterparts, recognising that a degree from one of the

[3] Published in *The Public Interest*, No. 25 (Fall 1971), pp. 59–98.

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leading institutions will then permit them to take another round of examinations with a chance to work for Mitsubishi or Toyota or Sony or one of the other great Japanese corporations. Parents often hire private tutors for their children even if the parents have little money; and they save for their children's education in case they cannot enter the government's free universities but have to pay tuition at a private one. It is a meritocracy undiluted by sentimentality, with the advantage of an ethnically relatively homogeneous society.

Once in the university, however, the students have a period of relative relaxation which may last until their senior year. During this period, they can undergo what is often referred to as the "pink shower", absorbing vulgarised Marxist ideas which are full of talk about the alienation of modern life, the horrors of industrialisation and urbanisation, and all the rest of the familiar complaints of those of us who have been kept alive (if, on occasion, overfed) by precisely the antibiotics and the pesticides and the superior breeds of livestock and of grain made possible by modern technology. But the Japanese students, including those from well-to-do families, recognise that college is what we would in an earlier day have termed "collegiate." Instead of playing games or joining fraternities, they may join radical groups and play games of protest against the police which resemble nothing so much as a Japanese version of *The Three Musketeers* or, for more local colour, *The Seven Samurai*.

It is true that older Japanese believe that this is changing, that the young are hedonistic and slipshod—a worldwide complaint in the industrial countries. I have just examined a recently completed survey of Japanese students by Professor Hidetoshi Kato of Gakushuin University in Tokyo and the East-West Center in Hawaii. Professor Kato summarises many surveys of attitudes among Japanese university students: much like our own students, they talk glibly about "alienation" and the lack of opportunity for individual expression and autonomy in contemporary life. But these attitudes are superficial and do not affect behaviour. These students on graduation, as I have said, take the examinations for the large corporations (or sometimes for the great newspaper chains such as Asahi or Yomiuri). They see in large organisations the opportunity for lifetime security. As is well known, large Japanese organisations are a kind of expanded version of IBM, which has taken pride in never firing anybody; but at the same time, the Japanese, like IBM, give individual employees the chance to express and exhibit their own talents, although they must do this with an attractive modesty and civility, as against the litigious and argumentative or even narcissistic fashion which is more characteristic of the US individualistic style. Professor Kato concludes that, in spite of what students say about alienation and boredom, there is a great deal of contentment in Japanese daily corporate existence and no substantial anti-organisational syndrome once the college years—the years, so to speak, of childhood—are behind one.

I MIGHT ADD, on the basis of my own observations in Japan, that there are great variations: not everyone works for a large organisation, and employees in the smaller ones live on a different level of security and well-being. Throughout the post-War period of prosperity, Japanese continued to re-invest savings, whether for their children's education or not, and to practise in terms of personal style of living a culture of restraint. Top executives, i.e., the high civil servants of Japanese corporate life, have only recently discovered stock options; they are well treated and well paid while in office (and provided with the chauffeur-driven automobiles that are absolutely necessary if they are to cope with Japanese traffic). But they do not pile up personal fortunes in the American manner, and I think this is another reason why Japan is in some respects, although strictly meritocratic (and perhaps in part *because* strictly meritocratic), a more egalitarian society. In connection with this, one should say more about the ways in which younger Japanese corporate officials and government officials get their views approved by the seeming gerontocracy of Japanese hierarchies in which the old are treated with respect, but also know how to make use of and to respect the ideas and interests of the young. As a consensual society, the Japanese were able to cope with their frightful "*oil shoku*" with far more self-restraint than marked the response of other countries to the oil embargo.

I have a suspicion that one element in the Japanese willingness to exercise restraint and to accept the restraints of a consensual society as adults may be connected with the fact that Japanese schooling is not supposed to be "fun." Everyone is subordinated to a uniform round of work. Indeed, Japanese students wear uniforms, a far more democratic pattern than the semi-uniform of blue jeans worn by the affluent (this style is a kind of proletarian "drag", and has now been taken up even by its original working-class wearers). Because of the severity of Japanese schooling, the entire Japanese population has become truly literate. The result is a conscientiousness absent from much of the Western semi-literate (though often college-attending) population. Indeed, we have now invented the term "workaholic" in order to denigrate those who

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keep our society running by working terribly hard in the supposedly idyllic "command posts" (as C. Wright Mills termed them) of the American economy and polity. There is also hard work among some individuals in the lower ranks, or the blue-collar ranks (like the Consolidated Edison workers who got service restored in New York after the great blackout, even while their company was being attacked as in some way conspiratorial). But, generally, my own observations lead me to believe that much mechanisation in the USA results from efforts by management to cope with the inefficiency and sabotage of the labour force, and its often understandable mistrust of management (even though good workmen would be no more costly, and retaining them far more humane, than mechanisation).

TO CONCLUDE: the Japanese do not doubt that education is a privilege which has to be earned, rather than an entitlement which is automatic. In the USA, education has become an entitlement, an investment one makes in oneself at the expense largely of other people. The exceptions are (*1*) the income foregone, which is important in low-income families, and (*2*) in an era of student consumerism, the extremely limited discomforts our students sometimes endure of over-crowded classrooms (or much more likely, in the situation today, under-occupied ones).[4]

Generations & Careers

I MUST MAKE A DISTINCTION between what might be termed first- and second-generation colleges and first- and second-generation careers.

As a result of the great expansion of US higher education in the post-World War II era, many small colleges and universities expanded, so that the majority of their undergraduate students were the first in their families to attend college. I define the colleges dominated by such students as "first-generation" colleges. Unless they are especially gifted and energetic (are picked up, for example, by the National Merit Scholarship Service, or do outstandingly well on the College Board Examinations, or, more recently, belong to one of the minorities defined as disadvantaged), such students will attend local colleges and universities, mostly in the overwhelming and continuously increasing proportion of academia which is publicly controlled, where the bulk of their fellow students will also be "first-generation-in-college." The careers such students have in mind are those which make sense in the milieux from which they have come. Engineering, although its internal diversities and opportunities will be poorly understood, will make sense to the parents of young men off the farm and out of working-class backgrounds. Accountancy is something which can be understood, as well as other undergraduate business programmes which have been increasing with extraordinary rapidity. For women, nursing (and other health-related careers such as occupational therapy), schoolteaching (while this was an expanding profession) and possibly social work will be seen as sensible careers—or, rather, *jobs:* an important distinction in terms of whether the work is interpreted as part of a total life-plan or an interim way-station before marriage (before children come, and then again when children have reached the age when the mothers no longer need to be at home full-time). Even women of very high ability can, much more than men, arrive at first-generation colleges with jobs rather than careers in mind.

In contrast, the number of what might be termed metaphorically "second-generation colleges" is small. The category includes the principal selective private institutions, and a few public ones which sometimes seem to me private institutions run at public expense (the University of Virginia, the University of Vermont, to some extent the University of California in some of its branches, are among those in this category). Here, the majority of students, or at least the majority of visible and vocal students, will be the children of college graduates—often the mother will turn out to be a schoolteacher even if the father holds a blue-collar job and did not attend college. And since the majority of their fellow college-students come from professional and business families, where certainly the men and most of the women have attended college, other students who belong to the "first-generation-in-college" category are influenced by the ethos of the institution and of their peers to think in terms of quite a different set of careers—and this of course includes the women who begin to think of careers rather than of jobs.

THE CAREERS WHICH HAVE high social and/or economic status in the USA are not identical with those which have similar status elsewhere in the world, although there is very considerable similarity. For example, engineering is largely first-generation: the sons of engineers may become physicists or musicians or professors of

[4] I sometimes wish that our privileged students, before coming to the university, would spend six months at the University of Rome or the University of Tokyo. This might lead to a considerably greater appreciation of how much subsidy and amenity, including subsidy for the moderately well-to-do, is provided for the student in his role as consumer.

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classics or lawyers. But engineering is not considered in the same light in Spain or Latin America or in much of the world where engineers are not seen as an employee cadre, with limited professional power as a guild. On the other hand, physicians, who have such exalted status in the USA—combining as they do the appeals of service, science, security, and relative affluence—have no comparable standing even in Britain, let alone in the Soviet Union where most physicians, although not the heads of hospitals or major institutes of medical science, are women. In second-generation colleges, students of whatever origin are led towards careers in the professions which require a post-baccalaureate education. Hence the fierce competition to do well enough to enter medical school or one of the great national law schools (anyone can get into some law school somewhere, and in Vermont can become a lawyer through apprenticeship and passing the Bar exam) or the major graduate schools of business.

But it should be borne in mind that I am generalising, and that there are many cross-overs. I have met second-generation engineers. And there are students whose parents are professionals but who have gone into elementary schoolteaching, particularly in the so-called open or experimental schools, or to teach handicapped children or to discover some other, as yet relatively unnoticed, deprived group whom they can serve. Thus one may find the children of the élite, and I include both sexes, teaching in "Head Start" programmes, just as they might have gone into the Peace Corps or VISTA, which might be called second-generation way-stations.

To put matters in a different way, students in first-generation colleges want to learn something that they can do on Monday when they graduate and get their first entry-level position, as well as something their parents can readily comprehend. I have in mind a student of this sort at a commuter college, who went home one day and said to his immigrant parents: "I want to become a psychologist." The parents said with bewilderment, "What's that? We sent you to college to become an engineer. Psychology? How does one make a living at that?"[5]

These students are not much interested in upward mobility, but have already defined themselves as "losers", sometimes ready enough to assume that something will turn up when they graduate, sometimes waiting out the time necessary for a credential which they trust will provide an entitlement to a well-paying job. Many have not been responsive to analysis by economists, such as Richard Freeman (see e.g., *The Over-Educated American,* 1976), who contends that, taking into account the costs of income foregone, college is for many no longer "a paying proposition." Though the number of white males attending college has dropped relatively, many continue to attend for status and other social-psychological reasons, unrelated to entry-level occupational aspirations, save in the vaguest and most flimsily explored terms.

I TURN NOW to colleges tipped in the direction of "second-generation-in-college" (and of course "second" here means second or more). What is it that students seek in what I have called "second-generation" colleges and universities? What is it that they want to avoid?

The latter question is more easily answered. They are seeking careers in which they believe that they can be independent—and this is a principal source of what I consider a brain-drain of some of the most talented young people in the country into the law, under the misapprehension that, for example, large law-firm or government-office lawyers are able to say (as our students want to be able to say to all and sundry, including their parents and faculty and other adults): "You're not the boss of me!" It is much the same in medicine, where I believe that there is also a brain-drain, and that we will soon have a surplus of physicians—although this does not mean that all medical needs in all areas will be appropriately served. Even at the present time I believe we have a surplus of extraordinarily gifted young people who, rather than, for example, preparing themselves to be hospital administrators or health-care professionals, are seeking what they regard as the non-bureaucratic and independent career

[5] The dichotomy employed here of "first-generation" and "second-generation", like any such simplification, leaves out many necessary qualifications. A large proportion of students in first-generation colleges are older, have been in the Services or worked for a time—sometimes after beginning college and dropping out, or stopping out—and are no longer dependent upon or close to their families of origin. Many are in college because available subsidies in effect bribe them to attend as semi-voluntary captives. They are not eager to find work, and they say of college that it "beats working." They pursue vocational courses, but they do so with limited energy, little assessment of actual possibilities in the field, and much fantasising, while crowding into courses in sociology or clinical psychology which offer them an opportunity to explore their identities, to "rap" with faculty who are frequently younger than they are, and who need their attendance to justify the maintenance or growth of their departments and their own retention.

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of the physician or the lawyer. Little do they realise that they will be subject to the urgencies and imperatives of clients; and, except in those few cases where they practice law as solo lawyers (a very low-paying and precarious occupation for the most part) or medicine as solo practitioners (an increasingly infrequent phenomenon), they will also be subject to the demands and expectations of colleague groups.

ALTHOUGH I have noticed a change in the last several years, very few students in colleges like Harvard will even consider a graduate school of business or management. Not only do they look down on "commercial" callings and harbour the antipathies toward business which I have earlier referred to, but they have this notion that they can be "on their own" in what are often called the "independent professions", while in a large corporation they would be subject to the whims of an arbitrary hierarchy. When I tell them that a scientist at Bell Labs, or a top executive at Hewlett-Packard, can have an independent "life-style" (to use the common phrase of which I am not especially fond) and maintains a high degree of personal autonomy, I am regarded at best as an apologist, and at worst as a liar. The suggestion that one might have an interesting life working for a multi-national corporation, and in this way get out of what I see as the Great American Parish—another form of "Protectionism"—is also resisted by students in the most selective colleges.[6] Such corporations bring with them the "contamination" of American economic imperialism. I sometimes ask students: if they were a Thai peasant, would they rather be exploited by a local Thai merchant, who may be both inefficient and corrupt, or by a multi-national corporation with French, Japanese, and American management which is seeking to establish a reputation for fair dealing and efficiency in Thailand? The question comes as a totally new idea to most of them, as it would to a number of my academic colleagues.

[6] It is not recognised by most commentators (or, of course, by most students and academics) that the proportion of Americans working for multi-national corporations has declined relative to the number of individuals working for companies employing 500 persons or less.

The Multi-Nationals now occupy the same role in the imagination of what corporate working life is like that the Assembly Line in the past has done, which has always occupied a minute proportion of the life of the work force, and among that proportion, very few for an entire lifetime. In other words, though Multi-Nationals are undeniably important, they are not growing in size in relation to the rest of the labour force.

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WITH THE UPWARDLY MOBILE "first-generation-in-college" students who are sufficiently able to enter top-flight state universities and private colleges, and to aim for careers in law and medicine, motivations are relatively uncomplicated. They want the high status, the assured income (far more assured, of course, in medicine than in law), the supposed options that these professions provide. But with Black students of both sexes I have known, in second-generation colleges (though themselves the first in their families to attend college), it is very difficult to persuade them not to aim at law, or, in cases where they can do well enough in science, at medicine—even though these same students complain about the lack of faculty "role models" throughout academia, or about the absence of Blacks in such fields as banking or entrepreneurship generally, although more and more Blacks are now willing to attend undergraduate and graduate schools of business.

But I want to concentrate here on those whose choice of profession is less obvious. They come from affluent families, and enter these professions not for economic and status reasons, but for the reasons of independence that I have already mentioned. In many cases there is also a strong impulse to do what is defined as "meaningful" work, which at the very least means that one is not doing harm, but at most means that the work is intrinsically varied and challenging and that one is "doing good" (and only incidentally "doing well").

This insistence on professional careers is especially striking among second-generation women students in second-generation institutions —including a number of older women returning after interrupting their educations to obtain a law degree, and in some cases even a medical degree. In such institutions, for a woman to declare that she wants to be a "housewife and mother" and to do "volunteer work" would be almost taboo. When my wife and I had a group of Radcliffe first-year students to tea at our home, we asked them: "Would it be legitimate for any of you to say, 'I want to become a housewife, to have a family, and to serve on the board of the PTA'?" They unanimously agreed that to say such a thing —even to think it—would mark one as hopelessly out-of-date. "Volunteering" is, in fact, becoming a pejorative term in the Women's Movements, although many of the triumphs of these movements have been achieved by volunteers, going back to the early 19th century and to the suffragettes of the period during and after the First World War. Only paid work is legitimate. The social glue that volunteer work provides, and which in fact many perform in what lawyers would call *cui bono* work (being unpaid and not having a name on the door), becomes illegitimate, a vestige of the now despised feminine mystique.

I might add that in no other country are the Women's Movements comparable to those in the USA. In part this reflects the fact that in few countries have women been as free—as Tocqueville observed in 1831—and the nearer the approach to equality the more insistent the demand for it. American women are free in many legal and formal ways, yet constrained in others, for they are subject to peer pressures from their own sex and from the opposite sex which both guide and limit their choices. Whereas, in Germany today, women with doctorates and professional positions believe that they should be at home when their children are young, even if this means withdrawal from the career ladder, one would not find such an attitude among comparable women in this country.

One could say that it is egalitarianism which makes both sexes in college so vulnerable to peer pressure. In a more hierarchical and stratified society, upper-class women can afford to be eccentric (in the way that, let us say, Virginia Woolf and her Bloomsbury women friends were eccentric, or much as Bertrand Russell could be eccentric), while in this country same-sex pressures lead to attacks, as in the common accusation: "Who do you think you are?" Thus, at one time, it was difficult for American women to pursue careers; now, in some institutions, it is difficult for them not to. Their social class does not protect them from sex-role definitions as would be the case in a country where most women had no choice, yet a woman of high position could become a Madame Gandhi or in Japan a sociologist, Kazuko Tsurumi, or in England an economist, Joan Robinson. Unlike their mothers who, after the Second World War, were forced to work by the shortage of men and the precariousness of economic life, they can decide that they want to be at home with their children and, indeed, to have children—a decision which is under pressure in the USA with our sharply falling birthrate among the educated.

I might add parenthetically that I see many academic couples embarking on two-career lives, and occasionally including children in the mix of activities, with the expectation that the husband will take a heavy share, sometimes contractually defined, in the arrangements of homemaking and parenting. I would urge such couples to take metabolism tests to see if they have enough energy to pursue the extraordinarily difficult combination of family and career. (This is in part required by "democratisation" since such parents, even when they can afford full-time help, generally choose *not* to—or say it is *impossible* to find when it is only nearly impossible—because

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they cannot bear to have a servant in the house who is not treated as part of the family.)

Class Warfare & The Elite

OF COURSE, there are many other young people in selective colleges who would regard marriage as an unwarranted constraint. I recently watched a television programme entitled "Singles in Seattle", and it amounted to a declaration of independence by what seemed to me a group of unattractive hedonists. "Single by choice" was their term for themselves. Perhaps the fact that they had picked that label indicates a residual recognition that there are other, and perhaps superior, choices. But these people claimed to be footloose and fancy free, not appreciating what thoughtful students of family life and the Women's Movements have pointed out, namely, that what may seem a satisfactory mode of life in one's twenties may leave one extremely lonely in later life.

This kind of self-indulgence and egocentricity can of course be found among students in second-generation colleges. Many dismiss as "boring" any activity which is not instantly gratifying. They resist the demands that any serious course in school or college makes for work that is sometimes frustrating, and that does not massage one's narcissism. The notion that to call something "boring" is also a verdict on themselves never occurs to such students.[7]

BUT I AM MORE INTERESTED HERE in another group of students in second-generation colleges who, as I have said, want to be of use. And whereas in the 1960s students in such colleges were inclined to proclaim their idealism as a way of shaming or intimidating adults (even when their protests had elements of carnival as well as conscience), today such students may be inclined to conceal their idealism. They want to be "of use", as I have said; they want to serve people. Although their behaviour has changed as vocational horizons have darkened, the structures of belief have shifted much less. The cynicism concerning authority, large organisations, bureaucracy, and indeed America, has changed much less than is often supposed. For example, many young people entering medicine from second-generation colleges aim at careers in community medicine or family practice. They want to be neither research scientists nor specialists, and often fail to appreciate that community medicine, like poverty law, is something one can do for a Peace Corps term, but probably not for a full life.

Although the number of colleges and uni-

[7] These attitudes are to be found in high degree also among students in first-generation colleges. Many of these are also likely to say their work is "boring", never having extended themselves sufficiently in school or college to become fully engaged with any academic or intellectual activity, and at the same time lacking the basic skills of literacy and numeracy which are necessary for genuinely college-level work. They expect to be entertained in college, and behave as critical consumers. In addition to some income foregone (since many are working only part-time rather than full-time), most of the costs of their education are subsidised by state and nation. But they often complain if not every course appears "relevant", or every faculty member instantly available. (Some complaint is justified—many faculty members restrict effort through collective bargaining agreements, or are simply time-servers.)

In a situation of under-enrolment in virtually all private colleges and many non-flagship state universities and regional colleges, "consumer sovereignty" reigns in academia; and no academic requirement can compete against the desperate need for "customers" who will pay tuition or, indirectly, bring tuition through the "Full Time Equivalent" formulae under which State institutions are financed.

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versities which I have described as "second generation" is small, they encompass a great many of the students who intend to pursue careers in the law. Ralph Nader is a hero for many of them. Even without the enormous drive to enter law school of some of the most talented young people of the current generation, there would be a "brain-drain" into a field which caters to the nation's adversarial spirit and litigiousness. I say this, although I recognise that many lawyers are in practice people who do seek to resolve conflicts, not to create them. Still, we have created a climate for business in the USA in which, as with universities now, litigation and the fear of it are the order of the day; and litigation is usually an effort to *stop* something, some productive process, and not to *start* something. Hence, I confess I felt a certain dismay when a very intelligent lawyer recently became President of Dupont. Maybe it is the new model. Not a chemical engineer, but someone capable of coping with government regulations, litigious customers, and stockholders, and environmentalists.

I SHOULD MAKE PLAIN that I am not attacking all lawyers and all environmentalists! When I advise individual students, I do not let my general prejudices against the litigious society (and my preference for the Japanese procedure of go-between) interfere with my judgment as to the particular person; and of course I recognise that law school can be seen as a post-baccalaureate moratorium which helps to "keep options open."

Nor do I mean to criticise environmentalists as such. What I have in mind is the tacit class warfare between the affluent second-generation students (often allied with their teachers) who already have jobs or the ready prospect of them, and possess the standard package of consumer goods (or the often at least equally expensive fashionably un-standard package), who want clean air and water and mountains to hike in—and, on the other side, people in the working class, who might also enjoy amenities, but think it more important to have jobs and their first chance at the consumer goods which are in the standard American package. Law is often a route by which environmentalists can stop production, just as malpractice suits can stop medicine, or make it very difficult, or turn it into a defensive practice which is harmful to the patients and costly to the society.

And my objection to the law as a mode of training is that it seldom prepares people for the necessary trade-offs which must be made among competing interests and interest groups (although it is also true that many people come out of the law who do secure such training on the job). I would prefer people to attend a good school of management or a school of public policy and to study economics, which is concerned with trade-offs or cost-benefit considerations. I think the future of this country, and indeed any Western country if it is to compete successfully in an international world economy, lies in people who can *start* productive processes and not in those who are skilled at interfering with them or making it so difficult to conduct them as in effect to veto them.

Not all environmentalist efforts have this tacit character of social class combat. Nor are all such efforts carried out with dogmatic hostility to large organisations, such as public utilities; they make very easy and vulnerable targets in fact, while seeming to the student protestors and their faculty allies to be part of what people assume is the single "power élite" which runs America, if not the entire world beyond America.[8] Many student idealists today are prepared to work within established channels and established institutions for moderate and incremental reform. (I think, for example, of a number of young people who have been involved in the experiment in the redesign of work at the Bolivar, Tennessee, plant of Harman Industries. This group recognises that the project would not be workable if it resulted in a decline in productivity. They have also come to recognise that not all factory workers are eager to manage the plant, any more than all students are

[8] An example of what seems to me a mindless attack on public utilities is the litigation brought against Massachusetts utilities by "Fair Share", a consumer advocacy organisation. The ground was that the utilities have deferred paying federal taxes, the purpose of such deferral being to permit construction of new facilities without paying high interest rates or entering the sagging stock market. If "Fair Share" wins its case, costs of the litigation will be paid by the consumers "Fair Share" is supposedly representing. So will the costs of borrowing to build necessary facilities. Any increase in rates would also be attacked (first, by public utility commissions; and second, by similar litigation). One could argue from the viewpoint of traditional Capitalism that corporations ought to pay out retained earnings in dividends and keep minimal depreciation accounts, going to Wall Street for additional capital. There is no doubt that oligopolistic pricing allows corporations to free themselves of the money market in this way. But this has been true for several generations, and was in fact facilitated by the earlier clamour against "Wall Street", which characterised populists right through the New Deal era.

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eager to manage the universities—or even their investment policies.) But I see among the students in the "second-generation" colleges a marked distaste for competitiveness—though rarely any recognition of what I consider to be the case: namely, that individualistic competitiveness is far more powerful in academic life, among intellectuals and among artists, than among people in big business who are team-oriented and rarely "jungle fighters."

HOW DO I RECONCILE what I have just said about non-competitiveness with the fierce competition implicit in the almost panicky rush to law and medical schools?

It would not be more than a very partial answer to refer to that minority of students who are so antagonistic to all competitiveness, to all that they subsume under the term "rat race", that they seek a path of gently sloping downward social and occupational mobility. They end up running restaurants in Vermont or pottery kilns in college towns. They are partially subsidised remittance men and women who are making way for what Pareto termed the "circulation of élites" by leaving room at the top for the more assertive of both sexes—that is, notably including those newly assertive women who have taken the recently available opportunity of moving from locker room to boardroom, having undergone the socialisation and camaraderie of team sports.

My paradox is a hypothesis rather than something based on substantial empirical data. It is the idea that the rush to medicine and law by the children of the already-arrived (the second and third generations) is a form of anti-élitism—a decision based on a certain humility, not on vaulting ambition.

I can put the matter this way. A student who has gone to a good secondary school and a selective "second-generation" college, who comes from a cultivated home, will not really have serious difficulty even now in entering medical school—and all American medical schools are fairly good, even though some are more sought after than others—or one of the major national law schools. All such students have to do is work reasonably hard, and they will be admitted (although it may require an additional summer of work in a laboratory or another course in organic chemistry, if their records are not outstanding). What would look to a person from "first-generation" settings as an *ambitious* choice of career is for these students a modest one, intended to keep them on the same plane of security and financial resources as their parents, but not to use their talents or their particular gifts as the basis for making more daring claims.

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something to say . . . I am capable of originality . . . I have a contribution to make which is distinctive", whether in academic life or in the arts, would be to go against the ethos of egalitarianism. To go further still, and to add that one can "afford to take risks" because one comes from a certain kind of background and stands on the enviable platform of a selective college—this, too, is something which students know intellectually, and yet it makes the more sensitive feel *guilty*. It does not lead them to conclude that they can indeed afford risks that less privileged "first-generation" students will take only if they have outstanding and easily recognised talents. And to make just such a distinction would seem to the guilty possessors of privilege a recognition that they are *different* from other less fortunate students—a judgment the élitist anti-élitists recognise when it comes to supporting the causes of the deprived, but *not* when it comes to taking full advantage of their own opportunities for high distinction.

Thus, for example, when I speak of the brain-drain of talented people into medicine, I am saying that medicine is a useful applied science-and-art whose practice requires a high but not especially exalted level of competence. It is work on a plateau for the most part, not on the peaks of excellence.

It is, I should add, not only the young people themselves who react this way, but often their anxious parents (perhaps especially common in Jewish families, but not only found there). Parents want to be sure that their children do not take undue risks—and certainly work, for example, in the arts or work which aims at an academic position in over-supplied fields involves great risks. Young people and their parents thus enter into a tacit alliance to raise the floor—but at the same time lower the ceiling—on American aspirations.

Immobility & Imperialism

THERE IS ANOTHER ELEMENT in student career choices which influences what I see as a certain lack of venturesomeness among a number of American students in "second-generation" colleges. If such young people violate prevailing patterns in their own restricted orbits (and again, recall that we are talking about a small minority of America's enormous college-going population), and decide to marry and to start a family, I have found a great resistance both to horizontal and to vertical mobility. When, for example, undergraduates quickly conclude that there are "no jobs" in academic life, I sometimes find on exploring the matter that they fear that there will be no jobs on the two seacoasts where they feel that they can live in their accustomed "life-styles." I observe that they are not likely to change their career plans if I indicate that there may be ample jobs at the newly developing University of Texas in Dallas, or the new branch of the University of Houston at Clear Lake, or the University of Indiana at South Bend etc.

Similarly, politics aside, they are rarely interested in the possibility of work at the new universities in Iran, or even in the continuing need for expatriate faculty at the expanding universities of Nigeria. Sometimes they will say that it is "not good to uproot children and move them around."[9] When I note that it has not been my observation that "army brats" or children brought up in the Foreign Service are any less stable than children brought up in Evanston or Marin County or Wellesley, they are still not moved. That is, they are not willing to move, even though, as I also point out to them, in a country where other people move around while they stay in the same place in order to have "roots", it isn't going to remain the same place since other people, very different sorts of people, will be moving in.

TO PUT IT DIFFERENTLY, there is a certain stickiness about movement, whether upwards in a hierarchy or sideways at the behest of a calling, whether in business or in academic life, where accomplish-

[9] I do not mean to imply in the text that these hesitations about mobility are wildly irrational or simply provincial. It was irrational in an earlier day to move for the sake of career advantages without regard to one's family. Even if the main job-holder's work would be rewarding, the milieu for the spouse and children, and schools for the latter, might be less so. Much depends on the stage of life, importance attached to friendships, to the accessibility of the outdoors, and many other factors of personal preference. However, many people on the two seacoasts have not caught up with the burgeoning of artistic and cultural facilities in many other parts of the country over the last several decades, and the extent to which chamber-music players, for example, can find people of their own speed (much as chess-players can) in even moderate-sized cities all over the United States. One of many unobtrusive measures is the extent to which there are squash courts, soccer teams, "little theatres" (often including facilities for avant-garde music and dance)—not as commonly as Holiday Inns, but often hidden from those with an out-dated view of US communities—Washington, D.C., for example—once regarded as simply One Industry (or Company) towns.

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ment may depend on the willingness to move. The Women's Movements are, of course a factor here. US males no longer make such decisions solely on the basis of their career opportunities; they must also consider the career opportunities for their spouses. In fact, some liberated women are, in my limited experience, more willing to move, irrespective of their spouse's career chances, than husbands are willing to move at the cost of their spouse's careers or joint definitions of what "parenting" involves. In the social strata of which I have been speaking no appropriate trade-off has yet been worked out between parenting and productivity, and the costs to individuals and to society that an unbalanced emphasis on either one can involve have not been explored.

It has always been the case that there have been blue-collar workers who did not want "promotion to foreman." And in the past, coal miners, to give one example, have been notoriously "sticky" at a time when there was unemployment in the coal fields; but professionals and executives were willing to move wherever opportunity offered. Today, it is the US coal miners who are willing to move, all too many of them for the "energy problems of the Nation", while it is the professional and executive classes who seem *not* to want to pay the price of promotion to positions which offer opportunity but demand great sacrifices of *work* and *care*—and also, potential sacrifices in terms of moving to parts of the country often considered "less desirable."

IT IS MOVING one's "home base" that I am discussing here, not an allergy to travel. Many of the young idealistic Americans who proclaim themselves "anti-imperialists", and see, often correctly, the imperialism of a good deal of American foreign policy and a fair amount of American commercial policy, are what I have come to term "Trans-Atlantic provincials." They insist on their own form of cultural imperialism: which is speaking English to multi-lingual nationals of other countries and assuming that, wherever they go, they need not learn the language or indeed pay much attention to the customs of the local culture.

I am reminded of an experience ten years ago, when I spoke to the Peace Corps volunteers then working in Senegal and the Gambia who had learned to converse in French and some of the local languages such as Wolof. I met them in company with their mainly Senegalese counterparts who were engaged in *Action Communale*, a kind of community social service, and was depressed to see that in the 100° (F) heat the Senegalese were wearing white shirts with French cuffs and dark suits, whereas the Americans (including of course the Black Volun-

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'Oh, never mind that, girl', the teacher said. 'You're not going to get a question about that in the exam.' And that was that. As an example of teaching literature, I would rather trust my kid to almost any comprehensive school I can think of. **Alan Forrest**, *Books & Bookmen*

The Elegant Double Negative

Though not unaverse to men – 'I like them very much' – she would have told her constituency party to 'go jump in the Nene' if they had asked her to be photographed with one. **Alec Hartley**, *Guardian*

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teers who were in that setting so obviously American—of course they are among the oldest Americans) were in the usual garb of cut-off jeans, scruffy beards and slouching postures, sprawled all over the floor of the Country Director's home where we were meeting. I criticised the Peace Corps Volunteers for their mode of dress. It was condescending to the local population, just as the bluejeans affected by the élite a few years ago were an insult to the working class who were seeking to move away from bluejeans.

The Volunteers defended their mode of dress and manner as "authentic" and "natural." This term "*natural*" is currently in vogue to defend a mode of life almost unique to America. We throw young people at each other in cross-sex encounters in a way that is often defended as "natural", whereas any anthropologist knows that in most cultures separation of the sexes until puberty or marriage is customary, however it may be violated in secrecy. The desire for a "natural" mode of life, free of greed for possessions, is in some ways an admirable feature of the idealism of which I have been speaking and which makes it possible for the "second-generation" students to seek work which they regard as "meaningful", because greed for wealth and the far more dangerous greed for power are repressed or non-existent. The Volunteers in Senegal and the Gambia thought that in their "natural" manners and mode of dress they were behaving as "natives" are romantically supposed to behave. They were quite unaware of how condescending and/or arrogant they appeared to their host counterparts. Anti-imperialist in ideology, they were behaving in a way that only "imperialists" could afford. To be sure, some did get expelled from a number of countries because of use of drugs or other ways of behaving also regarded as "*natural*" in the contemporary Western youth culture.[10]

THESE PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS had gone outside what is becoming the Great American Parish, the province of provinces, cut off (despite jet travel and mass communication) from the rest of the world by the deliquescence of training in foreign languages and the relative rarity of true immersion in a foreign culture. Many of the Volunteers, however, did exactly that: they made themselves (in some ways almost too quickly) at home abroad, and they also often learned a great deal about another society, a knowledge which I regard as essential if one is to understand one's own society. And their unintended condescension was in no way a sign of ultra-American chauvinism. (We suffer from such chauvinism now, for example, in President Carter's human rights campaign with its echo of Woodrow Wilson's moralism and even that of John Foster Dulles.) Many Volunteers learned the complexities which might be involved in preaching human rights, American style, vis-à-vis countries with very different traditions. I only wish there were more such volunteers.

But what has happened in recent years is, so to speak, a domestication of idealism, a concentration on problems *within* the United States which goes together with the unwillingness to move to other countries, whether to work for a multi-national corporation or to practise one's profession there.

The Corporate Villains

WHAT EVIDENCE IS THERE that with the apparent change of behaviour by college and university students, there had not also been commensurate changes of attitude? In some studies that were done by Marshall Meyer, instigated by our mutual interest in understanding these issues, Harvard College undergraduates were presented with a political spectrum on which they were to mark their own position, that which they attributed to their parents, to their teachers, and to other adults; and also answered questions about their general attitude toward their country, toward the future, etc. What the investigation shows was that students in 1972 were *more* hostile to authority, *more* cynical, and located themselves further to the political Left vis-à-vis parents, teachers, and other adults than had been the case even during the height of the demonstrations at Harvard in 1969! This picture was little changed for Harvard students in 1974, in contrast to the situation at Riverside which (the least sought after of the University of California campuses) has many students of lower-middle-class and working-class background who do not share the attitudes of the privileged which I have primarily been describing. They are "first-generation."

Furthermore, contrary to the general impression, students can *still* be mobilised into political activism although the television cameras no longer follow them, and it is no longer newsworthy, especially when demonstrations occur (as they now sometimes do occur) on non-élite campuses. Some of these protests are consumer-oriented (against rises in tuition or cafeteria prices). Indeed, some state universities have organised active lobbies (notably the State

[10] Of course, there were other and less honourable reasons why local dictators won support for the anti-American gesture of throwing out Peace Corps Volunteers who were doing plainly useful work.

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University of New York in Albany and the University of California in Sacramento) as well as a National Student Lobby in Washington, D.C. Then there are the many Public Interest Research Groups, founded on a model sponsored by Ralph Nader, often with a check-off from the student activities fees and with considerable resources for consumer or environmental or other local actions —these can be found on a great many state college and university campuses. But, under the right conditions, issues more characteristic of the élite universities can be found arousing protests *now* in non-élite colleges, e.g. investment policy. Any conflict which involves charges of "racism" or "sexism", or the dismissal of a popular professor who can claim that his or her dismissal was the result of racism or sexism can bring out student protests, invasion of trustees' meetings, and all the other tactics except for the violence which we associate with the late Viet Nam War period. One reason that there are not so many protests is that university administrators have become much more conciliatory, and often give in at the first sign of protest rather than give battle.

STILL, THE MATTER HERE RAISED is one which deserves much more investigation than it has received. And I find that this whole complex situation always raises the question: given the negative public view of business, can business do anything to change it?

One of the things I would suggest is to try to get across to people that they are picking easy targets. Students and political leaders, and probably most of the country, regard the oil companies and public utilities as powerful. There is no doubt that money can be translated into political power although it does not automatically bring political power (one of the complaints that the Right-wing well-to-do are apt to make). Recent events have shown how cautiously that translation has to be undertaken not to boomerang. I cannot emphasise enough what I said at the outset, namely, how timid big businessmen often are, how scared they run. They are scared of stockholders, of Congress, of litigation, not to speak of the perennial conflicts (to which businessmen have become rather accustomed) of dealing with powerful trade unions.

Even so, does it help to make this point if oil companies report "windfall profits" or use funds supposedly retained for exploration in order to diversify against the day when they run out of oil (an understandable desire to diversify, but hardly a wise move politically)? Yet, saying this, how could one manage, with one's stockholders and one's board of directors, to declare that one must

THE STATE OF FICTION
A SYMPOSIUM

with contributions from A. Alvarez, Brian Aldiss, Kingsley Amis, Martin Amis, Paul Bailey, J. G. Ballard, A. L. Barker, Stan Barstow, David Benedictus, Malcolm Bradbury, Melvyn Bragg, John Braine, Christine Brooke-Rose, Jeremy Brooks, Brigid Brophy, A. S. Byatt, Angela Carter, Isobel Colegate, William Cooper, Robert Coover, Elaine Feinstein, Eva Figes, Nicolas Freeling, Giles Gordon, Patricia Highsmith, Michael Holroyd, Dan Jacobson, Diane Johnson, Jennifer Johnston, Gabriel Josipovici, Mervyn Jones, Francis King, David Lodge, Ian McEwan, Olivia Manning, Stanley Middleton, Brian Moore, Helen Muir, Edna O'Brien, Julia O'Faolain, David Plante, Barbara Pym, Frederick Raphael, Piers Paul Read, Alan Sillitoe, Julian Symons, Emma Tennant, Paul Theroux, Anthony Thwaite, William Trevor, Peter Vansittart, Auberon Waugh, Raymond Williams, Angus Wilson, A. N. Wilson.

in the summer issue of

THE NEW REVIEW

single copies £1.75 Annual Subscription £7.50

from The New Review, 11 Greek Street, London W.1.

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be sure not to "make too much money" (at least not this year)?

Some of the things large established corporations do to win public support are of some modest help (e.g. the sponsorship of the Public Broadcasting System, the various educational foundations such as the Lilly Endowment or the Exxon Education Fund). But none of this really gets to the heart of the anti-organisational syndrome which makes work in large organisations, governmental or private, illegitimate.

I GO BACK IN MY MIND to Joseph Schumpeter's great book, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, written in 1942, in which the Austrian-born economist pointed out that Capitalism would be its own undoing. He believed that its affluent heirs would find it undramatic, its leadership uncharismatic. Whoever heard of an accountant being the hero of a television drama or even a comic strip? Clark Kent is a hero not because he is Clark Kent, but because he can change into *Superman*. Our heroes are not the bureaucrats who keep our society, if just barely, manageable; they are the stars of athletic contests, or television celebrities, "Lone Rangers" and buccaneers who appeal to the nostalgia of the country and to the Huckleberry Finn hiding inside the sober-suited business executive.

Is it the *size* of organisations which in itself made large business so ready a target? I know that there are institutions which are beyond manageable human scale, even though I do not accept automatically the "Small is Beautiful" dogma. This is true of the United States of America itself. In my fantasies, I have often wished that we had not fought the Mexican War, and that, in the conflict over chattel slavery, the South had been allowed to secede. I do not admire the effort to preserve the Union, although I sometimes wonder what this continent would be like if the Mexican government controlled the Southwest; if the States of the Confederacy controlled the South (I am reasonably sure that slavery would long since have been abolished); and if the residual Yankees and new immigrant groups inhabited the Northeast and the Middle West.

Similarly, I think that there are universities which are beyond human scale and which should be decentralised. Large corporations have often been good at this, creating sub-units which are virtually autonomous and compete with each other as well as with the parent company's competitors. And there are certainly situations (illustrated by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company) where a large monopoly position has led to what I regard on a world scale as extremely effective service, and (in Bell Laboratories and Western Electric) to some of the best basic research going on anywhere.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY that we are dealing here with very long-run phenomena. The cynicism and even nihilism toward authority, which we attribute to Viet Nam and Watergate, is something characteristic of people everywhere in greater or lesser degree. I believe that there is nothing business or government or intellectual debate can do which will rapidly change such deep-seated attitudes. I have found in the last several years students in second-generation colleges who are more willing to listen to arguments of the sort I have advanced here than was true a few years earlier. There is less belief that the Millennium will come about if we can only shoot a few corporate villains. In fact, in some quarters, nihilism has replaced euphoria. One of the reasons that this shift is so marked in the US is that this country is still living on the inheritance of the "good years" of the 1950s and 1960s economically and also culturally. We have been holding on to the immense set of entitlements and expectations which were evoked and proclaimed in that period as part of the whole egalitarian and populist tide, Lyndon B. Johnson was an unusual "self-made man" in that he did not want to kick down the ladder up which he had climbed, but rather wanted to extend it to those who had started from even lower positions than he (e.g. the Mexican-Americans he had taught at San Marcos State College in Texas).

But the fact is that no country—no business enterprise, no government, no university—can deliver on *the claims already filed*. This is another way of contemplating "the tragedy of the commons."

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The Smell of Human Flesh

Life in Montaillou—By JOHN BOSSY

IT IS NOT EASY to think of an important history book, except Huizinga's *Waning of the Middle Ages*, which can have been less trouble to write than *Montaillou*.[1] Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie had in front of him the three volumes of the register of the inquisition into heresy of Jean Fournier, bishop of Pamiers between 1317 and 1326 and later Pope Benedict XII, edited and published by Jean Duvernoy. He gave, apparently, two sets of lectures on what was in them, and these seem to have served without much alteration as the basis for the French edition published in 1975. Though the book was a great success, it gave every sign of having been put together, intelligently but without much art, from a card index. Now his English publishers, and Barbara Bray his translator, have done the job of compressing the text and smartening up the language which Gallimard failed to do, and the result is an intensely readable and finely produced book of moderate length. Between the two ends of the process which has produced it, Le Roy Ladurie's contribution looks more like the decisive reaction in some process of industrial chemistry than a complete work of historical authorship.

Yet *Montaillou* is a most important book. For one thing, it is a notable sign of the times. In the development of the dominant school of French historiography known as the school of *Annales* it marks some kind of a fission. Its ancestry in Fernand Braudel's *The Mediterranean* is clear enough: Le Roy Ladurie's Occitania is visibly a region of Braudel's Mediterranean, with its mountains and mountainy people, its transhumant sheep and shepherds, its Catholic culture of the lowlands and Catharism of the mountains. But its reference is to one theme of Braudelian geohistory, the *part du milieu*, the ecological theme exploring the static relations of people and their environment: a theme of a good deal more public interest, not to say a good deal more fashionable, in 1978 than in 1949. What was perhaps more important to Braudel—the mobile geography of routes and communications, the diffusion of people, their notions and techniques—is here extremely subdued, its Promethean implications uncongenial to the conservationist and anti-colonial ethic of the present.

This is significant enough, and one point at which the parting of the ways between Le Roy Ladurie and his strongest competitor for the Braudelian succession, Pierre Chaunu, may be detected, since Chaunu made his name, before turning to other things, by translating Braudel's Promethean theme from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. But it is probably less significant than the lack, in *Montaillou*, of any sign of what had become the *Annales* orthodoxy—that nothing that could not be counted mattered very much. There are no tables, no graphs, no histograms in *Montaillou*. Admittedly there was not much in the source which was readily quantifiable, but Chaunu's vision of a serial history subjecting vast masses of repetitive data to the reign of the computer, taming the maquis of historical fact to a system of numerate tillage, reducing narrative sequence to the explication of a graph, is a long way away. So, it may be added, is the quantitivism of Le Roy Ladurie's first major work, *Les paysans de Languedoc*, as graph-bound—and in its treatment of religious communities (in that case Catholic and Protestant) as reductionist—as any other *Annales*-inspired thesis of its date. If Le Roy Ladurie is a Braudelian, he is a sort of primitive Braudelian, rediscovering the environmental timbers under the quantitative deck-cargo which turned *The Mediterranean*, in its second edition of 1966, into so unwieldy a sailor.

Notice—to put roughly the same point in a different way—the subordination of explanation to description in *Montaillou*. Its rambling form makes an acute contrast to the conscientious structures (economy, society, civilisation) of the classic *Annales* product. It represents a conscious effort simply to convey what is there, not to boss

[1] *Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village, 1294–1324*. By EMMANUEL LE ROY LADURIE. Translated by BARBARA BRAY. Scolar Press, £12·50.

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reality about or claim too much for the constructions of the mind as against it. Le Roy Ladurie's model has been the ethnographic description of the anthropologist, rather particularly of the English or American anthropologist, not so much of the Lévi-Straussian French. His instincts are still reductionist, as any historian's are perhaps bound to be: the *domus*, the Pyrenean family house, is his god from the machine, and despite the genuine attention given to religious feelings as expressing an appetite for the otherworldly, they are sometimes diminished to epiphenomena of domestic solidarity when the evidence is at best unclear. (Sometimes it *is* clear.) But I personally have every sympathy for Le Roy Ladurie in his dilemma: how to become a faithful descriptive historian without becoming an antiquarian. His *domus* is no doubt about as important as he thinks it is, and a little over-insistence helps to get the subject into focus. Anyway, perhaps the main reason why the book has been such a success in France has been the way it simply, indeed a trifle lazily, conveys the flavour of a community as it was in the Pyrenees in the 14th century, towards the close of some two centuries of religious division:

> "At the time when I lived in the house of Raymond [Belot] and his brothers", deposed a serving-woman, "the Belots built a new *solier* [upstairs room] over their kitchen. . . . I suspected that the heretics had come and were sleeping in the *solier*. So one day, towards the hour of vespers, after having fetched water, hearing people speak in low voices in the *solier*, I . . . went out into the courtyard. In the courtyard there was a big tall dungheap, from the top of which you could see through a chink in the wall what was going on in the *solier*. I climbed up on the dungheap, and through the chink I looked round the said *solier*, and in a corner of the room I saw Guillaume Belot, Bernard Clergue and the heretic Guillaume Authié, speaking to each other in low voices. Suddenly, Guillaume Clergue came along. I was frightened. I got down off my dungheap."
>
> "What were you looking for in the courtyard?" asked Guillaume.
>
> "I was looking for the cushion which I put on my head to carry my pitcher of water", I answered.
>
> "Be off with you, It's time you went back into the house", said Guillaume."

In this case the religious solidarity of the *domus* did not extend to a female servant: I wonder if the group in question is not more of a kin-group and less of a household than Le Roy Ladurie makes out.

I have heard other reasons for the book's popularity suggested, among them an appeal to Occitanian regionalism or nationalism. Le Roy Ladurie certainly makes a good deal of this, more at least than his English title does: "*village occitan*" has become "French village", which is surely rather anachronistic. Another possibility would be his insistence, discreet but by French standards extremely firm, that the class war was not going on in Montaillou. He concedes that it was going on elsewhere, but many Frenchmen, if only for a change, will have been grateful to him for choosing not to write about it. What he has recaptured is surely the smell of human flesh; Marc Bloch had always claimed that it was the true diagnostic sign of the historian's prey, but in the 30-odd years since his death it had seemed to be drifting farther and farther away from the preoccupations of the historical lineage he helped to found. English Francophiles may feel, thanks to Richard Cobb and Theodore Zeldin, that the smell is not an unfamiliar one, but will be glad of such a mighty waft as this.

GUIDED BY THESE INTENTIONS Le Roy Ladurie and his English adaptors present, in 21 lecture-length chapters, an attempt at a complete description of an insignificant Pyrenean village during 20 years or so around 1300;

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complete, that is, so far as can be gleaned from the answers offered by members of the community to questions posed by a gratifyingly patient inquisitor seeking to uproot heretical depravity from one of its stubborner seats. Relative fidelity to its *Annales* heredity has divided it into two parts (absolute fidelity would have divided it into three): Part I, Ecology; Part II, Archaeology. The exact meaning of the two terms, and the division between the territories they delimit, is not, to me at least, entirely clear. Ecology means something to do with habitat, *oikos*, and subsumes economy in so far as that preserves its primitive sense of the relation between a domestic entity and the environment which supports it. Archaeology is nothing to do with digging; so far as I can see it is used in a sense invented by Michel Foucault and means roughly a structure of thought and perception in so far as it may be supposed to be fundamentally different from ours, or rather the faithful rendering of such a structure. Physical and mental constituents, nature and culture, the given and the created, seem to be more or less what is intended: why exactly the domestic should be ecological and the sexual archaeological is a bit of a puzzle.

Anyway ecology, for the sedentary population of the village, amounts to the *domus*, a physical structure and an organised group of people. Physically, the house is built around the kitchen, the "house within the house" where, if you lift a corner of the roof with your head (sic), you can see a preacher giving gnomic advice around the fire, or a distracted mother debating whether to give food to a daughter who has received the *consolamentum* and ought by rights to be fasting to death. Its moral weight is conveyed in two passages which have already become famous, one about the servant of a dead paterfamilias removing his hair and fingernails before sending him to the custody of the parish for burial, so that his potency would not leave the house; the other advocating incestuous marriage between brother and sister on the grounds that any other arrangement, besides being intrinsically unattractive, weakens the house by requiring the provision of dowries. For the non-sedentary population of shepherds ecology means the mountain itself, in summer at least, for in winter they move themselves and their sheep to lower pastures in Spain; their shelter is a mountainside *cabane*, their society an easy-going male camaraderie and plenty of conversation over bread and cheese. Here we get the story of the footloose shepherd Pierre Maury, whose adventures in marriage I mentioned in an earlier article in ENCOUNTER,[2]

[2] "The Sacred and Profane History Machine", ENCOUNTER, November 1977.

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and some speculative thoughts about the ethics of poverty bred in these high pastures.

THE SEXUAL ARCHAEOLOGY of Montaillou reveals no great surprises: homosexuality, like (according to Le Roy Ladurie) Catholicism, does not thrive at this height, bestiality seems unknown; liaisons are free enough outside marriage, rare within it. The priesthood, in the considerable person of the parish priest Pierre Clergue, is dramatically unchaste (he persuaded his *châtelaine* to make love to him in the sanctuary of a neighbouring church) but surprisingly learned, I get the impression, in theology and canon law. The marital customs of Montaillou will bring reasonable cheer to those who believe that the mediaeval church's large-scale system of incest taboos was popularly supported, and discourage such as Chaunu who have supposed that a drastic increase in the age of marriage, at least for men, occurred in Europe somewhere between the 14th and the 17th century. We get a good view of the condition of special categories of people like women, children and the dead, and eavesdrop on the occasions of general sociability outside the domestic scene, as men gather in the evening under the elm-trees in the square to discuss the resurrection of the body.

It seems reasonable for the publishers of the English version, in altering the French subtitle, *Village occitan de 1294–1324*, to imply that its representation of the religious and moral beliefs current in Montaillou is its most interesting part. This has, to my mind, the signal virtue of exploding the theory, widely held in the past and recently revived by historians over-impressed by the achievements of 16th-century Christianity, that the belief of the ordinary soul in mediaeval Europe was something else than Christian. Montaillou has little to show in the way of fertility rites, human or agrarian, and even less of what Barbara Bray, in a happy coinage of her own, calls "pagan fallout." What mattered for the people of Montaillou, says Le Roy Ladurie, whether they were Cathars or Catholics, was the salvation of their souls. As distinguished from their theology, which does seem to have been fairly radically Manichean, the religious practice of the Cathars incorporated a dense undergrowth of traditional Christianity which they shared with the Catholics. Both of them held to the redemptive merits of fasting, the symbolic virtue of eating fish and the eucharistic overtones of a nice pie consumed in common. They held to the sacraments as social institutions, and rather particularly to the institution of godparenthood, to whose importance as a formal bond of Christian friendship between people who would not otherwise have been related the practice of

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both sectors of the population bears firm testimony. They had similar instincts about the dead, and about the difficulties of coping with the multitude of their all-too-physical "souls" before the doctrine of purgatory had brought some order into their condition and transported them, not exactly from the frying-pan, but from a cold and damp graveyard, into the cleansing fire.

IT IS AT THIS POINT, as we look back to where we started and consider the relation of Le Roy Ladurie's end to his beginning, that we may begin to wonder how coherent a view of his community his minimalist method has actually given him; or rather, whether the extremely coherent view which he actually offers is in keeping with his description. The view is that Montaillou maintained its ecological balance through the self-perpetuating mechanism of the *domus*, and celebrated that achievement in its religious belief through the notion of a universal *domus* in the sky or the hereafter, born of the earthly *domus* and guaranteeing its perpetuity in time and stability in the spatial scheme of the universe.

> Montaillou is the physical warmth of the *ostal*, together with the ever-recurring promise of a peasant heaven. The one with the other, the one supporting [*portant*] the other.

Yes, maybe: as a conclusion, this is elegant and attractive. But if, as his description seems to me to show, this Cathar house and Cathar heaven could not have come into existence save by the mediation of a "Catholic" Christianity already *in situ*, where exactly, in the way of a geography of religion, has his ecology of the mountains got us? His book, if it has no other effect, ought surely to persuade us that people are people, and will have their own ideas about things at any height above sea-level. Gauzia Clergue had her idea:

> [In 1302] during Lent, I was coming back one day . . . from gathering beets in one of my fields; and on the way I passed Guillaume Benet.
>
> "Have you had lunch?" he asked me.
>
> "No", I answered. "I am fasting."
>
> "Well", said Guillaume, "yesterday, Sunday, I was invited to Ax-les-Thermes, and I had a very good lunch. At first I hesitated about it. So I went to see the goodmen [Cathar *perfecti*] to ask their advice. 'Anyway', they said, 'it's just as great a sin to eat meat out of Lent as in Lent. It soils the mouth just as much. So don't you worry about it.' And so I accepted that excellent meat lunch."
>
> But I did not agree. Meat in Lent or out of Lent: from the point of view of sin it is not at all the same thing."

Fantastic Eschatologies

Recent Fiction—By TOM PAULIN

DORIS LESSING'S stories[1] are feminist fables and it would be wrong—at least initially—to judge them by purely aesthetic criteria. Reading them is rather like listening to a prophetic voice from the past, a rational intelligence which mercilessly exposes those attitudes which we now call male chauvinism and female dependency. Long before feminist ideas became generally accessible, Doris Lessing was analysing sexual relationships with a cool liberated detachment, and it's interesting to notice just how comprehensive her vision is. Like an anthropologist she describes a whole series of culturally conditioned attitudes.

In "The Habit of Loving" a wife celebrates her fortieth birthday by dressing in dowdy clothes and pinning her hair back into a "clumsy knot." Her husband protests: "I do so love you being beautiful in your lovely clothes." But she laughs and refuses to take part any longer in his possessive fantasies. Unlike the character in "The Woman" who changes the colour of her hair to suit the different preferences of her two lovers, she rejects the role of pretty servant and becomes an early prototype of the liberated woman. Lessing is very much aware of what she terms "masculine solidarity", but she is equally critical of feminine servility and in "He" there is a neat description of a deserted wife's reaction to the news that her husband is coming to visit her:

> The moment Mary was gone, Annie rushed into her apron and began sweeping. She got

[1] *To Room Nineteen*. Collected Stories: Volume One. By DORIS LESSING. Jonathan Cape, £5.50. *The Temptation of Jack Orkeny*, Collected Stories: Volume Two. By DORIS LESSING. Jonathan Cape, £5.50.

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> down on her knees to polish the floor, and then took off her dress and washed herself at the sink. She combed her dragging wisps of pale hair and did each one up neatly with a pin till her face was surrounded by a ring of little sausages. She put back her dress and sat down at the table. Not a moment too soon. The door opened, and Rob Blake stood there.

What we see here are the frenzied gestures of a dependent automaton, and the prose catches the way her nervously hurried reactions are the result of a conditioning process so thorough that she is completely unconscious of it. She is peevishly house-proud, a neurotic servant who is unable to engage in an equalising anger, and at the end of the story she is gripped by "a terrible feeling of injustice":

> . . . it was just this feeling she must push down, keep under, if she wanted him. For she knew finally—and this was stronger than anything else—that without him there would be no meaning in her life at all.

The injustice is partly that of male domination, but it also stems from her inability to be independent: she is the passive victim of her need to have a man to give meaning to her life. And Rose in "The Other Woman" is, at least to begin with, a similar character and one who is compared to "a little cat, all purring and pliable." As Betty says in "Pleasure": "A woman should think of her husband's career." Because of this women can have no identity of their own, and when they try to discover one they are destroyed like Susan in "To Room Nineteen." Several days a week she rents a room in a sordid hotel in Paddington where she waits "for the easing hours of solitude to begin." Eventually she turns the gas on, lies down in the stale bed "that smelled of sweat and sex", and escapes from the "dry, controlled wistfulness which is the distinguishing mark of the intelligent marriage."

LESSING CONCENTRATES on the predicament of women who always put their husband's career before their own, who exist to "bolster up some damned genius" and learn young how to be "a vehicle for other men's fantasies." She also demonstrates the jealous hatreds which underlie "possessive masculinity", and in "One Off the Short List" and "A Woman on a Roof" she depicts men whose sexual desire is "like needing to kill something or someone." There is a Lawrentian quality in this group of stories (particularly the clumsy "England Versus England"), though there is none of the sappy freshness of Lawrence's prose. And it's at this point that my reservations about Lessing's art begin to surface. The doctrine, the analysis, are cogent and definite, but in terms of imagination, sympathy and narrative skill these stories are badly deficient. The characters have a paradigmatic flatness—in one story they are referred to as A, B and C, while other characters are given deliberately unconvincing names like "Frederick Jones" and "Henry Smith." Places have names like "Petersbank" or "S-", and Lessing's prose-style is uniformly flat and hard, like the minutes of a meeting. The characters and the scenery are all like this passage from "Dialogue":

> The people passing were hostile, stupid animals from whom she wished to hide herself. But worse than this, there was a flat, black-and-white two-dimensional jagged look to things, and (it was this that made it terrifying) the scene she walked through was a projection of her own mind, there was no life in it that belonged there save what she could breathe into it. And she herself was dead and empty, a cardboard figure in a flat painted set of streets.

This dead flatness and metallic bluntness give a montonous sense of controlled sterility and unreality. The characters are like ciphers in an equation—they know "to a fraction of a degree the state of their emotional pulse", and this makes them resemble the electro-chemical organisms which pass for people in Huxley's novels. The Scottish doctor in "The Eye of God in Paradise" is described as "busy, hard-working, essentially pragmatic, practical and humane"—a string of deadening adjectives which sounds like a marriage-advertisement from the back page of the *New Statesman*. Lessing's rational humanism is adept at analysis and prophecy, but unfortunately deficient in imaginative sympathy. And while her ideas are convincing and influential, her fictions seem to be set in outer space.

MARTIN AMIS'S NEW NOVEL[2] is a constrained re-write of *Dead Babies*, that savage and brilliant satire which is set in a place of "shifting outlines and imploded vacuums . . . of lagging time and false memories . . . street sadness, night fatigue and cancelled sex." This consumers' hell is also the setting of *Success* which transforms London into a state of nature inhabited by the ugly, the nasty, the brutish and the short. Central to Amis's vision is a sense of deprivation which annihilates the past and makes the present moment seem an exhausted bundle of vicious, fetid and desperate energies. As he says in *Dead Babies:*

[2] *Success*. By MARTIN AMIS. Jonathan Cape, £3.95.

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> But pity the dead babies. Now, before it starts. They couldn't know what was behind them, nor what was to come. The past? They had none. Like children after a long day's journey, their lives arranged themselves in a patchwork of vanished mornings, lost afternoons and probable yesterdays.

However, this is a pitiless, almost Jacobean world where everyone agrees "that life is a rat's ass and that it's no fun being yourself all the time. So why not do with your brain what you do with your body? *Fuck* all this dead babies about love, understanding, compassion." The only constants in this dead secular world are "self-pity, self-disgust, and self-love"; innocence is transformed into a baby-like boiled egg, and life has a scratchy, scurfy texture that infects the rhythms of Amis's prose.

Take, for example, the "chippy" and disgruntled Terry's remarks in *Success* about the cool, "naturally stylish" Gregory:

> I want details, I want details, actual details, and I want them to be hurtful, damaging and grotesque. I nurse dreams of impotence, monorchism and premature ejaculation. I lust for his repressions and blocks; I ache for his traumata.

Here, as too often elsewhere, Amis heaps up verbal triplets and refuses to write well. But in a valueless world style may be a value that he is deliberately rejecting—he prefers a hectic, spasming prose-style whose jerks and contortions resemble the death throes of an electric eel. It's this abrasive lack of coordination and the fact that the two central characters, Terry and Gregory, duplicate Quentin and Little Keith in *Dead Babies* which make *Success* a sporadically impressive but disappointing sequel. Nevertheless, Amis's sense of the way in which Terry's personality is the result of a derelict childhood represents an original revaluing of traditional notions of childhood and maturity. Terry has a murdered baby for a sister, a schizophrenic foster-sister called Ursula, and he remembers lying in bed "like a shrivelled grub", another withered baby. He is, he insists, comprehensively "fucked-up", and here Amis draws on Larkin's "This Be The Verse" in order to explore a condition of radical cynicism. His exploration isn't merely personal and neurotic—it is deeply sensitive to the mood of the late 1970s, and anyone who belongs to Amis's generation must recognise his understanding of where we are now.

THIS IS APPARENT in Gregory's remark: "The world is changing; the past has gone, and from now on all is future tense." A remark which

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adapts these lines from Peter Porter's "A Meredithian Treatment": "The past is dead, the future dead, the now/Is here, an apotheosis of girls begins." Porter's poem critically catches the atmosphere of the 1960s, and Amis darkens that climate of liberation in order to explore what it's like to live in a cultural dead-end. Everything in this terminal world is grubby, glossy and expensive—it is like Terry looking at one of those magazines "in which girls show the insides of their vaginas and anuses to the world for money." The streets are "like a dead newsreel reshown nightly", and this city of consumers and transients at times resembles Eliot's "twittering world" of torpid commuters. It may be that Amis is attempting to take the negative way through the hell he depicts, but there is a helpless uncertainty in his treatment of it. Far from subverting or qualifying his demonic competence he tends to recommend it, and this is one of the reasons why *Success* is a comparative failure. There is nothing in it which matches this marvellous passage from *Dead Babies:*

> Quentin is a superman. The versatility of the fellow! He can talk all day to a butcher about the longevity of imported meats, to an air-hostess about safety regulations in the de Gaulle hangars, to an insurance salesman about post-dated transferable policies, to a poet about non-typographical means of distinguishing six-syllable three-lined stanzas and nine-syllabled two-line ones, to an economist about pre-war counter-inflationary theory, to a zoologist about the compensatory eye-movements of the iguana. Just so, he can address a barrow-boy in rhyming slang, a tourist in yokel French, a Sunderlander in Geordie, a Newmarket tout in genteel Cambridgeshire, a gypsy in Romany.

Quentin's demonic identity (he is the murdering Johnny at the end of the novel) is the creation of his extraordinary versatility, and here Amis has a very sure sense of that endlessly competent nihilism which is the most apparent non-value in a certain strand of contemporary culture. It is a practical value, like success itself, and for all Quentin's brilliant guises it reeks of the merest efficiency. Unfortunately, *Success* depends on the cultural associations of the word "chippy", which is defined as "minding being poor, ugly and common." It's a term that recognises and colludes with the authority of class, and it passively submits to the condition of being an anxiety-ridden *petit bourgeois*. Here and in the description of Terry and Ursula as "below-stairs lovers" Amis harks back to previous class-structures (the Edwardian period, the 1950s) and this confuses the contemporaneity of a narrative which is at times reminiscent of Larkin's *Jill*. In the character of Gregory, Amis appears to be exacting a personal revenge on all the gilded fools whom he must have beaten long ago and who must therefore be scarcely worth bothering about now.

THERE ARE A FEW amusing moments in the story —Gregory's father is described as "an insatiably compassionate man (i.e. off his chump in a posh kind of way)", and Terry wonders how to invite a secretary out:

> A donnish, twinkly "Let me take you to a place where cash can be exchanged for alcohol"? A frank yet slightly literary "Why not let me take you to the pub"? A casually speculative "Coming over The Crown"? An abruptly plebeian "Fancy a drink"?

But at other times the introverted narrative lags and becomes boring. Perhaps this is because a story of two sophisticated and demented adolescents is bound to seem rankly narcissistic and eventually pointless. Like a tramp who shambles about cursing at himself, Amis's novel occupies a sort of twilight zone where neurosis only occasionally makes a statement about the essential conditions of life. This is because self-disgust is a narrowing perspective which reduces reality to the spectacle of someone squeezing spots into a steamy mirror.

ALTHOUGH GORE VIDAL'S prose has a fluent grace and witty simplicity which Amis's lacks, *Kalki*[3] is a much less interesting and provocative novel than *Success*. Vidal, like Amis, depicts "the human race ... in its terminal phase" and, quoting Horace, he shows a society of spoilt children "born under the malignant influence of change." He is nonchalantly attuned to the spirit of the age:

> Cultural note for future historians: The mood of most of the world last year was eschatological. Things were running down and negative entropy was on the war-path.

And he describes how an ex-GI, J. J. Kelly of New Orleans, becomes the Hindu god, Kalki, and eventually destroys the entire population of the world with a plane-load of poisoned lotus flowers. Vidal's eschatological fantasy glances at chemical warfare, Erica Jong, TV spectaculars, Women's Liberation, corrupt politicians and the current fashion for oriental religion, but it is only remarkable for the beauty of its prose and for the way it demonstrates Vidal's cultivated intelligence. His playful, cherishing mind is neatly allusive and

[3] *Kalki*. By GORE VIDAL. Heinemann, £4.50.

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one of the pleasures of the novel lies in noticing its various allusions to Pope, Kipling, and James's fascinating fable "The Papers." Vidal's New York, like Amis's London, is nightmarish:

> Black prostitutes (ostensibly female) in silver wigs and short skirts lurked in the doorways along Forty-Second Street. "Adult Bookshops" alternated with massage parlours and, worst of all, with Greek restaurants where the smell of frying grease deserved a circle to itself in Dante's hell. Sleazy movie houses advertised porno and murder films, subjects hardly alien to the street people.

And there are a number of pleasant witticisms: "Walter Cronkite, *Hollywood Squares, The Gong Show*, all will be as one with Nineveh and Tyre."

However Vidal is blandly unperturbed by the idea of an apocalypse and this makes his story seem curiously light and flimsy, as though he is writing elegantly on a paper tissue. *Kalki* is slight, enjoyable, intelligently trivial. Its unstrained smoothness would have benefited from some of Amis's energy and disgust.

JOSEF SKVORECKY's two novellas[4] are remarkable for their atmosphere, rather than for any depth of characterisation and narrative interest. In his loving introduction, "Red Music", Skvorecky pays tribute to the jazzmen of Europe whose music was a protest against political tyranny: "The Ghetto Swingers, the nameless bands of Buchenwald, the big band in Stalin's Siberia, the anonymous jazz messengers in Nazi uniforms criss-crossing Europe with their sheet music, the Leningrad Seven." And in "Emöke" a young man woos a beautiful widow with a whispered jazz lyric. The widow lives "in a fog of mystical superstition" and she sings in Hungarian "a hard, beautiful, primitive song of her nomadic ancestors." She is an allegorical figure (the soul of the country) who is pestered by a lecherous schoolteacher who is like "a caged armadillo" and whose brain is "accustomed to processing ready-made bits of information and to the endless, fruitless contemplation of ways and means of achieving physical satisfaction." He is a typical party-member, "a mere system of bowels and reflexes", and he competes with the young man for Emöke. They both lose, and Emöke is left "to the superstitions of the consumptive gardener" whom she once loved.

Skvorecky creates a dense atmosphere of damp neglected gardens, mouldering hotels and mansions which date back to the Austro-Hungarian

[4] *The Bass Saxophone*. By JOSEF SKVORECKY. Translated by KACA POLACKOVA-HENLEY. Chatto & Windus, £4.95.

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JOHN MURRAY

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Empire, baroque fascia and *fin-de-siècle* wallpaper. His blend of nostalgia and a love of freedom is strangely effective, even though his characters tend to be clouded by his syncopated prose.

PROSE IS AGAIN the problem with Robert Coover's immense and fantastic satire[5] which deals with the execution of the Rosenbergs and features Richard Nixon as the central character. Coover is an ambitious and gifted writer who has made the mistake of treating a distressing and important subject in a kind of surrealistic razzamatazz which rapidly becomes confusing and unreadable. In this passage the Rosenbergs become part of a collective nightmare which blurs and dissolves like a crazy documentary:

> ... and the Rosenbergs, grown monstrous, octopuslike as Irving Saypol depicted them, breaking out of their cells, smashing down the walls of Sing Sing with their tentacles, and descending upon the city like the Beast from 20,000 Fathoms. They knock over buildings, crush automobiles under their bodies, swallow policemen whole, get tangled up in a Coney Island roller coaster.'

The licence for this treatment lies in the statement: "The tradition of all past generations weighs like a nightmare upon the brain of the living", and Coover attempts to analyse a condition of political hysteria which selects the Rosenbergs as scapegoats. It is only towards the end that the prose clears and we are shown the "cables coiled out from under the chair like snakes, like thick turds", and then we see Ethel Rosenberg as she "plumps herself down in it with all the familiarity of a daily commuter taking her seat in the subway." However, by this time it is too late and Coover's act of reparation is lost in its murky verbiage.

His attempt to understand Nixon fails because he substitutes random sensations and swirling reminiscences for hard-headed analysis of a vulgar but fascinating political personality. Nixon, it seems to me, belongs to a tradition of self-justifying puritans and his installation of a tape-recorder in his office was the equivalent of a diary in which every minute act and thought is entered. Like a character out of Defoe he felt that everything was significant. Although Coover tries to present Nixon in all his furtive contingency, he fails to understand his personality and without that psychological insight we are left with a miasma of disjointed phrases. Lowell's "a savage servility/slides by on grease" is more acutely aware of America's problems than most of the pages of Coover's novel. And it is more in sorrow than in anger that I have to say that *The Public Burning* is a colossally mistaken attempt to understand the disturbing politics of America.

[5] *The Public Burning*. By ROBERT COOVER. Allen Lane, £5.50.

Sad Poem

What he wanted
Was a Grand Wurlitzer
With five keyboards
And a carillon;
Or failing that
The portable organ
From Cotgrave Miner's Welfare
They offered him
For next to nothing.

What he got
Was the house
She'd always
Dreamed of
With two bathrooms
(One carpeted)
And "the holiday
Of a lifetime":
An African Safari.

Vicki Feaver

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EAST & WEST

Soviet Russians Abroad

Emigré

By Andrei Sinyavsky

Paris

I HAVE READ your remarks about Russian *émigrés* and the journal *Kontinent* with sorrow and sympathy. For, apart from some minor mistakes and inaccuracies (for instance, it was not Brodsky but Bukovsky who was dumped in Vienna in handcuffs), everything you say is, unfortunately, true. Your article evinces a friendly sympathy for us, a sincere effort to understand what is happening here, but also, may I say, gloomy thoughts on this subject of reciprocal misunderstanding. You make it quite clear to any unprejudiced reader that you are not an enemy of *Kontinent*, but wish it well. I must confess that I was surprised and pleased by the calm, objective, and unimportunate tone in which you discuss these very difficult matters, problems, and troubles that are so remote from Europe. I refer to those deeply rooted complexes of Soviet psychology which in our *émigré* environment, in the Western conditions in which we now find ourselves, sometimes emerge in the form of party feuds and dictatorial impulses.

One can argue about the origin of these tendencies. In my opinion they are the reverse side of the unity, the solidarity, of which we all dream. It is a pity that sometimes, without our wishing it, our dream assumes the features of unfreedom or of that unhappy "moral and political unity of the Soviet people and Soviet society" that our rulers declared to be the mark of their totalitarian domination. It was in a resistance to this party "discipline" that dissidence arose and developed in the guise of insistence on the human ability to "think differently", everyone for himself in his own way. Dissidence as such has nothing in common with orders and commands. Nor has it anything to do with divisions between Right and Left; since such divisions are just as likely to occur in conformist circles as in those in which free critical thought prevails. The Camp tradition to which you refer is equally irrelevant to this phenomenon. Inmates who have experienced labour camps and prisons, who have been tortured and subjected to every kind of humiliation, are not scrupulously careful about what they now say. That is surely understandable and forgivable. Present-day concentration camps in the Soviet Union, the camps for political prisoners, generally display a remarkable concord of different nationalities, faiths and beliefs, a human fraternity in extreme situations, in the face of death and the machinations of the *KGB*.

Perhaps it has to be different when the danger is over, and we have escaped from our prison to Western freedom. This is sometimes harder to cope with than decades of slavery. Now and then monstrous distortions of our Soviet hell come to the surface. The impulses that here in conditions of freedom give rise among many Russians to a certain tendency to "dictatorship . . . leadership . . . closing the ranks" around immutable authorities, that lead to abusive language and threats against those who think differently, are all unfortunately the results of a Soviet education and are hard to overcome even among

EMIGRÉS have never had it easy: life in exile tries their souls. Even if sometimes in history they return to their homelands in honour, helping to make a revolution or a new, more liberal, régime, they never escape the scars of their painful sojourns abroad. The story of Alexander Herzen—so memorably told in E. H. Carr's "Romantic Exiles"—is one side of the drama of expatriation; the mixed chronicles of all the Central and Eastern Europeans during World War II (the Germans, Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs, and all the other refugees who were waiting impatiently for "liberation" and, meanwhile, wrangling among themselves) is another.

In previous documents we have in ENCOUNTER *tried to follow the spiritual and intellectual conflicts of the Russian dissidents who in the time of Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov try to come to grips with the trials of "inner" and "outer" emigration. See the exchange in* ENCOUNTER, *December 1974, between Andrei Sinyavsky and Günter Grass, and in a subsequent number (July 1976) the contributions of Igor Shafarevich and Mstislav Rostropovich.*

The following document, which was originally published in the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", deals with the problems of "Kontinent"—a Russian émigré journal which may or may not be legitimately compared to Herzen's "Kolokol" ("The Bell"). ANDREI SINYAVSKY, *whose first novel under the name of "Abram Tertz" had its first publication in English in* ENCOUNTER *("The Trial Begins", January 1960), has often appeared in our pages. Andreas Razumovsky, a much-respected German journalist who specialises in European cultural affairs, was the author of a critique of the new Russian emigration to which Sinyavsky replies.*

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those who stood up against power, authority, and censorship.

Sometimes there is another element in this: our usual Russian quick temper, which angrily sees words as deeds and tends to make of every controversy a cold or even civil war. At the slightest excuse the horrid spectre of an "enemy of the people" is conjured up out of the shadows, sometimes to be denounced as an "ideological diversionary" or "a Zionist" (by Soviet judges in Soviet courts) or pilloried as a "dangerous Red" or a "Moscow stooge" or a "henchman of the *KGB*" (in *émigré* circles). Basically this is nothing but the fall-out of our own fears and inferiority complexes, the paranoia we brought with us from the barbed-wire zone. In accordance with the law of repression, differences of opinion that are taken for granted in the West are transformed in the subconscious into those detestable expressions: "Don't wash your dirty linen in public" and "Those who are not with us are against us." Both expressions are essential for the creation and cementation of a spurious "unity."

I DEPLORE the exaggerated over-reaction of the editors of *Kontinent*, the excessive offence taken at your loyal and well-meaning criticism, the import of which I see in your desire that a good (an excellent) journal should occasionally admit a broader spread of opinion, display more tolerance and politeness, exercise a more exacting editorial attitude to the content of its numbers, and show more respect for its contemporaries. Basically it was this feeling that made me write this letter. Style makes the man, and I am surprised by the inappropriateness of the style by which *Kontinent* demonstrates its tolerance. One more step in this direction and (as the old story has it) the result of this kind of struggle for peace will be that throughout the world not one column is left standing. That can hardly be avoided if everyone with whom one differs is regarded as an enemy and the outside world is perceived as a hostile encirclement.

I have heard—I do not know whether it is true or not—that somebody intends to bring a legal suit over one critique of the "disease of intolerance." I fear that in that case I should feel obliged to appear as a defence witness and to say that the disease of intolerance—the small beginnings of which you reported—is spreading and gaining in emotional force.

TWO YEARS AGO I left *Kontinent* more or less for the same reasons that are mentioned in your analysis and in Ota Filip's letter of protest. I did so quietly, in order not to disturb "unity" (we all aspire to "holding together" and "keeping in step"). I grant that others who work for the journal do not feel they are exposed to literary or partisan pressures. But everything is relative, after all, and what to one man is a manifestation of tyranny seems to another the highest stage of liberty and democracy. I left because I felt I could no longer do anything useful for a good journal with which I had been closely concerned. And I had no desire to be a mere decorative figurehead or VIP wedding-guest.

There are among the Western dissidents not a few "renegades" and "quitters" like me: we feel no hostility towards *Kontinent* but simply do not feel free enough in that circle of free men. We have therefore decided to launch *Syntaxis*, a journal with a different spirit and profile, with no aim other than open-mindedness and, to be sure, autonomy in relation to its elder brother. I do not know what will become of it—whether *Syntaxis* will succeed in turning its modest possibilities into reality. We shall see. In any case I see no reason to make a number of theoretical and stylistic differences the occasion for internal struggles and mutual suspicions. Everyone has the right to be himself. Pluralism and tolerance are of especial importance for the development of independent thought in present-day Russia. And above all, it seems to me, your article should be a reminder of that.

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INTERVIEW

Michael "Bommi" Baumann

The Mind of a German Terrorist

WHAT *does it feel like in the underground when your former comrades are in the dock?*

BAUMANN: I wish them luck.

—Is that all?

BAUMANN: I have enough troubles of my own. I'm between all stools. I have the public against me, and the police, and my comrades. And the rumour is that they want me to be killed.

—Why should they?

BAUMANN: Even if one betrays nothing, they regard simply "getting out" as a betrayal.

—You say in your book[1] that the armed struggle experiment was "useful and right" even though it was a failure. How do you see things now after Schleyer and Moro?

MICHAEL BAUMANN *is still on the German police list of the "30 most sought-after terrorists." A reporter from "Stern" Magazine met him recently in an "underground hide-out" and conducted the interview which we publish in translation. Baumann has been a leading figure in many of the horrific incidents which have bloodstained the ten-year record of the violent German Left: see the account of "The Transformation of Humanism" in* ENCOUNTER *(November 1970) for the background to the von Rauch death which he mentions. Now aged 31, he was close to the "Baader-Meinhof" and the "2nd of June" gangs, but withdrew from "active terrorism" shortly before the kidnapping of the CDU chief Peter Lorenz in Berlin. Peter Neuhauser is the interviewer; and "Bommi" (for his bomb-proficiency), as he reports, agreed to put his thumb-print on the manuscript in order to "authenticate" it.*

BAUMANN: The Urban Guerrilla experiment was useful and right even though it was a failure, because you can't learn without making mistakes. But in my opinion the form the struggle is taking now is madness. Mogadishu—you can't take your life and place it above that of children and Majorca holiday-makers and say: *My* life is more valuable! That is élitarian madness, bordering on Fascism.

—But where do you draw the line? Doesn't the same apply to Schleyer's and Moro's murdered guards and the two kidnapped politicians themselves?

BAUMANN: From the guerrilla point of view those are military operations and cannot be done otherwise. The objective was to capture Schleyer, and there are his bodyguards—you can't tell them just keep still until we've gone—you know they have fire-arms and will use them.

—Politically, does that lead forward in your opinion?

BAUMANN: No, backward. But the people who have got as far as that are in a spiral; they act according to laws that they've long since lost the power to lay down themselves. They have completely departed from their original course.

WHAT WAS *the original course of the "June 2 movement"?*[2]

BAUMANN: From our point of view Fascism in the West German Federal Republic had not been overcome; from our point of view it was growing again at the end of the 1960s. We did not want to look on helplessly as people did in 1933.

—Looking at it ten years later, was that analysis correct?

BAUMANN: It was wrong, at any rate so far as the timing was concerned. There's also something else we can see now. Urban guerrilla warfare as a form of struggle has collapsed all over the world. It works only so long as the state that is being fought adheres to some extent to democratic laws. If it resorts to military force and

[1] Michael "Bommi" Baumann, *Wie alles anfinge* (Trikont Verlag, Munich).

[2] The "June 2 movement", a group of young Germans mostly from working-class families, took its name from 2 June 1967, when a policeman shot the student Benno Obnesorg at an anti-Shah demonstration in West Berlin. It tended to "spontaneous acts" in contrast to its rival the Red Army Fraction (*RAF*), which was organised on stricter, more disciplined lines.

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torture, any urban guerrilla movement is bound to collapse. Militarily it is hopelessly inferior.

—Would you say that a state that similarly thinks in military terms has better prospects in fighting urban guerrillas if it reacts toughly?

BAUMANN: Experience shows that that is the case, from the Tupamaros in Uruguay to Schleyer in Germany. And that is a fact that the planners of the Schleyer affair did not take into account.

—When did the "June 2 movement" begin to talk about armed struggle?

BAUMANN: After the attack on Rudi Dutschke at Easter 1968. At first the talk was not so much about pistols as about the most effective ways of hitting back. We had been throwing bombs for six months before anyone of us had a pistol.

—How old were you when you got your first pistol?

BAUMANN: Twenty-four.

—When was that?

BAUMANN: In the summer of 1971, when I came out of the clink after eighteen months.[3] By then the first shots had long since been fired.

—What did it feel like to have a pistol in your belt?

BAUMANN: You have a feeling of superiority. The weapon takes your fear away. Even the greatest weakling feels stronger than Cassius Clay. All you have to be able to do is to crook your finger. Any idiot can do that. It has a fascination to which many succumb.

—Do you carry a weapon now?

BAUMANN: No, I haven't for a long time. Rudi Dutschke has often talked about the "upright stance." A pistol hampers the upright stance purely physically. Your head is never quite straight, you always bend in the direction of the weapon, you walk so as to be able to use every movement to be quick on the draw.

—How did you get the pistol?

BAUMANN: Through the police. An unemployed pipe-layer named Peter Urbach had been a member of our group for years. He was a companionable easy-to-get-along-with type, and was always around whatever was going on; and he was above suspicion, because he was always one of the most militant of us all. In 1967, when we were still making *"happenings"* with Fritz Teufel and other members of the Commune, he was already always talking about armed struggle. "When you've got to the point of needing weapons, tell me, I can see to that for you, I have long-standing contacts", he said.

—How were you going to pay for the weapons?

BAUMANN: Money wasn't mentioned.

—And didn't anyone think anything about that?

BAUMANN: No. We were glad there was someone who knew a source. Then in 1969 we decided to explode a bomb when Richard Nixon paid a visit to West Berlin—on his route to an official visit. Personal injuries were to be avoided at all cost. Urbach said he could procure bombs.

—And did he?

BAUMANN: Yes. A few days before the visit I met him at the corner of the Kurfürstendamm and the Schlüterstrasse, and he handed over a plastic bag containing five or six bombs. The bombs that were planted at the official building during the Nixon visit didn't work, but most of the others worked very well on later occasions.

—So Urbach was the star procurer of weapons in your group?

BAUMANN: Yes, for quite a time. But then we noticed there was something about him that wasn't quite right. He was supposed to be getting weapons for Greek resistance fighters and told so many lies about it that we started making a check on him. Some old trade-unionists whom I knew from Berlin-Wedding said to me: Who have you got there?—the man's not water-tight! . . . " I found out that years before he had been exposed as a spy for the Special Branch authorities in Berlin. He was said to have gathered information about Communists on the staff of the *Reichsbahn* in Berlin.

—And what happened next?

BAUMANN: In 1969 the Red Army Fraction (*RAF*) was formed, and Andreas Baader wanted weapons immediately. Baader was a weapons

[3] Baumann was on remand from April 1970 to July 1971, charged among other things with shooting down the journalist Horst Rieck "because of his reactionary reporting." Since 1972 he has been wanted for several bank raids and attempted murders of policemen. The Berlin prosecuting authorities report that he was involved in a shoot-out with the police in the course of which his friend Georg von Rauch was shot.

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maniac, and later had an almost sexual relationship with pistols (the Heckler & Koch type in particular). He was living underground because he still had some time to serve from the Frankfurt department-store arson case, but he too knew of no source of arms other than Urbach. Georg von Rauch and I warned him urgently against contact with Urbach, but he went to him all the same; and Urbach gave him weapons.

—What weapons were handed over where?

BAUMANN: Three or four Belgian 7.65s and a Kalashnikov sub-machine gun, on the Havelchaussee. Another bigger delivery was agreed on at that meeting, but for that Urbach wanted money. He said it would be easy to get it in a bank raid.

—Did that second delivery take place?

BAUMANN: No. At the second meeting at Berlin-Kreuzberg in 1970 Baader was arrested.[4] The police were waiting, but Urbach got away as if by a miracle. The weapons from the first meeting had been in a hiding-place for about eighteen months. The *RAF* sent them to us when four or five members of our group came out of prison in July 1971. We knew they came from Urbach.

—Let's get this straight. You say that the first weapons for the German terrorists came from the police or the counter-intelligence authorities. And the revolutionaries accepted them?

BAUMANN: Yes, it shows how things get out of one's control. That's what I mean by the spiral one gets into. To us it was crystal clear that those weapons were known to the police, but from a certain point on, a weapon is a weapon, never mind where it comes from. Two days after my release my *Genossin* [girl-comrade] Petra Schelm was shot by the police in Hamburg. That made it clear to us that they had stopped taking prisoners, and we were not willing to be shot down without offering resistance.[5]

—What would happen if you met Herr Urbach to-day?

BAUMANN: I should walk straight past him. He was a classic example of an *agent provocateur*; he had been used by the counter-intelligence for years. We were caught up in a game that to the present day I still don't fully see through.

AFTER A BANK RAID *what happens in the plotters' flat?*

BAUMANN: First of all there's euphoria, because the thing has come off. You count the money, and hear on the police radio that they know nothing.

—And then?

BAUMANN: Then you watch the Berlin evening news bulletin on television, and that again makes you feel good. Next day someone goes out and buys all the newspapers, as inconspicuously as possible, and everyone reads every line.

—How important are the media in connection with these operations? In the absence of the media would the operations of the Urban Guerrillas take place at all?

BAUMANN: Hardly. Without reporting there would be a void. We were built up by the press, after all.

—If you had to fight terrorism, how would you deal with the media?

BAUMANN: I should forbid all reporting. OK, there's a bomb explosion, and nothing appears. Dead silence throughout the country. We were always afraid there would not be enough indignation to make sure of wide-spread publicity. Once we threw a bomb at the door of some judge in the Appeal Court, and nothing about it appeared. So we said to ourselves that we must send another message to the press to make sure they'd give a full account of it.

—So the group was less interested in what was written than in being written about. The bigger the display the better?

BAUMANN: Exactly. For instance, we sat down and pondered what would be a story that nobody could miss, that everyone would have to talk about and everyone would have to report. And we came up with the right answer—a bomb in the Jewish Community Centre—and on the anniversary of the "Crystal Night" during the Third

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[4] Andreas Baader was arrested in Berlin, on 4 April 1970. On the following 14 May he was freed by a gang led by Ulrike Meinhof. A warder was shot and crippled on that occasion. See: Melvin J. Lasky, "Ulrike Meinhof and the Baader-Meinhof Gang" (ENCOUNTER June 1975).

[5] Petra Schelm, a hairdresser, was a friend of "Bommi" Baumann's and transferred from the "June 2 Movement" to the *RAF*. During a large-scale police operation on 15 July 1971 she broke through a road block, continued her flight on foot, fired at the police and was then shot herself.

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Reich.[6] It was one of Urbach's bombs and, though it didn't explode, the story went round the world.

[6] On the night of 10 November 1938 the Nazis mobilised the *SA* against the German Jews. Nearly all the synagogues and about 7,000 Jewish businesses were set on fire, and 30,000 Jewish citizens were driven away to concentration camps. This was the "*Kristallnacht*", so-called after the smashing of the plate-glass store windows.

—What political ideas played a part in that?

BAUMANN: We sought out a point where everything met, the uncoped-with Nazi past, the Palestine problem with which we had been recently presented, and also we wanted a starting shot to announce the opening of Urban Guerrilla warfare. It was an operation that everyone was bound to take note of, from liberals to old Nazis, absolutely everyone in fact, abroad as well.

Dissension Among the Terrorists:

THE PRISONER *leapt from his chair and vaulted over two tables. Federal Judge Horst Kuhn, responsible for judicial inquiries into cases of terrorism, had been looking through his papers in the interrogation room of the West German prison at Frankenthal (Pfalz) when the prisoner suddenly knocked him down. To overpower the assailant a burly warder was needed, which was not surprising, since the prisoner was described in the files of the Federal criminal investigation department as a "karate instructor" to German terrorists. The man, Stefan Werner Wisniewski (25), had been arrested by the police in Paris.*

He had booked an Air France flight to Zagreb in the name of "Erich Lagger." His passport (No. J 0848862) had been stolen last fall from an Austrian detective, and he also had in his possession a passport and driving licence stolen from a Swiss named Francis Ledermann. When he was taken to Frankfurt in a chartered jet on the evening of his arrest a "bombshell" was found in his luggage—a five-page "Red Army Fraction" (*RAF*) document subsequently known as *Exhibit 1.2.2.1* kept under lock-and-key in the Federal criminal investigation office at Wiesbaden. The document has somehow been smuggled out of prison; and we give a summary of it here.

ITS AUTHOR **is an old comrade-in-arms of Wisniewski's, Karl-Heinz Dellwo, who is serving a life sentence in the Cologne-Ossendorf prison for the armed attack on the West German Embassy in Stockholm several years ago. It made its way from Dellwo's cell to the underground in spite of "strict security measures" and regulations forbidding "contacts"; and it reveals that a measure of dissension has broken out in the ranks of the Red Army Fraction.**

The disagreements revolve around the hijacking by Palestinians of a Lufthansa airliner on a flight from Majorca to Frankfurt (13 October 1977). The object was to put pressure on the German Government after the *RAF* had failed to secure the release of their ring-leaders Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe and seven other prisoners by the kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the president of Germany's employers' organisation. 82 passengers, including women and children, and 5 members of the crew were held by the terrorists for five days before they were liberated at Mogadishu on 18 October by a special detachment of the GSG-9, aided by a specially armed British unit. Schleyer's *RAF* kidnappers had welcomed the hijacking, and Wisniewski (the *RAF*'s man in Majorca) had taken an active part in the preparations for it.

In the course of the operation the captain of the Lufthansa aircraft was "executed."

In the secret smuggled document (dated 2 April 1978) signed "K. H.", Dellwo sharply criticised his friends. "*RAF* operations are never directed against the People!" But that principle had been reduced to a mere "tactical statement" by the Lufthansa operation. Instead of using urban guerrilla methods within Germany itself to secure the prisoners' release, they had awaited Palestinian aid. "Euphoria" and "admiration" of the Palestine Liberation Front had taken the place of ideas among the Germans, with the result that many sympathisers had been alienated and the *RAF*'s "moral claim" jeopardised. Dellwo believed the *RAF* was capable of gaining new adherents because the West German Federal Republic was being increasingly unmasked as a "police state."

"THE GUERRILLA'S LANGUAGE *is action", Andreas Baader had once said, and therefore action must be inherently intelligible without any need for elaborate explanation. In the struggle against Bonn, as "the Satrap of Imperialism" Schleyer "had therefore been a correct target." But hijacking an airliner full of holiday-makers had been a great mistake. Dellwo had a sounder idea. The* RAF *should have provoked an open breach between the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats through its "choice of object" and thus put the Union under such pressure "that it would have left Schmidt with no choice but to give in." Translated from terrorist jargon, this obviously means that Dellwo believed that the kidnapping of a famous politician or prominent capitalist would be more efficacious than kidnapping an organisation-man like Schleyer.*

The police believe that the document contains a concealed reference to another suitable candidate for kidnapping—the Hamburg publisher Axel Springer, for it says:

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—Could it be said that at that time the Mass Media had taken the place of the Masses in your eyes, with the result that you had ceased to be concerned with political persuasion in your own country?

BAUMANN: We regarded ourselves as the Fifth Column of the Third World, and we were pretty indifferent to the German working masses. To us the German working masses were an integral part of the capitalist system and had long since been getting their share of the spoils. The workers in our country can have it so good only because things are so bad for the masses in the Third World.

WHAT WAS IT LIKE *in your group between operations? What was everyday life like?*

BAUMANN: An operation was always a relief. The real stress came from life in the group. You were always sitting around with the same people in the same flat with the same personal problems

Killing People is Wrong. . . .

"In an analysis of the concrete political situation others leapt and leap (*sprangen und springen*) to the eye. But you will have tumbled to that yourselves. . . .'

Another politically mistaken terrorist coup *was the hijacking of the Jumbo jet belonging to the Israeli air line El Al to Entebbe in Africa, in which Germans were also involved. This was just as mistaken as the Lufthansa hijacking in his opinion, since both were directed "Against the People." "By such operations those who support us are again and again put back on the defensive by a few silly asses."*

Dellwo also complained of the difficult position in which such mistaken operations put the group. "On the subject of Entebbe, **'a'** *[Andreas Baader] said we could not dissociate ourselves from it because that would be condemning the hijackers, and that would not do."*

FINALLY HE WANTED HIS COMRADES **in the underground to carry out an operation to free the *RAF* prisoners from prison. "We want to get out of these holes!"**

The members of the Berlin June 2 terrorist group had long since made this one of their aims. "None of us should be inside for longer than a year", they declared. On a recent Saturday morning two women with forged identity papers secured admission to Berlin's Moabit prison. They forced the 57-year-old warder Horst Mausolf at pistol point to take them to the cells where prisoners see their lawyers.

There the suspected terrorists Till Meyer (34) and Andreas Vogel (22) were sitting with their lawyers. They and four other members of the June 2 group were charged with being involved in the kidnapping of Peter Lorenz, the CDU chairman in Berlin. By the time the prison alarm was sounded the two women with Meyer (and the warder Mausolf as a hostage) were back at the entrance. When they shot Mausolf in the legs, other warders opened the main gate of "the securest prison in Berlin."

TILL MEYER *(since recaptured in Bulgaria)—and he protested all the way back to Moabit "against the illegal kidnapping"—is the son of an interpreter, had been a painter, a seaman, and a canteen-owner before becoming "book-keeper" to the June 2 group. During the Lorenz kidnapping he saw to the proper and punctual payment of rent for the various premises in which the politician was held. The police later found Meyer's finger-prints on a beer-bottle left in a "people's prison" and on two pieces of adhesive tape with which Lorenz was blindfolded before his release. Meyer carried out his first bank raid in Berlin in 1971 and was arrested at Bielefeld in February 1972 after a shoot-out with the police. In 1973 he was granted leave from prison on parole ("auf Ehrenwort") and vanished into the underground; and he was again arrested in Berlin in June 1975, four months after the Lorenz kidnapping.*

The June 2 group got him out and thus made the politicians and administrators of justice look foolish. Dellwo of the RAF *called for a large-scale coup, so organised that the Bonn Government would have to give in to the ultimatum and free all the prisoners. At the same time this would expose the tough attitude of Chancellor Schmidt in the Schleyer case as an alibi for his real aim at the time, which was "the death of the four", that is, the liquidation of Baader, Ensslin, Raspe and Ingrid Schubert, who had been the internationally known symbolic figures of the movement.*

A PRIMARY CONDITION **for a successful operation to free the prisoners would be their concentration in a few prisons instead of being scattered in so many as they were now. As this objective was not attainable by hunger strikes, Dellwo recommended "a few attacks on prisons", but added that there must be no bloodshed. There must be no metal in the explosive charges. One night holes should be blown in the walls of six prisons (Hamburg, Werl, Schwalmstadt, Zweibrücken, and Hanover), so that the police authorities would be forced "to send us to Stammheim, because they can't surround all the prisons with guards (weil sie nicht alle Knaste mit Bullen umstellen können)."**

Dellwo, the lifer, wanted clear instructions for *Stunde X*, zero hour. "You must tell us what we are to do"—particularly when asked after an *RAF* operation where they would want to be flown to: "We want of course to go to a place of safety. . . ."

Michael Seufert

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that were never solved. Many of us, for instance, agreed with the members of the Commune, that is, that everyone should have it off with everyone else. But not every comrade liked that, and neither did every girl, and that was enough to cause tension.

—Is it a fact that such groups produce just the kind of tension that has to be discharged in action?

BAUMANN: Exactly. Outside pressure forces us together, and action is the objective that holds us together. But in between the tension is often intolerable. Once we came to blows about where to go for breakfast.

—Quarrelling with weapons in your belt?

BAUMANN: Weapons are always a factor. You're always cleaning your weapon or changing the ammunition; you're busy with the thing for noticeably a large part of the time. Or you're practising being quick on the draw, or reading books about guns. The *Deutsche Waffenjournal* (German Weapons Journal) was the favourite reading by far.

—Did you ever point your weapons at each other?

BAUMANN: No, but it happened in other groups. Only once was there a crazy situation when Andreas Baader insisted that our organisation should be completely in and subordinated to the Red Army Fraction. One night he and Georg von Rauch suddenly found themselves facing each other with drawn pistols. That startled me into dropping a bottle of red wine; that made everyone turn and look at me, and the tension was eased.

—Were there discussions in the group about what should be done with traitors?

BAUMANN: Of course. They were to be killed.

—And supposing someone only wanted to get out?

BAUMANN: The group principle is that there's no entrance fee, but quitting is impossible. That is made clear to every new member—the only way out is via the cemetery.

—Isn't it alarming to have to make a decision that will be irrevocable for the rest of one's life?

BAUMANN: Determination and keenness for action are so strong, at any rate at first, that all such considerations are considered unimportant and are swept aside. You simply say yes.

—Can such a group be held together from the inside?

BAUMANN: No, only from outside. One's own will is practically completely eliminated, only the group will prevail. The objective, the operation cannot be questioned, but only the means to be used; which car or what weapon, for instance.

THE POLICE PICTURE *of the terrorist is that of the complete man of action. Do terrorists have a similar picture of the police?*

BAUMANN: Most certainly not. After bank raids I've seen policemen for whom I felt really sorry, seriously. Young men, junior-squad types, they were even younger than I was, jumped out of cars with their sub-machine guns. I looked at them, and they were even more afraid than I was. They all hope it's not up to them to try to stop us. Once I was surrounded and was going to give myself up. I wanted to throw my pistol at the feet of a cop in a trench coat and I put my hand on my belt. But he thought I was going to draw and ran away, screaming.

—After you took the step into the armed underground, in what situations did you feel fear?

BAUMANN: Anyone who says he never feels fear is a liar. But after a time the things you're afraid of are no longer the same. The idea of spending years in prison becomes more frightening than death. Georg von Rauch, for instance, told me on the evening before he was shot that never again would they get him back into prison.[7] Having a pistol in your pocket during a major police operation meant in plain language that you preferred death. But it goes further than that. You can go on the trip because you simply want to meet death face to face, since it is always so close to you. *Todessehnsucht*, the death wish, is a fact.

—When you're deciding whether to draw your pistol or not, for instance?

BAUMANN: The dividing line was clear. Be the first to draw, if possible, but not if you endangered uninvolved third parties. After Georg von Rauch was shot I took refuge in somebody's flat on the other side of the Kurfürstendamm. I stood on the balcony, and down below were Neubauer [Berlin's senator for police and security], cops, dogs, sub-machine guns—the street was full of them. The flat behind me was full of uninvolved comrades, who said: "Well, when the

[7] Georg von Rauch was the son of a Kiel university professor. He escaped from prison while on remand on a charge connected with the attack on the reporter Horst Rieck, and on 4 December 1971 was shot in the Eisenacherstrasse during a large-scale raid and shoot-out.

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police come you won't shoot, will you?..." I'd already heard the order: "No more arrests to be made" on the police radio wave-length, followed by a reminder from headquarters that radio discipline must be maintained. So I'd heard my death sentence broadcast. I dismantled my pistol, dumped the parts in the toilet bowl, and flushed it. I cut off my long hair, changed my clothes, grabbed a girl and said: "Out of here!" I dragged her half-unconscious behind me, went down the stairs and walked straight towards the police. And they let me through! In those cases only instinct works—reason is out.

—How long did it take for "reason" to come back?

BAUMANN: A week. For a week I didn't sleep or eat, I just sat there. My mind was a blank, a complete blank. All I saw was Georg von Rauch dropping beside me over and over again.

—Do you regard the police as ineffective?

BAUMANN: They've certainly improved. But only the *GSG-9* are hot at shooting, I think. There's a new quality about them. Before they existed we were really afraid only of the Israeli secret service.

—But (if your theory is correct) counter-intelligence planted Urbach in your group, and Schmücker[8] was a spy too.

BAUMANN: That's true, but later on nothing went right for them, nothing important. Counter-intelligence still manages to track down sympathisers, but recently the real stalwarts have eluded them.

WHAT *do you think the RAF still capable of?*

BAUMANN: A great deal. Appalling things may happen.

—What, for instance?

BAUMANN: We live in the age of the atomic bomb, the atomic power station.

—Atomic blackmail, you mean. What possibilities do you envisage?

BAUMANN: I am not suggesting that at the present moment the groups have concrete plans or even ideas of that kind. But such things are in accordance with the logic of the age and the logic of the group. To them the three deaths at Stammheim Prison [Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ennslin] were confirmation that Fascism has openly broken out. Henceforth there are no limits.

—Was the possibility of atomic blackmail discussed at an earlier stage in Berlin terrorist circles?

BAUMANN: Yes, certainly. But now there's much more reality about the threat. The attack on the German embassy in Stockholm showed the *RAF* that their methods no longer work against the state. So I don't understand why they tried again with Schleyer. But they did, and again it didn't work. Now they've got to do something that certainly will work. And what can that be except an ultimate thing like that?

—Could it also mean occupying an atomic power station?

BAUMANN: Certainly. They are clever people, and they have vast amounts of money. A primitive atomic bomb could also be made. But a raid on a stockpile is more likely. After the Lebach raid[9] the Americans realised that 16 atomic detonators were lying half-forgotten in a hut near Mannheim, guarded only by a few men with dogs from a local security service.

—And where would the RAF terrorists go then?

BAUMANN: That is a matter of complete indifference to them. If you have a thing like that under your control you can make the Federal Chancellor dance the can-can on a table on colour television—and a lot of other statesmen with him. It's a bill of exchange on eternity.

—If you heard of such a plan, would you go to the police?

BAUMANN: I should never give away anyone to the police.

—So what would you do?

BAUMANN: I'd go straight to them and settle the matter myself. Because if the police intervened I'm quite certain there'd be an atomic explosion.

WHAT *are your prospects? How does one live underground?*

[8] The body of the student Ulrich Schmücker was found under a tree in the Grunewald in Berlin on the night of 5 August 1974. He had been a revolutionary, but was recruited as a spy by the Special Branch authorities while in prison on remand at Koblenz. He was "sentenced to death" by a kangaroo court of the June 2 Movement (of which he was a member) and "executed."

[9] On the night of 20 January 1969 three young men raided a *Bundeswehr* depot at Lebach in the Saarland for arms, and four West German soldiers were killed.

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BAUMANN: It's difficult. I live in a complete social void. I've no job, no family, no home, no nothing. But I also get away with a great deal—I don't register with the police or fill in all those government forms—I pay no rent, no taxes and no hire-purchase instalments. I'm not in the machine. That of course also has tremendous advantages.

—How does one sleep at night?

BAUMANN: Oh, I sleep quite well.

—Even with the threat of a bullet from your former comrades hanging over you?

BAUMANN: I don't know that for certain, but one lives better if one takes all possibilities into account.

—At the end of your book you say: "One day I shall join in the fight again." How?

BAUMANN: What matters to me in the long run is to get rid of the ex-terrorist label and communicate new experiences I am now having because of my present way of life and situation. If we are honest with ourselves, none of us are so certain about the future. We all need to be jolted into new ways of thought. I shall be heard of again. Until then may your heart grow wings—*Goddafes.*[10]

[10] "May God be with you on your way" (ancient greeting on Oriental caravan routes).

The Doll's House

Open the doors
and let your little fat pinkies
prowl through these rooms.

There is no cellar
with dark stairs
to frighten the children.

It is a house
with no roots at all.
Come into the hall

and tap the barometer
that hangs on the wall.
It will neither rise nor fall.

In the kitchen
you will touch
the little red paper fire

that glows in the range,
then put your finger
to your mouth

and make a show
of being burned.
They all do.

And you may,
if you will,
mumble my wooden food.

Upstairs, in the bedroom,
you will not fail
to lift up the pretty valance

and find
to your feigned
and loud delight

that there is indeed
a guzunder there.
For this is an old house

and as its ways
are not your ways,
improprieties

are of no account.
But when you find me,
and try to lift me,

as I know you will,
you will find
that someone—

oh, it was years ago—
thought fit to stitch me
into my chair.

Neil Curry

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POINTS OF THE COMPASS

You Norman, Me Saxon

By Stephen Toulmin

Hamburg

AFTER A MONTH revisiting my family in Britain, I find the transition to Germany unexpectedly abrupt—almost like returning direct to the United States. It's not the affluence that is so striking (though the Mercedes do seem as common here as the little Morrises and Datsuns in Britain) so much as the *tone* of the society. Above all, that sense of homogeneity and social mobility that have become part of the everyday atmosphere for me after living in America for a dozen years and more. For the nth time, I puzzle aloud about the profundity and rancour of social divisions in Britain, and the crippling effect they are having, not just on "economic growth", but on all political and social evolution.

I am sitting at a café overlooking the busy water traffic on the Alster, with a colleague who comes from an old Texas family of German ancestry and language. He at once picks up my thought and reinforces my impressions. It is understandable, he says, that shop floor workers should *envy* those managers who make more money, live in better neighbourhoods, and drive more expensive cars than they do; and this kind of envy can be found in Germany as much as anywhere else. But the sheer *enmity* towards the managerial class that he, too, has found among British factory workers is unlike anything he has ever met with in Germany.

Given that contrast, it is no surprise that the roles of trade unions in Germany also recall those in American industry, and differ sharply from the labour-management battles of Britain. This is not a consequence, or effect, of the participation by German workers in joint management councils (the policy of *Mitbestimmung*) so much as a precondition of this participation. German workers not only see it as, but also feel it to be, an advantage to them to be involved in the running of the factories from whose efficient management and productivity comes most of their own hope of improved wages and working conditions. British workers, by contrast, do not see this—still less do they *feel* it—to be the case. But this renewed contrast only raises my original question afresh in a sharper form: "Why has *Mitbestimmung* had so little appeal to trades unionists in Britain?"

My Texan colleague confirms this reading of the situation in Germany. There may be disquiet and uncertainty about national policies and priorities in the *Bundesrepublik*, but these are not generated by or associated with any kind of a "class war." The dangerous follies of the terrorist "Red Army Fraction" are products of middle-class fantasies and purely theoretical analyses of the "proletarian situation" in Germany. They arouse no sympathy or support among the proletarians themselves. If Dr Jürgen Habermas's "crisis of legitimacy in late-capitalist Germany" had real political roots, where are the resulting skirmishes between the classes? In fact, the radical campaign of violence is entirely *internal to* the white-collar classes. Once again, I am reminded of the United States, where the violent radicals of the Weather Underground have been recruited predominantly from professional and managerial class families, and have entirely failed to strike roots in the industrial working class. Real feelings of class strife do exist and show themselves in America, at any rate locally. But they do so in the decaying parts of early 19th-century American industry—e.g. in the back-country coal mines of Kentucky, and the run-down factory towns of Central and Western Pennsylvania, not in the car factories of Detroit or the aero-space plants of the West Coast.

Corsica

THE OTHER EVENING—in Vico, an old town a dozen miles inland (and uphill) from the modern holiday resorts on the western coast of Corsica—it is the local saint's day, and we come from the Church, where late night Mass has just ended and *Ave Maria* is still glowing in cursive neon over the high altar, to the main square, where the two leading cafés have sponsored a series of bands to play till the small hours. With me is my elder son, who has spent several years in a series of working-class jobs in Sheffield since

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coming down from Cambridge, and is now a trainee in the factory inspectorate.

We finally succeed in cornering a table for our party. We sit marvelling at the flow of champagne bottles to the neighbouring tables, since few of their occupants look at all like tourists. M is a bit perplexed. After 25 years of English life, particularly his last years in the factories of the West Riding, he expects to be able to spot "class" from dress and manner. And here we are in France, and a part of the French Republic with a lot of poverty and a substantial Communist vote. Yet where in this crowd are the Communists? For this evening at least, everyone looks middle class —or is it classless?—to English eyes.

M's remarks provoke my own sense that, in England, even the most superficial seeming marks of class difference are much more clearly evident than they are in the other countries of Western Europe. When we visited him in Sheffield earlier, he took us to his local pubs (the *Bunch of Grapes*, the *Dog and Partridge*) and there there was no mistaking the accents, the caps and scarves, or the attitudes of the local factory workers (not that any of the managers would have been seen dead in that particular pub, anyway). If this is so, of course, it is not because the clothes and voices of the upper classes are all that hard to copy. Enough working-class boys have made it into Oxbridge Fellowships, from the late 1940s on, for that to become quite clear. If these class differentiae persist as they do, it is because they are cherished as much from below as they are from above: it requires no sumptuary laws to maintain them. Few of those on the underside, in fact, have the slightest interest in being mistaken for anything but what they are. When he was a post-graduate student at Oxford in the early 1950s, an Australian friend of mine with estimable social-democratic principles deeply embarrassed the "cleaning lady" at his rented North Oxford house by insisting that she address him by his first name. I doubt whether another 25 years have made much difference to those kinds of feelings.

Seated over our drinks at Vico, I take up again with M the continuing exchange we have had (by transatlantic mail, and in person) and remind him of the questions I had raised earlier, when he was working as a semi-skilled labourer in a Sheffield steelworks. I had asked him what his mates thought about the *Mitbestimmung* idea, and he answered that they did not think about it at all. It was not that they wanted a share in management and resented being excluded. On the contrary, far from having any aspirations to move up into the managerial levels of their firms, most of them would feel very uncomfortable about getting involved in managerial affairs, even if they had the chance.

"Why?" I asked.

The real reasons, he replied, are rarely articulated. His colleagues on the shop floor seem simply to assume, as an axiom, that management itself is a "ramp": a disreputable and unnecessary activity, serving no recognisable function beyond the enrichment of the managers personally. (True: trade unions do, of course, need to be "run" decently, but that is quite another matter—that is *our own* people.) For most factory workers in large-scale British industry today (or so his impression was) collaborating wholeheartedly with management would be incompatible with self-respect. It would be—well, you know—*collaborating*.

"You make it sound as though the managers were an Occupying Army!" was my reaction. "Attitudes of that kind are understandable enough among the French workers under Nazi occupation —in *The Sorrow and the Pity*, for instance—or among the Greeks towards their Ottoman conquerors. But are they not rather extreme, and rather destructive, as between two sections of a single nation?"

Stratford upon Avon

YET HOW FAR are the English, even now, a single nation? How far have they ever been? The seeds of that earlier exchange have been in my mind for a while now, and I have begun to accustom myself to the thought that, perhaps, the Norman Conquest has never been finally successful. Isn't it still going on, and aren't the Saxons still resisting? This thought comes vividly back to mind as we watch an excellent performance of *Henry VI* (*Part II*) at the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre, and it sensitises me particularly to the rhetoric when, halfway through the play, we are shown Jack Cade's Rebellion. For the harangues by which Cade whips up the feelings of his rabble army, and drives them on to brutal, vengeful and murderous assaults on anyone of social standing—

> *Now show yourselves men; 'tis for liberty.*
> *We will not leave one lord, one gentleman:*
> *Spare none but such as go in clouted shoon;*
> *For they are thrifty honest men, and such*
> *As would, but that they dare not, take our parts—*

or of education ("*Away with him, away with him! he speaks Latin*") or even of simple literacy—

> *Away with him, I say! hang him with his pen and inkhorn about his neck—*

display an extreme of violence and alienation that rings bells in me. This is not just "class" rhetoric. Isn't it the anti-élitist radical rhetoric of the late 1960s? By contrast, the attitudes among the Kent peasantry from which Cade gets a response are those of M's steel-worker colleagues. And, when the King finally offers them a free pardon in

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return for abandoning Cade's cause, they are ready enough to turn away from his theoretical communism and egalitarianism, and go back to their earlier loyalties in sheepish confusion. They have been accustomed for too long to inequality. They cannot, at a stroke, develop any real feeling for the classless society of Cade's dreams. Even Cade himself is able to get a temporary hold over their loyalties only by presenting himself to them as the unacknowledged son of Edmund Mortimer, Earl of March, and so as rightful heir to the Plantagenet throne and England's "legitimate" monarch.

I have long felt that "economic" factors alone are not enough to make properly intelligible the existence of such deeply antagonistic "social classes" as exist in England. As my Texan colleague puts it, quantitative differences in fortune and income may account for envy between social classes, but not for outright class enmity—to say nothing of "class warfare." So perhaps it has been a mistake to look for the origins of English class structure merely in recent economic history, even in the history of the entire last two centuries of Industrialisation and Urbanisation. It seems rather, that the industrial roles we know as "Labour" and "Management" are being played out in England by the contemporary representatives of *pre-existing social classes*—that is, by social classes *pre-adapted* over long centuries to the roles of "Exploiter" and "Exploited."

These classes are, apparently, the same self-defined classes that have persisted in uneasy equilibrium, and more rarely clashed bloodily—under Jack Cade and, before him, under Wat Tyler—ever since the Norman-French horsemen under Duke William crossed the Channel, slew good King Harold while routing his Anglo-Saxon infantry on that unforgotten field at Battle in Sussex, and established the tradition of landed, horse-riding gentry (sc. *gentilhommerie*) that has shown such extraordinary powers of survival in all subsequent English life.

CERTAINLY, THE NORMAN ESTABLISHMENT began by keeping themselves strictly apart from the Saxon peasantry, by their language, by marrying within their own class, and by their general mode of life. The two peoples were slow to come to terms with one another, and the resulting social differences cut deep. This was especially so, because the Norman élite was so successful in developing a "feudal" society within which social and economic relations perpetuated and reinforced the original ethnic and linguistic differences. In this way social status quickly and permanently came to involve both ethnic and functional considerations ("Gentlemen don't engage in trade", etc.). From the very beginnings of English social history, the deepest social cleavage, accordingly, ran not just along economic lines, i.e. in terms of possessions and functions,—but also along ethnic lines, in terms of communal self-image and identification.

Coming as I do myself from much more recent (17th or 18th century) immigrant stock—Huguenot and Socinian—I do not find it natural to identify wholly with either side in this historical standoff. Still, it is not hard to see how things looked from the Saxon point of view. From the start, the division between the two communities involved language and possessions, status and mode of life alike. Why, even the very animals that "we" (the Saxons) raised and tended under orders from "them" (the Normans) always had different names from the meats which their flesh provided for "our lords and masters" to eat. No other European language shares the distinction we have in English, between the Saxon-derived "animal" words, *cattle/sheep/swine*, and the Norman-derived "meat" words, *beef/mutton/pork*. And "they" have even had the impertinence to dismiss all "our" British and Anglo-Saxon forbears as prehistoric, and to define "English history" as beginning with their own arrival in the year 1066! . . .

DOESN'T THIS THOUGHT appear fanciful today? It is not, after all, wholly original. As early as 1820, Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe* successfully exploited familiar pre-industrial stereotypes of four-square and virtuous (if slightly stupid) Saxons fighting to hold their own against crafty and cultured (but fundamentally cowardly) Normans. Twenty-five years later, Benjamin Disraeli was giving his novel, *Sybil*, the subtitle "*The Two Nations.*" As a rank outsider breaking into the gentlemanly society of the Conservative Party, Disraeli had no doubts about the long-standing historical roots of the industrial confrontation which he saw being played out in his own generation under the banner of Chartism. So, between them, *Sybil* and *Ivanhoe* certainly placed the origins of English class divisions far back before the Industrial Revolution, even before the rise of modern capitalism. Only, of course, Scott and Disraeli were in the same unfavourable position as that other outsider, George Bernard Shaw, seventy years later. It might be necessary to tolerate a Scots novelist, an Irish wag, or a foreign wit, as writers and politicians. But one was not obliged to take them seriously as theorists and critics.

Vermont

THIS TALE IS TELLING ITSELF backwards. Just a few days before leaving for Britain, we met for the first time our neighbours in the house

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just across the way on Maple Hill Road. Jerry works for a multinational computer firm. After ten years based in London, he and his family are just about to move to Paris: their holiday in Vermont is repeatedly interrupted by calls from Head Office with plans for him to go off to Saudi Arabia and other exotic places.

Over cocktails in their house, I chat with Jerry about his impressions of Britain after ten years. Inevitably, the problem of labour-management relations comes up, and I try out my own tentative historical reconstruction. Like the successful manager he is, he begins by being sceptical. But, after a little, he warms to the topic and begins to embroider further details on to it himself.

"Well, that does at least explain one thing", he says. "The British are the only managers I know who make a habit of boasting to you about how *little* work they do. Germans, French, Japanese, Americans, whoever . . . they will all complain to you about their seventy- or eighty-hour week. But you can see how proud it really makes them! Lots of British managers just want to get back to their place in the Cotswolds, to their daughters with their pony clubs, and all the rest. They know how well they have got their firms organised, when they find they can stay away from Friday midday till Monday lunch, and spend the week-end hunting. . . ."

A nice twist. What evidently corrupts the morale of British industrial managers is the dream of joining the Gentry; and this demoralisation quickly communicates itself to the Lower Orders, who see themselves cast in the role of Peasants. So, the duties and privileges of knighthood and landed gentrydom remain the dominant ideal of all those who either are or wish to become by adoption the occupying Normans of contemporary Britain. If the only horseborne persons left in their families today are their daughters jumping (rather than jousting) at their village gymkhanas, so be it. A Jaguar XJ-S will make do *faute de mieux*, in place of an Arab thoroughbred.

Are the attitudes of English management really so distinctive? If so, then the stereotypic roles of *Norman/Saxon* confrontation are deeply embedded in the tastes and work habits of the managerial class in Britain—and of their families, remembering all those disparaging generalisations about "Labour" and "the workers" that I have heard over the years from the mouths of Tory ladies—quite as much as they evidently are in those shop-floor workers who reject "management" itself as a symbol of overlordship. A number of recent items (in the *Economist*, *Der Spiegel* and elsewhere) come back to my mind: reports about British factories set up, or taken over, by firms from other countries, in which Worker-Management relations are said to be excellent. Again and again, the managers are reported as saying, "British workers are just fine." But then, as you read on, it becomes clear that the chief factor in transforming the situation has been the conduct of the managers themselves. They have come to work as early as anyone else. They have taken their coats off and rolled up their sleeves. They have had no special executive dining-rooms or *W.C.s*. They have mucked in with everyone else. In a word, they have *not* acted like the "Normans" they were naturally expected to be, and the work-force has responded accordingly. Will the whole of British industry have to be taken over and managed by Europeans, Americans and Japanese before the long-standing cycle of stalemate and hostility between labour and management can be broken?

Hamburg

"BUT if that is anything like the right story", I say to my Texan friend, "think what an ironical light it throws on recent political thought! What Friedrich Engels studied as a background to the Marxian analysis of class warfare was the condition of the working class in Manchester, not the condition of the working class in Naples, or Lyons, or this self-styled *Freie Hansestadt Hamburg*. So, of course, he formed an impression that the antagonism between Capitalists and Workers—Manchester entrepreneurs and the Manchester operatives—was a kind of *war*! And that is just what it was!—a continuation of the uncompleted conquest of the Anglo-Saxons by the Normans. . . ."

Without the concepts of *economic class* and *class war*, what would Marxism as a political movement have become? Like the length of Cleopatra's nose, the *belief in* economic classes and class warfare has itself played such a determinative part in recent social history that one finds it hard to see how differently things might have appeared without it. Yet, shouldn't we be facing just that question? It is one of the recurrent problems in the history of Marxist political movements that economic differences have so rarely served to define self-conscious, self-sustaining "classes" of political agents, except where those differences were reinforced by other, naturally more powerful class divisions. Still less have they, by themselves, provided the conditions for "class warfare." People do not readily cut each others' throats over wage differentials and factory organisation alone. Historically speaking, self-defining social classes have typically divided along economic lines in situations where those economic differences have, for local reasons, coincided with other differences: religious, ethnic,

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linguistic, or all three. As every political activist knows, it is a hundred times easier to create the appearance of "proletarian self-awareness" if you can first play on the workers' consciousness of being (say) Catholics, or Black, or Flemish, in opposition to the Orangemen, or Whitey, or the Walloons. So it becomes a matter of great complexity to disentangle the economic factors at work in (say) Ulster or Québec, Palestine or Belgium, England or Burundi, from the shadows cast by Cromwell and Montcalm, Outremer, Brabant and the rest—that is, from those other social and communal differences around which traditional loyalties and interests have defined themselves for so long.

"Gad, Sir!", as Low's Colonel Blimp might have said, "Dizzy was right!" The "Two Nations" of Disraeli's *Sybil* are with us today as much as ever. It was a curious historical accident that, on its first appearance, the Industrial Revolution found English society already divided into "labourers" and "gentlefolk", along lines whose origins and significance antedated the rise of modern industry, and had nothing to do with its economics. And, though factory workers and their families in England may still take pride in being "workers" rather than "gents", and may deride the *la-di-da* accents and manners of their "betters", the self-image of those workers even now has more to do with *Ivanhoe* than it does with the Marxist conception of industrial proletarians ground down under the heel of monopoly-capitalists. Indeed, once you have seen how possible it is—how likely, even—that Engels himself was misled by the complex factors at work on the mid-19th-century Manchester scene, you have to be a very dogmatic kind of Marxist to continue insisting on the essential primacy of economic class differentia over all others.

Not that this view makes England's present task—in overcoming the legacy of its history and learning to live, in the way Disraeli hoped it could, as *One Nation*—appear any the easier. It is bad enough that the Orangemen and the Catholics in Northern Ireland are continuing to fight the Battle of the Boyne 300 years later.

But what are we to do with an industrial system that still organises itself, today, along battle lines drawn up originally for a War that was—in theory, at least—lost or won in 1066, i.e. more than 900 years ago?

The Battle of Sleep

A hand upon your throat; doesn't it hurt
Under that grip, when all it holds is sleep?
But soon it lets you go, to where dreams keep
Loosening only, and you walk alert

With every change adapted to your pace,
But not the principle that leads you here.
That arms itself alone, to disappear
From any hero staring in its face.

Some braveries are not as you supposed.
And if you wander back with empty hands,
Invulnerable to the undisclosed,

It's as the ghost of steps you could not take.
Then there is pain, which stands and shows its wounds
Transparent in the sunlight when you wake.

Michael Vince

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LETTERS

Margaret Cole & the Webb Legend

IN HER COMMENTS (ENCOUNTER, "Letters", July 1978) on my essay on "The Webbs as Pilgrims" (March), Dame Margaret Cole concedes a good deal, more perhaps than intended. She admits the Webbs' racialism, in apparent contradiction of her view in an earlier exchange. She concurs that they were imperialists and élitists (though misses the point that their élitism was positivistic, rather than that of "responsible empire-administrators of the ruling class"). She accepts that they were poor judges of "political personalities." She agrees that they were generally uncritical admirers of Stalinist Russia.

All this accords with my own account. But the intrepid Mrs Cole none the less proposes to deal with "some inaccuracies" in my article. The only ones I can detect are of her own commission. An examination of these will be instructive to students of the ideological mode of argument.

In one sense, the question of Mrs Cole's ignorance of the *Our Pilgrimage* scheme is irrelevant: the fact is, as I have shown, that Beatrice *did* have such a project well under way in her later years. But since Dame Margaret has drawn attention to her editorial role, readers should know that this is not her sole lacuna. It is well known, for example, that she resisted very strong evidence that Beatrice's romantic involvement with Joseph Chamberlain was deeply (indeed, permanently) scarring, and thus of considerable importance in the formation of Beatrice's mature emotional and intellectual character. Mrs Cole's 1956 defence of her version of the love affair (in an "Appendix" to her edition of *Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 1924–32*), while purportedly based on a close review of all the relevant diaries and correspondence, is, to say the least, seriously lacking—as a number of writers, including Shirley Letwin, Ruth Adam and Kitty Muggeridge, and latterly the MacKenzies, have demonstrated. Mrs Cole's writings on the Webbs are informed by her personal friendship and identity with Beatrice, and by the fact that, with her late husband, she was herself a principal player in a sort of second generation Webbian partnership on the political left. The point is quaintly illustrated in her 1945 biography of Beatrice, where she describes the failure of her heroine's romance with Chamberlain as something for which "the Socialist and social student cannot but be profoundly grateful." It was against this background that it seemed fitting to describe Mrs Cole's apparent lack of knowledge of the *Pilgrimage* project as "rather puzzling."

Mrs Cole's claim that the editors of the Australian and American diaries, as well as unnamed "others", share her view that the travel diaries are lacking in value is not substantiated by the facts. The editor of the American diary says specifically in his Introduction that one value of the work is that it provides "further clues to the diarist's character and social thought . . . reveals much about its author." In similar vein, the Australian editor says: " . . . a fascinating record of the impression Australia made on two highly intelligent and highly idiosyncratic visitors. It is also, I believe, an important document about the Webbs." Mrs Cole has committed an error common in ideological thinking: namely, that to criticise the Webbs' accounts of their foreign tours (and these editors, certainly and rightly, do so) is to deny absolutely their value. There remains, in any event, the overriding consideration that Beatrice herself thought the travel diaries valuable, and intended to publish them.

On Russia, Mrs Cole illustrates another logical confusion of the ideological style: the wish to have one's argumentative cake and eat it too. Thus, while the Webbs' views of America and Australia were "superficial" and their admiration of Japan "altogether excessive", she tells us their "anxious[ness] to believe" in Russian Communism was very valuable! Besides, Mrs Cole explains, lamely, they had done "a good deal of study of the USSR before they visited it." Indeed they had: and in May of 1932, shortly *before* leaving England on their three week "tour" of Russia, Beatrice noted in her diary that she had Sidney help her draft "our hypothetical conclusion", adding that even poor Sidney had warned her about "becom[ing] a monomaniac about Russia."

THAT "A GOOD many radicals" were anxious to believe in Russian Communism is beside the point. They, like the Webbs, were wrong. In retrospect, those who were never drawn in by Soviet claims showed the best judgment; those who were, but later changed their minds, a respectable second-best. But what is striking in Mrs Cole's remarks is her naïvety regarding the supposed "convictions of the leading Russian Communists", and her reluctance, even now in 1978, to say anything more critical in tone of the monstrous excesses of the Russian régime in the 1930s than that many were willing to believe in Soviet Communism "even if they made serious mistakes on the way." On the way to where, one might well ask? As for her attempt to correct my Samurai reference, Mrs Cole should consult the Webbs' *Soviet Communism* (1935), Part II, Epilogue, p. 1131, where the following passage occurs: "It is interesting to recall [write the Webbs] that essentially such a Vocation of Leadership, termed the Order of the Samurai, was suggested by Mr H. G. Wells in 1905 in his book entitled *A Modern Utopia.*"

Mrs Cole "protests" against my quotation from Harold Laski. She seems not to have noticed that I have, in fact, described his remarks as "malevolent." But a word of contextual explanation is in order. This "private letter" (it has been cited previously in print, in Ross Terrill's recent biography of R. H. Tawney) occurs in a file in the Tawney Papers at the London School of Economics. It concerns the circumstances surrounding Tawney's resignation in the late 1940s of a commission from the Passfield Trustees to prepare an authorised biography of Sidney Webb. Tawney, very annoyed, felt that Mrs Cole, herself a trustee, and thus party to the agreement, was undercutting his work through her own Webb publication schemes. Laski's letter is in apparent commiseration—his real point being not the money Mrs Cole stood to make out of the Webbs, but the looming prospect of an intellectual monopoly exercised by her over the Webb legacy. Readers can

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judge for themselves whether or not, in this instance, Laski was telling a tall tale, from a brief review of the history of Webb publications in the years surrounding this private controversy. In 1945, Mrs Cole's biography of Beatrice was published, and in 1948, her edition of *Our Partnership;* in 1949 appeared her edited collection of essays (the immediate cause of her dispute with Tawney) *The Webbs and Their Work.* In 1952 she brought out her edition of selections from Beatrice's diaries for 1912–23; and in 1956, a further volume of diary selections for the period 1924–32. Not for several years after that did works on the Webbs by others begin to appear.

New perspectives on the Webbs have broadened and deepened our appreciation of their significance, as much by pointing out their shortcomings as by myth-making about their achievements. Judging by early press reception of the Webb correspondence (and a microfiche of the complete diary of Beatrice Webb) recently issued, the job of scholarly revision is still under way. As for "The Webbs as Pilgrims", it is apposite to note in closing that Professor Norman MacKenzie, editor of the Webb correspondence, has seen fit to title the individual volumes comprising the complete work thusly: 1. *Apprenticeships, 1873–92*; 2. *Partnership, 1892–1912*; and 3. *Pilgrimage, 1912–47.* That is what my article was all about.

GEORGE FEAVER

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Hitler's Iron Cross

IN THE MAY ISSUE of ENCOUNTER (on p. 81) you have again printed a vignette showing Adolf Hitler wearing the Iron Cross in a ribbon round his neck. Only the *Ritterkreuz* of the Iron Cross was worn in this fashion, and this—the highest—class of the Iron Cross was created by Hitler when he resurrected the Iron Cross in 1939. As far as I know, he never conferred the *Ritterkreuz* on himself, but remained content with the Prussian Iron Cross which he got in World War I, and which he wore on the left side of his tunic. Therefore I suggest that you delete the *Ritterkreuz* from the block before you publish the vignette next time.

KNUT PIPPING

Fägränd
Finland

Race or Nation?

IN HIS ARTICLE about the Spanish historian Americo Castro in your November issue, Raymond Carr writes of the Jews of medieval Spain that they "set such great store by racial purity, by untainted descent." If this was so they were not good Jews and were apparently ignorant of Jewish Law.

This point is not only of historical interest but has an important present day significance. The Jews are a nation, not a race. One can belong to the Jewish nation, i.e. be a Jew, either by being born of a Jewish woman or by conversion. Please note that in the former case the father need not be a Jew for the child to be one. This is the rule according to *Halakha*, the Jewish Law. Concerning conversion, the story of Ruth in the Bible is a famous example in Jewish tradition of someone not born into the House of Israel who became a Jew. Countless hundreds of thousands of others who were not Jews at birth have joined the Jewish nation, and in so doing have acquired the burdens and rights of being a Jew including, of course, the obligation and the right to live in the Land of Israel. (This is what makes Arthur Koestler's book

The Old Ordure Changeth . . .

MANURE *was propelled in the direction of MPs yesterday* [*Frank Johnson reports*]. *Your correspondent was in the Press Gallery bar at the time, engaged upon in-depth research. He therefore cannot, for once, be held responsible.*

By the time he arrived in the Chamber, MPs were filing out with impressive calm—women and children first. Various attendants were busy with brushes and brooms.

Relatively few MPs or journalists were present for the incident. This was because the House was debating the Scottish Devolution Bill.

It seems that a man and a woman in the public gallery yielded to a temptation which a lot of people must feel from time to time, and launched the rude substance, in what appeared to be several half-open plastic bags.

Mr Tam Dalyell (Lab., West Lothian) was in mid-point of order. This of course rapidly became a point of odour.

The Speaker shouted "order!" but, according to some reports, it might have been "ordure!"

(The reader will be burdened with no further puns.)

The fall-out covered a wide area and was non-ideological in its choice of victims—it, ranged from the Tribune benches to the Right-wings.

And the worst affected MP in this worst affected area was Mr Dennis Skinner (Lab., Bolsover), but he has always claimed that politics under capitalism were a dirty business.

Visitors in the public gallery gazed down impassively—the Americans, Japanese and Arabs among them being presumably under the impression that it was all a regular part of the unchanging ritual of the oldest Parliament.

Mr Dalyell, a remorseless critic of Scottish devolution, was forced to stop speaking—something which only dung from heaven could have achieved.

The first instinct of the Speaker, Mr George Thomas, must have been to consult Erskine May, the Parliamentary rulebook, to discover the precedents. But under what heading to look? Pollution? Agriculture?

DAILY TELEGRAPH

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about the Khazars utter nonsense, whatever its historical validity.)

I know one such convert here in Jerusalem who, in fact, is a rabbi. He was born in America and is a black man of largely West African descent. He is married to a woman who is white. But regardless of skin colour or other aspects of race, they are both Jews.

SAMUEL WOLF

Jerusalem

World War I (& II)

CORRELLI BARNETT is concerned to have us stop thinking about the Great War in terms of clichés ("Of Horrors & Scapegoats", May). I share that concern. But then why does Mr Barnett refuse to rethink the cliché of what a German victory would have meant in the early stages of that war.

> "... the absence of the British Expeditionary Force" he writes, "would almost certainly have resulted in a German triumph, with all that would have implied for the history of Europe and the world."

Well, in 1870 there was a German triumph and we know what it meant: over 40 years of peace and uninterrupted and fairly enlightened social progress. In contrast, what did the Allied victory imply for the history of Europe and the world? That we know too: Stalin, Hitler, another "great" war and half of Europe under the domination of the Soviet Union.

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Minneapolis, Minn.

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Renzo Rosso was born in Trieste in 1926; he now lives in Rome. His work includes a volume of short stories, *Gli Uomini Chiari*, and a novel, published in England as *The Hard Thorn* (Alan Ross, 1966). His stories in earlier issues of ENCOUNTER—"The Fair Ones" (July 1973), "The Rats" (June 1974)—were, like "The Gallows", translated by Gavin Ewart, whose most recent book of poems is *Or Where A Young Penguin Lies Screaming* (Gollancz).

Leopold Labedz is the editor of *Survey* (a London quarterly). He edited the standard volume on *Revisionism* (1963) and *Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record* (Penguin, 1972).

Richard Pipes is Professor of History at Harvard University and was Director of its Russian Research Center. Among his books are *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (rev. ed. Harvard University Press, 1965), *Russia Under the Old Régime* (Weidenfeld, 1974) and *Soviet Strategy in Europe* (Macdonald, 1976).

Philip Stratford is Professor of English Literature at the University of Montreal. His writings include *Faith and Fiction: Creative Process in Greene and Mauriac* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1968) and many articles and translations. He is the editor of *The Portable Graham Greene* (Viking Press, 1973), and co-author of "Looking for the Third Man" (ENCOUNTER, June).

John Bossy is Reader in Modern History at the Queen's University of Belfast, and editor of Outram Evennett's posthumous *The Spirit of the Counter-Reformation* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1970). His latest book, *The English Catholic Community, 1570–1850*, was published in 1976 by Darton, Longman & Todd.

Tom Paulin is Lecturer in English at the University of Nottingham, and the author of *Thomas Hardy: The Poetry of Perception* (Macmillan, 1976). His volume of poems, *A State of Justice* (Faber) was the Spring 1977 Choice of the Poetry Book Society.

Stephen Toulmin is Professor in the Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago. He has held Chairs in Philosophy at Michigan State University and at Brandeis, and was from 1960–64 Director of the Nuffield Foundation Unit for History of Ideas. Among his most recent books are *Human Understanding* (Princeton University Press, Cambridge University Press, Vol. I, 1972) and *Knowing and Acting* (Collier Macmillan, 1976). His articles in ENCOUNTER include "Rediscovering History" (January 1971) and "Ludwig Wittgenstein" (January 1969).

Dissident News: Alexander Zinoviev (see the account of his work by Helen von Ssachno in the May 1977 ENCOUNTER) has been unexpectedly given permission by the Soviet authorities to leave. Zinoviev was a professor of philosophy and logic until he lost his Moscow post for having published his *samizdat* novel in Switzerland. As an unemployed (and "unemployable") person he was to be charged with "parasitism", but the passport authorities in mid-July suddenly informed him that he would be given (for himself and family) a visa to emigrate. His novel, *Yawning Heights*, was a satire on the irrationalities of Soviet life.

Nico Huebner, whose article "A Young Man in Opposition" we published in the July ENCOUNTER, has now been sentenced by an East Berlin Communist court to a 5-year prison term. The 22-year-old East German had refused to be drafted, on ground of conscientious objection, into the East German Army.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY WATMOUGHS LIMITED, IDLE, BRADFORD; AND LONDON

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Life and Letters Today

London

ELIZA DOOLITTLE (thou shoulds't be living at this hour!):

Lord Drogheda is chairman of Covent Garden and the Financial Times.

His book of memoirs is called "Double Harness" ("to suggest being yoked to two organisations which dominated my life"). The Jubilee celebrations, for which Lord Drogheda was primarily responsible as chairman of the organising committee, will also put in a brief appearance.

"There's nothing much to say about them," he said. "Except that we have a bloody good Queen and we did our best to put on a jolly good show."

EVENING STANDARD

New York

DOMESTICATION: *Noah Webster spent a lifetime (1758-1843) taming disorders of vocabulary and anarchies of usage, and when his "American Dictionary of the English Language" came out just 150 years ago, he considered his struggle victorious—he had domesticated English.*

In this anniversary year, with his dictionary long since absorbed into larger and even greater works, he is remembered as the father of American lexicography, his very name synonymous with "dictionary." Long before America gained its cultural independence, he fought to free the nation from what he termed blind and servile veneration of European authorities.

Until Webster's assault, the great lexical authority was Samuel Johnson's 1755 dictionary, a work Webster condemned because:

Many of its words were not English—such as, adversable, advesperate, adjugate, agriculation, abstrude, injudicable, spicosity, crapulence, morigerous, tenebrosity, balbucinate, illachrymable.

The likes of Shakespeare used them and vulgarities abounded—fishify, jackalent, parmacity, jeggumbob, conjabble.

Definitions showed "want of discrimination." Fraud, for example, was defined as deceit, cheat, trick, artifice, subtilty and stratagem, though one could use tricks, artifice, subtilty and stratagems without fraud and could be deceived without being defrauded.

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE

London

LITERARY NEEDS: When I sent Laurence Olivier [Christopher Fry writes] the first draft of *Venus Observed* I think he must have found it hard to read: in the post by return came a parcel from him containing some fresh carbon paper, a clean typewriter rubber, a new ribbon and a note reading "If there's anything else you need, just let me know."

THE TIMES

Sydney

EWE & NON-EWE: *The black sheep of Victoria are turning white from sunburn, and it is not only the sheep that are suffering.*

The problem is that the black coloring of the fleece absorbs ultraviolet light, and sunlight is actually bleaching the fleece of the sheep, reducing their value, the newspaper "Australian" reported yesterday. As a result, farmers are now "dressing" the valuable black sheep in light plastic cloaks to screen out ultraviolet light.

"We have heard about wolves in sheep's clothing," the newspaper said in an editorial. "But sheep in plastic raincoats? It may not be woolly thinking . . . but it's a yarn that rams home a lesson to us all."

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE

Vienna

PROGRESS: Albania is to become a "Socialist People's Republic" instead of a "People's Republic", according to the draft of a new constitution which replaces the Soviet-style constitution dating from 1946.

THE TIMES

Berlin

UNSER WILLY: *According to the German official handbook of all performances on Germany's stages, it appears that William Shakespeare led all the rest with some 37,000 performances. In second place was Friedrich Schiller who was performed over the same period—the last 30 years in the Bundesrepublik—25,000 times. Top place for an individual work was Lessing's "Minna von Barnhelm" (6,000). The most played composer in German opera houses was Verdi (30,000), with Mozart in second place (24,000), and Mozart's "Magic Flute" (8,400) leading as an individual work.*

DIE WELT

Cambridge

RESEARCH: Two Israeli professors have arrived in Cambridge to piece together fragments of ancient parchment which they believe to be a long-lost Hebrew version of the apocryphal book of Ben Sira. More than 6,000 pieces have been found and the Universities in Cambridge and Jerusalem are carrying out a joint programme to repair the document.

A research unit has been set up and its director said: "Studies of this unique treasure could well go on for more than a century."

DAILY TELEGRAPH

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1478
1978 **Oxford University Press**

The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917

Edited by Lionel Kochan

'An indispensable handbook for those who need to penetrate the official smokescreen and arm themselves with the relevant facts and figures of a continuing national disgrace.' *The Observer*. This third edition, the first in paperback, takes account of recent events affecting Soviet Jews. £2.95 *Oxford Paperbacks*

Freud, Jews, and other Germans

Masters and Victims in Modernist Culture

Peter Gay

'Peter Gay is himself a distinguished historian, and this book suggests that his high reputation has been won by a stern refusal to accept even the most widely held of general historical ideas without carrying out a detailed scrutiny of the evidence.' Philip Toynbee in *The Observer*. £5.50

Austro-Marxism

Texts translated and edited by Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode, with an introduction by Tom Bottomore

The texts translated in this volume provide an introduction to the work of this important and influential school of Marxist thinkers, among them Max Adler, Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding, and Karl Renner. Through their writings and activities they had considerable influence upon European socialism in the first two decades of this century, as critics of 'revisionism' in German Social Democracy, and exponents of a form of Marxism which would claim to be a rigorous and undogmatic science of society while still retaining its revolutionary character. £7.95 paper covers £3.95

The Onion, Memory

Craig Raine

The poems in Craig Raine's first collection display all the sharp detail one associates with early pre-Raphaelite painting. The book makes a startling debut for him – tender, witty, dense with unforgettable images. 'His sharp, novel, at times even mixed metaphors have made him one of the most distinctive new voices to have emerged in the past few years.' *The T.L.S.* Paper covers £2.25

Pierre Louÿs 1870-1925

A Biography

H. P. Clive

'Dix ans, puis le silence pendant vingt ans, puis la mort' – thus was described the literary career of Pierre Louÿs by the critic Fernand Gregh. This book is accordingly devoted mainly to Louÿs' productive decade, from 1890 when he published his first poems, to 1901, when his novel *Les Aventures du roi Pausole* was issued. £10.50

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